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Abstract
This dissertation explores a critical question that arose naturally as a consequence
of the Great Recession: What is the appropriate role for and design of monetary
policy in financial economies? In addition to analyzing the unprecedented actions
taken by policy makers in the wake of the worst Financial Crisis since the Great
Depression, I also examine how conventional monetary policy instruments should
be designed and implemented in New-Keynesian economies - the workhorse model
of monetary policy for central banks.
Conventional Monetary Policy in Financial Economies
Unconventional monetary policy is designed as a response to financial crises.
However, in chapters 1, 2 and 3 I show that even conventional monetary pol-
icy must be adapted in financial economies. Specifically, I analyze the perfor-
mance of both Friedman ‘K-percent’ money growth rules and Taylor rules in
New-Keynesian models – the workhorse central bank model for monetary pol-
icy. However, unlike standard New-Keynesian models, I examine the theoretical
aspects of monetary policy in models with a meaningful financial sector. The
cumulative results of this section show the case against using monetary aggre-
gates by central bankers is significantly diminished once the financial sector is
included.
Chapter 1: Price vs. Financial Stability: A role for Money in Taylor
rules A consensus among central bankers, especially in the U.S., is that money
plays no meaningful role in the formation, nor execution of, monetary policy.
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This point is theoretically supported by New-Keynesian models in which optimal
policy can be described without any reference to money. However in Price vs.
Financial Stability: A role for Money in Taylor rules, my co-author and I turn
this logic on its head. By modeling a financial sector in an otherwise standard
New-Keynesian model, we show that augmenting a Taylor rule with a response
to the growth rate of money helps to offset the detrimental impacts of financial
sector disruptions.
Chapter 2: Determinacy and Indeterminacy in Monetary Policy Rules
with Money In Determinacy and Indeterminacy in Monetary Policy Rules with
Money, my co-author and I show the most basic of monetary policy rules, Milton
Friedman’s ‘k-percent’ rule fails to deliver a unique equilibrium, and therefore
creates economic instability. This result is in sharp contrast to the determinacy
properties of this rule in economies without a financial sector which feature no
bank produced assets. We then show the determinacy properties of this classic
monetary policy rule are restored when a Divisia monetary aggregate as formu-
lated by Barnett (1980) is used to measure the aggregate quantity of financial
and non-financial assets.
Chapter 3: A Working Solution to Working Capital Indeterminacy
Working capital refers to the financing firms’ require to fund inputs before they
receive payments for their output. When this channel is active, changes in inter-
est rates transmit through the usual demand/Euler channel and also a supply/-
marginal cost channel. The former dampens demand-pull inflation while the lat-
ter will exacerbate cost-push inflation. From a monetary policy standpoint, these
dual channels imply both a respective lower and an upper bound on the Monetary
Authority’s inflation response needed to guarantee the existence of a unique ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium (determinacy). In A Working Solution to Working
Capital Indeterminacy, I analytically show that Friedman’s ‘K-Percent’ rule is
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determinate in the presence of working capital channels. I additionally provide a
simple sufficient condition for the determinacy of interest rate rules reacting to
the nominal growth rate of the monetary aggregate: reacting greater than one
for one to changes in the growth rate of money guarantees determinacy. All of
these results are presented in the framework of a micro-founded New-Keynesian
model.
Unconventional Monetary Policy in Financial Economies
In chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, I turn the focus to unconventional mone-
tary policy. I use the term unconventional monetary policy to refer to the actions
taken by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve in the wake of the 2008 Fi-
nancial Crisis. In particular, the TARP legislation resulted in equity injections
into the largest U.S. commercial banks. Moreover, the Federal Reserve began
large scale asset purchases known as “Quantitative Easing” as a tool to improve
the functioning of credit markets. The Federal Reserve has especially focused on
purchasing Mortgage Backed Securities to: (i) improve the functioning of short-
term collateralized debt markets and (ii) increase home prices; with the goal that
both of these effects will improve the speed and strength of the recovery. The
results of this section provide insight into the transmission mechanism of these
policies and the role of housing, in both the recession and recovery.
Chapter 4: House Prices, Heterogeneous Banks and Unconventional
Monetary Policy Options In House Prices, Heterogeneous Banks and Un-
conventional Monetary Policy Options I answer salient questions in the wake of
the 2008 Financial Crisis. Why did a drop in home prices force big banks to
withdraw relatively more credit than smaller banks? What is the transmission
mechanism of equity injection into “Too Big to Fail” banks and “Quantitative
Easing” programs?
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To answer these questions I develop a general equilibrium model with fully inte-
grated housing and financial markets. In addition to introducing housing-secured
debt into the financial market, the financial sector features heterogeneous banks
whereby “Too Big to Fail” institutions emerge in equilibrium. Unlike other mod-
els which rely on“Financial Shocks” and quadratic investment adjustment costs
to simulate a crisis episode, I take the alternative viewpoint that housing, and
housing secured debt, played a critical role in initiating and propagating the
crisis. By eschewing these typical assumption, including that all banks are the
same, I am able to show how a drop in housing demand can set off a financial
fire-sale effect.
Quantitatively, the model matches empirical correlations that the traditional
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999) financial accelerator mechanism fails
to capture, including the correlation of finance premiums with home prices, in-
vestment and output. I then test the model’s qualitative predictions against an
estimated VAR. The results of these empirical comparisons support the model’s
financial structure. The model provides a framework to examine the ability of
QE policies and equity injections into big banks to mitigate a housing generated
recession. Although both are effective, the nuances of the policies are important.
A prolonged asset purchase program is preferable to a short-term equity injec-
tion; however, the model suggests the equity injections may have been necessary
to prevent an economic collapse at the acute stage of the 2008 Financial Crisis.
Chapter 5: The Foreclosure Accelerator versus the Financial Acceler-
ator: Housing and Borrower’s Net Worth The seminal work of Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) highlights how changes in the net worth of bor-
rowers can turn a typical downturn into deep protracted recession. However,
this celebrated financial accelerator model is silent with regards to the con-
nection between real-estate prices and borrower’s net worth. In this paper, I
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propose an alternative debt-contract in which agent’s net worth is largely in the
form of real-estate. This financial structure generates amplification and propaga-
tion of macroeconomic disturbances through a foreclosure channel as opposed to
investment-adjustment costs as in BGG. Contrary to the findings of Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno (2013), I estimate the equilibrium model using Bayesian
techniques and find that housing demand shocks, not risk shocks, drive finance
premiums. Finally, I answer some timely questions in the wake of the great reces-
sion including: Did the Federal Reserve’s low interest rate policy fuel the housing
bubble? How contractionary is the zero lower bound?
vii
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Chapter 1
Price versus Financial Stability: A
role for Money in Taylor rules1
1.1 Introduction
The New-Keynesian sticky-price (NKSP) framework has become the workhorse model for
monetary policy evaluation due to its ability to provide a relevant role for monetary policy
while avoiding the well known Lucas critique. The research on optimal monetary policy in
these models has reached a clear consensus on two fronts. First, price stability is a paramount
policy concern while output should only be stabilized at its flexible price level. Second,
money is an inferior policy instrument due to persistent money demand shocks and offers
no information regarding the natural rates of output or interest. These conclusions, which
are robust across many model specifications, have led both academics and policy markers
towards “cashless models” of the economy and the monetary transmission mechanism. The
result, which is emphasized in Woodford (2003), is that optimal policy can typically be
described by an interest rate rule which reacts to the natural rate of interest, inflation and
the deviation of output from its flexible price (or natural) level . Curdia & Woodford (2009)
1This chapter is coauthored with John W. Keating, Department of Economics, The University of Kansas,
Email: jkeating@ku.edu.
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show this description of optimal policy extends even to a NKSP model with a financial sector
for the appropriately defined natural rate of interest.
However, in practice, policy makers know very little about the natural rate of output and
interest in real time. This has led researchers to consider optimal simple policy rules which
central banks could actually adopt. A rule is considered simple (Gali, 2008) if:
1. It makes the policy instrument a function of only observable variables
2. It does not require knowledge of the correct model
3. It does not require knowledge of model specific parameters
The desire to develop simple rules has led researchers to examine interest rate rules which
react to inflation and output growth, variables which are readily available at quarterly fre-
quencies, though sometimes with error. The optimality of such simple rules, usually with
no output growth response, has been verified in NKSP models under a wide array of model
specifications. Simply put, an interest rate rule responding to inflation appears to be the
best available simple rule (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe, 2007).
Relatively less is known about optimal simple rules in models with financial sectors. To date
though, the literature on optimal simple rules in such models has often found no need to
deviate from inflation targeting interest rate rules. For example, in a model with financial
frictions, Faia & Monacelli (2007) find that responding to asset prices offers welfare gains
when the inflation coefficient is fixed at Taylor’s (1993) original values but these gains are
eliminated when the inflation coefficient is increased.2 Similarly, Dellas et al. (2010) find
that reacting to inflation of non-financial products offers the optimal simple rule in a setting
where banks are subject to supply shocks. However, none of these models which feature
financial sectors have examined the usefulness of monetary aggregates in simple rules.
2Curdia & Woodford (2010) provide similar evidence that such models may call for augmenting the
standard Taylor rule (with output and inflation coefficients fixed at Taylor’s (1993) original values) with a
reaction to the interest rate spread, although fully optimized simple rules are not analyzed.
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If money is to serve a useful role in such contexts it seems most likely to do so as an
informational variable regarding the natural rate of interest. The desire for “simple rules”
and the readily available data on monetary aggregates at high frequencies suggests that
this is a promising chance to expand the set of useful information to policy makers in real
time. However, under typical money demand specifications, money is determined by output,
inflation, a single interest rate and money demand shocks.
Two things are worth noting under such a specification. First, money provides no additional
information to policy makers regarding the natural rates of output and interest not already
contained in output, inflation and policy rate data. Second, such a specification is completely
at odds with reality for broader monetary aggregates - inside money - whose equilibrium is
determined by both money demand which depends on a vector of interest rate spreads
and money supply by financial institutions and the shocks which originate therein. Hence,
under more realistic descriptions, movements in broad monetary aggregates are driven by
movements in non-policy rates and financial firms ability and willingness to supply monetary
assets.
This point is apparent in the graph above which shows the growth rate of Divisia M4 along
with the Federal Funds (policy) rate and output growth during the recent financial crisis.
Typical money demand specifications described above would have a hard time explaining
why money growth slowed while the Fed was cutting interest rates. One possibility is that
weak output growth was suppressing the demand for money, however, this story falls apart
in in 2009 when output growth began rising but money growth weakened further. While
suggestive, this graph provides some intuition into the behavior of inside money when the
economy is subjected to financial market disturbances, thus motivating the question of what
(if any) information can policy makers glean from broad monetary aggregates? In particular
we ask, is there an exploitable relationship between broad money growth and non-observable
variables such as the natural rate of interest when the economy is subject to financial shocks?
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Figure 1.1: The shaded area marks the NBER recession dates. GDP and Divisia M4 growth
rates are quarterly percentages while the Fed Funds rate is in annualized percentage points.
1.1.1 Related Literature
We are not the first to explore the usefulness of money in Taylor rules. Berger & Weber
(2012) explore the relationship between a variable they define as the money gap (the dif-
ference between the equilibrium quantity of money and estimated money demand) and the
natural interest rate in a prototypical NKSP model. They find that with noisy output gap
information the optimal money gap response is positive. Our work differs from theirs in at
least three regards. First, we search for simple rules which as defined above avoid the need
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to use model specific variables nor estimate any model parameters. This point is especially
important since we explore the usefulness of monetary aggregates in Taylor rules for which we
employ the use of parameter- and estimation- free aggregation methods. Second, we examine
optimal monetary policy around a largely distorted steady state which requires a second order
accurate approximation to the model’s equilibrium condition as in Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe
(2004). Finally, we perform a complete analysis including numerically examining determi-
nacy regions for Taylor rules which react to Divisia monetary aggregate growth rates and
finding a robustly optimal policy rule under parametric uncertainty as in Giannoni (2002).
A second related paper is by Andres et al. (2009) who explore the empirical linkages between
dynamic money demand and the natural rate of interest. They find an empirical relation-
ship and suggest the possibility of exploiting this relationship in optimal monetary policy,
although they leave this for future work.
McCallum & Nelson (2011) also examine the link between monetary aggregates and the
natural rate of interest. They argue that the information in monetary aggregates could be
used to draw inference on the natural rate of interest provided the demand for the monetary
aggregate depends on a vector of interest rates. For example, assuming aggregate demand
depends on these real yields, then movements in these rates will affect the real policy rate
consistent with stable prices - the natural rate of interest. As they describe, movements in
these nominal yields will reflect movements in real yields aside from the policy rate causing
the quantity of money to co-move with the natural rate of interest. This is exactly the
path we pursue in this work. We spell out this relationship more carefully and provide an
implementable simple interest rate rule which could be put to use by central banks without
knowledge of model specific variables nor structural parameters.
1.1.2 Outline
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. Next, we present the New-Keynesian model
developed by Belongia & Ireland (2013) to include a role for monetary aggregates and finan-
cial firms. Then we define the natural rates of interest and output in the model and show
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that the financial market disturbances in the model decreases the natural rate of interest
which call for countercyclical monetary policy. We then examine the performance of opti-
mal “simple” interest rate rules using a micro-founded welfare metric and a second order
approximation to the model’s equilibrium conditions. With realistic assumptions regarding
the monetary authority’s information set we show that reacting to inflation alone, which is
typically optimal, fails to respond counter-cyclically to financial market disturbances leading
to poor welfare performance.
Instead optimal policy chooses to also react to the growth rate of Divisia monetary aggregates
which provide parameter- and estimation- free approximations to the true aggregate. We
show that policy rules with a positive Divisia growth response have well-behaved determinacy
properties satisfying a novel Taylor principle for monetary aggregates. Moreover, such rules
bring about a real policy rate which is highly correlated with the natural rate and maximizes
welfare. Interestingly, spread-adjusted Taylor rules are also highly correlated with the natural
rate but perform poorly from a welfare standpoint. We offer some insight into this counter-
intuitive result by showing that reacting to the interest rate spread fails to provide sufficient
liquidity following an adverse financial shock and ultimately induces unwanted volatility in
inflation . Finally, we end the paper with a robust policy prescription using a minimax
approach, as in Giannoni (2002), given the parameters driving financial and other stochastic
shocks remain uncertain.
1.2 Model
The model used in this analysis was developed by Belongia & Ireland (2013). It’s a stan-
dard sticky-price New-Keynesian model with the addition of a financial sector comprised of
perfectly competitive financial firms. The banks produce interest bearing deposits and loans
which requires a varying amount of real resources according to a stochastic process. As is
typical in these models, production of the final good requires inputs from intermediate goods
producers who have market power and hence can set their price given demand. The presence
6
of quadratic adjustment costs makes prices sticky which in turn makes monetary policy rel-
evant. Finally, the representative household works for, and holds stock in, the intermediate
goods firms. The household also demands loans and deposits from the financial firms which
depend on the vector of interest rates the household faces.
1.2.1 The Representative Household
The representative household enters any period t= 0,1,2, ... with a portfolio consisting of 3
assets. The household holds maturing bonds Bt−1, shares of monopolistically competitive
firm i ∈ [0,1] st−1(i), and currency totaling Mt−1. The timing of transactions requires the
household to carefully manage its portfolio of these assets. Central to this is the household’s
interaction with the representative bank with whom it makes deposits and takes loans.
The reason the household deposits and borrows money from the bank at the same time is
motivated in part by the description of the typical period t household budget constraints as
described by Belongia & Ireland (2013). This budgeting can be described by dividing period
t into 2 separate periods: first a securities trading session and then a transactions session.
1.2.1.1 Securities Trading Session
In the first part of period t the household purchases new securities which consists of bonds
Bt which pay one nominal unit of currency in period t for price 1/rt, where rt is the gross
nominal rate of interest, and shares of monopolistically competitive firm i, st(i) for a price
of Qt(i) per share. In this first portion of period t the household also acquires the liquidity
needed for the transactions period by securing loans from the representative bank totaling
Lt. The household ends this securities trading session by allocating its loans and the currency
remaining after trading securities between deposits and currency. Since deposits pay interest
they dominate currency in return, however the household will hold currency in equilibrium
due to the increased liquidity currency offers. The timing of these transactions is summarized
7
in the securities trading session budget constraint in (1) below.
Dt+Nt =Mt−1 +Bt−1 −
1
ˆ
0
Qt(i)(st(i)− st−1(i))di−Bt/rt+Lt (1.1)
1.2.1.2 Transactions Session
In the second portion of period t the household’s deposits mature yielding rDt Dt units of
currency which are then added to the currency the household set aside at the end of the
securities trading session - Nt. The household adds to this currency by supplying ht total
hours of labor to intermediate goods producing firm for a nominal wage rate PtWt. At the
same time each intermediate goods producing firm i ∈ [0,1] makes a dividend payment of
Ft(i) for each share owned by the household. The household must also pay back to the bank
all loans with interest totaling rLt Lt. The household then optimally allocates the remaining
currency between consumption goods PtCt and currency to be carried into next period Mt.
These activities are summarized in the transactions session budget constraint in (2) below.
Mt =Nt−PtCt+Wtht+
1
ˆ
0
Ft(i)st(i)di+ r
D
t Dt− rLt Lt. (1.2)
1.2.1.3 Household Preferences
The true monetary aggregate which enters the household’s reduced from utility function is
given by the CES aggregator
MAt =
[
ν
1
ω (Nt)
ω−1
ω +(1−ν) 1ω (Dt)
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
(1.3)
where ν calibrates the relative expenditure shares on currency and deposits and ω calibrates
the elasticity of substitution between the two monetary assets. In general, we need only
assume that the monetary aggregate is block-wise weakly separable within the household’s
utility function. The approach taken by Belongia & Ireland (2013) it to specify a shopping
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time friction of the form
hst =
1
χ
(
υtPtCt
MAt
)χ
(1.4)
where υt is a shock to the demand for monetary services following a first order autoregressive
process (in logs)
ln(υt) = (1−ρυ)ln(υ)+ρυln(υt−1)+ ευtwhere ευt ∼ i.i.d. (0,σ2υ). (1.5)
We take this as our baseline calibration however the non additive-separability of the mone-
tary aggregate implies a real balance affect which has been challenged empirically (See for
example Ireland (2004a)). To show that our results do not hinge on this feature of the
household’s preferences we also consider the possibility that the monetary aggregate enters
the household’s utility function in an additively-separable form so that the term
ηmυtln
(
MAt
Pt
)
is added to the household’s utility function over consumption and leisure. In either case we
can define the household’s preferences recursively by
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtat [ln(Ct)−η(ht+hst )]
or
U = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtat
[
ln(Ct)−ηht+ηmυtln
(
MAt
Pt
)]
where at is a preference shock which follows a first order auto-regressive process (in logs)
ln(at) = ρaln(at−1)+ ε
a
twhere ε
a
t ∼ i.i.d. (0,σ2a). (1.6)
The representative household faces the problem of maximizing its lifetime utility subject to
its budget constraints. The household’s optimization problem and the resulting first order
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necessary conditions are given in the appendix using Bellman’s equation.
1.2.2 The Representative Financial Firm
The representative bank creates demand deposits and originates loans for the representative
household in a purely competitive market. Specifically, in period t = 0,1,2, ... , the repre-
sentative bank creates interest bearing deposits in the amount Dt and originates loans in
the amount Lt. The pure-competition assumption implies the representative bank takes as
given the gross nominal interest rate it pays on deposits rDt and the gross nominal interest
rate it charges on loans rLt . The bank not only pays interest on deposits but also bears a
time-varying real cost ct(
Dt
Pt
) in order to create and service deposits defined by
ct(
Dt
Pt
) = xt
Dt
Pt
.
The xt term is what makes the cost of producing deposits time varying, and in this case
stochastic, as this deposit cost function evolves according to the first order auto-regressive
process (in logs)
ln(xt) = (1−ρx)ln(x)+ρxln(xt−1)+ εxtwhere εxt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2x). (1.7)
The representative bank is also subject to the balance sheet constraint defined by the identity,
Lt = (1− τt)Dt (1.8)
where τt represents reserves held by the bank. In this model, the banks demand for reserves
varies stochastically according the first order auto-regressive process (in logs)
ln(τt) = (1−ρτ )ln(τ)+ρτ ln(τt−1)+ ετtwhere ετt ∼ i.i.d. N(0,σ2τ ). (1.9)
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Taking xt and τt as given, the profit maximization problem facing the representative bank
is defined by
max
Dt,Lt
ΠBt = (r
L
t −1)Lt− (rDt −1)Dt−Ptxt
Dt
Pt
subjectto(1.8)
Substituting (1.8) into the objective function is a simple way to express the bank’s problem
and leads to the first order necessary condition for profit maximization
rDt = 1+(r
L
t −1)(1− τt)−xt. (1.10)
or
St = 1+(rLt − rDt ) = 1+ rLt (1− τt)+xt (1.11)
Equation (1.11) shows that the (gross) spread between deposits and loans varies endogenously
according to the market determined loan rate and varies exogenously according to the banks
demand for reserves and the marginal cost of producing deposits. The exogenous process for
reserves demand simulates times of financial distress when banks choose to decrease lending
activity and hoard deposits. The deposit cost shock acts to simulate negative banking
productivity shocks effectively raising the bank’s marginal cost of producing deposits. Just
as in Curdia & Woodford (2009), the existence of a time-varying loan-deposit spread has
implications for the natural rate of interest3 and ultimately optimal monetary policy.
1.2.3 The Representative Final Goods Producing Firm
The representative final goods producing firm maximizes period t profits for t = 0,1,2, ...
using a constant returns CES technology defined by
Yt =



1
ˆ
0
Yt(i)
θ−1
θ di



θ
θ−1
(1.12)
3See for example within their paper the natural rate of interest under financial frictions denoted rn,F Ft .
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where Yt(i) is an input from intermediate goods producing firm i
′s output. As is standard, we
assume the final goods market is purely competitive leaving the representative final goods
producing firm with no market power. Hence, behaving purely as a price taker in both
the output market Pt and the input markets Pt(i)∀ i ∈ [0,1] the representative final goods
producing firm solves
max
Yt,{Yt(i)}i∈[0,1]
ΠFt = PtYt−
1
ˆ
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di (1.13)
subject to (1.12). This constrained maximization problem can easily be transformed into an
unconstrained problem by substituting the constraint into the objective function to eliminate
the choice variable Yt. The resulting first order necessary condition defines the factor demand
for each input Yt(i) as
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
Yt (1.14)
∀ i ∈ [0,1].
1.2.4 The Representative Intermediate Goods Producing Firm
Unlike the final goods market the intermediate goods market is not purely competitive. In-
stead each intermediate goods producing firm i ∈ [0,1] produces a differentiated product
leading to some degree of market power. To permit aggregation and allow for the consid-
eration of a representative intermediate goods producing firm i, we assume all such firms
have the same constant returns to scale technology which implies linearity in the single input
labor ht(i),
Yt(i) = Ztht(i). (1.15)
In each period t= 0,1,2, ... the representative intermediate goods producing firm rents ht(i)
units of labor from the representative household for a nominal market determined wage rate,
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PtWt. The Zt term in (1.15) is an aggregate technology shock that follows a random walk
with drift (in logs)
ln(Zt) = ln(Z)+ ln(Zt−1)+ ε
z
twhere ε
z
t ∼ i.i.d. (0,σ2z). (1.16)
The market power of each intermediate goods producing firm i leads to the ability for each
firm to set the price Pt(i) of its output Yt(i) each period t. The price setting ability of
each firm is constrained in two ways. First, each intermediate goods producing firm faces a
demand for its product from the representative final goods producing firm defined in (1.14).
Second, each intermediate goods producing firm faces a convex cost of price adjustment
proportional one nominal unit of the final good defined by Rotemberg (1982) to take the
form
Φ(Pt(i),Pt−1(i),Pt,Yt) =
φ
2
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)π
−1
]2
YtPt. (1.17)
Every intermediate goods producing firm i ∈ [0,1] maximizes its period t real price per
share denoted by Qt(i)Pt . Though the firm maximizes period t share price, the costly price
adjustment constraint makes the intermediate goods producing firm’s problem dynamic (and
recursive) as shown in the appendix. Mathematically summarizing, each intermediate goods
producing firm solves to following dynamic problem,
max
{ht(i),Pt(i)}∞t=0
Qt(i)
Pt
subject to the constraints (1.14), (1.15) and (1.17). In a symmetric equilibrium the log-
linearized first order condition of the above problem takes the form of a New-Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) relating current inflation to the average real marginal cost and
expected future inflation. The resulting NKPC can be calibrated to match the NKPC
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derived from Calvo style price adjustment based on the frequency of price changes4.
1.2.5 The Central Bank
We close the model by specifying the general class of monetary policy rules we consider by
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φππ̃t+φy(Ỹt− Ỹt−1)+φmµ̃Divisiat −φsS̃t (1.18)
in log-deviations from steady state5 with ρr in [0,1] and φπ, φy, φm and φs in [0,∞) and
S = rLt − rDt . The policy rule is restricted to be both linear in logs and react only to
observable model non-specific variables. The second restriction is key for the policy rule
to be implementable as stressed in Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2007) and Faia & Monacelli
(2007). For this reason we include the growth rate of output instead of deviations of output
from its natural level.6 Orphanides (2003) stresses the latter is not available to policy
makers in real time without significant measurement error. For robustness, we also examine
the case when the efficient level of output is available to policy makers in real time (See
section 4.2.3). The implementability restriction also requires that we provide a measure of
the monetary aggregate that doesn’t require knowledge of its functional form nor the values
of its parameters. We discuss this issue below.
1.2.5.1 The Monetary Aggregation Problem
The general problem of tracking an unknown aggregator function without estimation is not
new. The solution lies in statistical index number theory as advanced by Diewert (1976)
and specifically applied to monetary aggregation by Barnett (1978, 1980). The focus of
this field is to provide parameter- and estimation-free aggregates. One such index number
performs this task with a known level of accuracy. The Divisia monetary aggregate provides
4However, the two pricing assumptions will in general result in different NKPCs up to a second order
approximation. This difference will generally lead to different welfare-loss functions when approximated
around a distorted steady-state as shown in Lombardo & Vestin (2008).
5To be clear, for any variable Xt, X̃t = ln(Xt)− ln(X̄).
6This natural level of output is defined in section 3 below.
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a second-order accurate approximation to the growth rate of MAt .
7 We now define the Divisia
monetary aggregate in this model.
Definition 1.1. The growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate is defined by
ln(µDivisiat ) =
(
sNt + s
N
t−1
2
)
ln
(
Nt
Nt−1
)
+
(
sDt + s
D
t−1
2
)
ln
(
Dt
Dt−1
)
(1.19)
where sNt and s
D
t are the expenditure shares of currency and interest bearing deposits re-
spectively defined by
sNt =
uNt Nt
uNt Nt+u
D
t Dt
=
(rLt −1)Nt
(rLt −1)Nt+(rLt − rDt )Dt
(1.20)
and
sDt =
uDt Dt
uNt Nt+u
D
t Dt
=
(rLt − rDt )Dt
(rLt −1)Nt+(rLt − rDt )Dt
. (1.21)
Since the definition of the Divisia monetary aggregate only requires knowledge of current
and one period lagged monetary component quantities and interest rates our policy rule
specified in (1.18) is a simple rule which could actually be implemented by central banks
facing limited real time information. For example in the U.S., the St. Louis Fed’s MSI series
provides Divisia monetary aggregates for M1 and M2 at a monthly frequency8.
We embed the Divisia approximation to the true aggregate, as opposed to alternative simple-
sum approximations, in the policy rule due to the superiority of the Divisia monetary aggre-
gate in tracking the true aggregate - as shown in this model by Belongia & Ireland (2013).
7The ability to track any function which is homogeneous of degree one (as all sensible aggregator functions
are) to second order accuracy places the Divisia aggregate in Diewart’s (1976) class of superlative index
numbers.
8Private organizations such as the Center for Financial Stability have recently begun providing broader
Divisia monetary aggregates at monthly frequencies as well.
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9 For thoroughness we examine the performance of the more common simple-sum aggregate
ln(µSimple−Sum) = ln
(
Nt+Dt
Nt−1 +Dt−1
)
(1.22)
in place of the Divisia aggregate in the above policy rule. The rule results in indeterminacy
in most of the parameter space. In the appendix we show the determinacy region and show
through linearization the size of the error of the simple-sum aggregate in tracking the true
aggregate in this model.
1.2.6 Market Clearing
It is now possible to define the equilibrium conditions which close the model. Market clearing
in the labor market requires that labor supply equal labor demand, or
ht =
ˆ 1
0
ht(i)di. (1.23)
Equilibrium in the final goods market requires that the accounting identity
Yt = Ct+xt
Dt
Pt
+
φ
2
[
Πt
Π
−1
]2
Yt (1.24)
holds as well. Equilibrium in the money market, equity market and bond market requires
that at all times
Mt =Mt−1 (1.25)
st(i) = st−1(i) = 1 (1.26)
Bt =Bt−1 = 0 (1.27)
9For more general research examining the Divisia monetary aggregate’s properties relative to alternative
simple-sum measures see the following works. At paper length Barnett & Chauvet (2011b); Belongia (1996)
and at book length Barnett & Singleton (1987); Belongia & Binner (2000); Barnett & Serletis (2000); Barnett
& Chauvet (2011a); Barnett (2012).
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respectively. Finally, imposing the symmetry among the intermediate goods producing firms
requires that in equilibrium
Yt(i) = Yt, Pt(i) = Pt, Ft(i) = Ft, and Qt(i) =Qt. (1.28)
1.2.7 Welfare Relevant Natural Rates of Output and Interest
Central to the analysis of optimal monetary policy in NKSP models are the concepts of
the natural rate of output and interest. These measures respectively represent the level
of output and the real interest rate in an identical economy as the one described without
the presence of sticky prices. Woodford (2003) has shown that these concepts play the key
role in optimal monetary policy, hence we provide the relevant definitions in this model to
show that financial market supply shocks affect these variables and hence impact optimal
monetary policy rules - similar to the model of Curdia & Woodford (2009). For cohesiveness,
we use Woodford’s (2003, pg. 302) definition of the natural rate of interest in a monetary
economy.
Definition 1.2. The natural rate of output is the equilibrium level of output at each point
in time that would prevail under flexible prices, given a monetary policy that maintains
a constant interest rate spread uAt = r
L
t − rAt between non-monetary (bonds or loans) and
monetary riskless short-term assets (currency and deposits).
The aggregate interest rate on monetary riskless short-term assets rAt in Definition 2 is the
nominal return for holding one unit of the monetary aggregate in period t. This interest rate
can be derived from first principles10 providing a coherent way to think about interest rates
in an economy with multiple monetary assets each with different rates of return. Therefore
the aggregate user-cost uAt = r
L
t − rAt provides a natural analogue to the the interest rate
spread between bonds and a single monetary asset, the environment considered in Woodford
(2003, Ch. 4). Applying this definition to the log-linearized equilibrium conditions results in
10We carefully define this in the appendix. See Eq. 1.A.18.
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a natural rate of output that depends only on the model’s stochastic disturbances. As shown
in the appendix, the resulting expression for the natural rate of output (in log deviations
from steady state11) is given by
Ỹ nt = Z̃t−Ψyυυ̃t−Ψyxx̃t−Ψyτ τ̃t (1.29)
where Ψyx and Ψ
y
τ are positive in all reasonable calibrations
12. As is standard from the
real business cycle literature, positive technology shocks increase the productive capacity of
the economy under flexible prices. Novel here is the appearance of the financial shocks in
this expression. Adverse shocks to the financial intermediary’s cost of producing monetary
assets and willingness to supply loans will behave as negative technology shocks and lower
the natural rate of output.
However, there is a striking difference between financial and goods market supply shocks
from a policy standpoint. This difference lies in how these shocks affect the natural rate of
interest. The expression for the natural rate - given the above definition of the natural rate
of output - is shown below (in log deviations from steady state 13)
r̃nt = (1−ρa)ãt− (1−ρz)Z̃t−Ψrx(1−ρx)x̃t−Ψrτ (1−ρτ )τ̃t (1.30)
where Ψrx > 0 and Ψ
r
τ > 0 and independent of how money enters the utility function. The
implication for monetary policy is that responding to adverse financial supply shocks calls for
countercyclical policy, meanwhile responding to adverse technology shocks calls for procyclical
policy. The challenge facing the monetary authority is how to form a policy rule which is
optimal in this environment given the lack of information they have on the natural rate. We
show the monetary aggregate provides valuable information regarding movements in this key
11To be clear, for any variable Xt, X̃t = ln(Xt)− ln(X̄).
12The sign of Ψyυ changes depending on the specification of preferences. For additively separable utility it
is always positive however for non additively-separable utility it is negative.
13To be clear, for any variable Xt, X̃t = ln(Xt)− ln(X̄).
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variable.
1.3 Calibration and Solution Strategy
At this point it is useful to proceed by assigning numerical values to the model’s parameters.
Following the calibration strategy pioneered by Kydland & Prescott (1982) we assign values
to parameters in a fashion that allows us to match key features of U.S. data. Since the model
used here was developed by Belongia & Ireland (2013) we take many of the values used in
their study. Moreover, the model is similar in many regards to the ones estimated by Ireland
(2004a,b) providing reliable estimates of the parameters defining the stochastic processes.
Table 1.10 in the appendix summarizes the choice of parameter values. We end the section
with a brief discussion of the solution procedure.
1.3.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy so that one period represents one quarter. We
set β = .99 and we set Z̄ = 1.005 which is consistent with annual real GDP growth of 2%.
These facts imply an annual real interest rate of 6% which is in line with the RBC calibration
literature (Kydland & Prescott, 1982). We set π = 1.005 which matches the official inflation
target of the Fed of 2% per year. The disutility of work parameter η = 2.5 so that one-third
of the household’s time is spent working. When money is non-separable setting χ= 2 makes
the shopping time specification quadratic. As for the CES monetary aggregator MAt , the
calibrations of ω = 1.5 specifies more substitutability between currency and deposits than
the Cobb-Douglas specification and setting ν = .225 pins down the ratio of steady state
ratio NN+D = .1, the U.S. average ratio of currency to simple-sum M2 since 1959. Similarly,
ῡ = .4 matches the steady state ratio N+DPC = 3.3, the average of simple-sum M2 to nominal
consumption expenditures over the same period.
On the production side of the economy we set the elasticity of substitution between in-
termediate goods θ = 6 yielding a steady state mark-up of 20% over marginal cost for the
monopolistic firm following Ireland’s estimates (2000; 2004a; 2004b). The setting for the
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cost of price adjustment φ= 50 implies a NKPC that coincides with Calvo style pricing dy-
namics when the average duration of a price is slightly more than one year (Ireland, 2004b).
Regarding the production of financial assets and services setting τ = .02 sets the steady level
of reserves to 2%, the average ratio of St. Louis adjusted reserves to the simple-sum deposit
components of M2 since 1959 (Ireland, 2011). From the goods market clearing condition,
setting x= .01 implies in steady-state 3% of output is devoted to banking activities, slightly
less than the 3.6% derived from “Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and related
activities” on average over the last decade according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The fact that our model implies a lower average is accurate considering the limited scope
of the activities carried out by the financial sector in this model (Belongia & Ireland, 2006,
2013).14
Many of the stochastic processes driving the model have been estimated in Ireland (2004a).
Specifically, we use Ireland’s estimates of the persistence and standard error of the money
demand, preference and technology15 shocks. However, the parameters driving the financial
shocks have not yet been estimated in the literature. Dellas et al. (2010) calibrate a model
with reserves demand and bank cost shocks interpreting the calibrated values from a fre-
quentists perspective. Following their approach to calibrating the financial shocks standard
errors we set στ and σx so that an increase in banks demand for reserves and an increase
in the benchmark-M2 aggregate interest rate spread of the magnitude witnessed during the
recent financial crisis occurs once every 80 years on average in our model, assuming normal-
ity.16 The time period of 80 years acknowledges the time span between the Great Depression
14As previously mentioned, the deposit-cost shock also dictates the spread between the benchmark interest
rate rLt and the deposit rate r
D
t . To confirm the logic of the calibration note the annualized spread between
the benchmark rate and the aggregate rate rL −rA in the model’s steady-state is about 4.6%, which is very
close to the average spread between the benchmark rate and the Divisia M2 aggregate interest rate in U.S.
data running from January 1967 to September 2009 equal to 4.2% using data from the Center for Financial
Stability. Hence, the ability of the model to emulate the data along this added dimension reconfirms the
calibration put forth by Belongia & Ireland (2013).
15The persistence parameter for the technology shock is set to 1 throughout the paper.
16More specifically reserves measured using the ratio of St. Louis adjusted reserves to the deposit compo-
nents of M2 spiked from slightly over .02 in September 2008 to over .21 in June of 2011. Hence we set στ so
that P (τ > ln(.21)− ln(.02)) = 1/320 where τ ∼N(0,σ2τ
∑11
i=0 ρ
2i
τ ). Similarly, the spread between the bench-
mark rate and the Divisia M2 aggregate rate stood at just 2.8% in July 2008 and in just one quarter the spread
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and the recent financial crisis. This specification of στ is conditional on a value of ρτ . When
calibrating ρτ and ρx we once again follow Belongia & Ireland (2013) and set ρτ = .5 and
ρx = .5. However since these are only calibrated values and not estimates in section 5.2 we
perform a robust policy calculation allowing ρτ and ρx to vary between [0, .99]. Moreover,
in this section we relax the normality assumption used here to calibrate στ and σx to a
student’s t-distribution with significantly “fatter-tails” as called for by much of the finance
literature (Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 1965).
1.3.2 Solution Strategy
Solving the full non-linear model is not possible hence we resort to approximation techniques.
Two main difficulties are encountered. First, the model as presented does not exhibit a
deterministic steady-state due to the unit root in the technology process and the price
level. To deal with this we detrend most nominal variables by the price level and the
technology shock. Details of this detrending are handled in the appendix. Second, a first
order approximation is adequate for questions of local determinacy however for proper welfare
rankings we must use (at least) a second order approximation17 (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe,
2004). Therefore we analyze determinacy using a linear approximation to the model around
the steady state implied by the competitive equilibrium and we evaluate welfare using a
second-order approximation around the Ramsey planner’s steady state with all distortions
in place as in Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2007).18We discuss this choice and provide more
details regarding the welfare evaluation in the section below.
spiked to 4.47%. In order to simulate such liquidity shocks we set σx so that P (x> ln(4.47)− ln(2.8)) = 1/320
where x∼N(0,σ2x). The value obtained for σx is very close the one obtained by Belongia & Ireland (2006)
when they calibrate an RBC version of the model to match their estimated VAR standard errors.
17An exception to this fact is when the steady state distortions are small. This case is the focus of
Woodford (2003) and Curdia & Woodford (2010).
18It’s worth noting, the determinacy results also hold around the Ramsey planner’s steady state and the
welfare results are qualitatively identical if we approximate the model around the competitive equilibrium’s
steady state.
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1.4 Welfare Evaluation of Monetary Policy Rules
We now present our main results of the paper. Most importantly, optimal monetary policy
features a positive response to the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate. We show
that policy rules which respond to the growth rate of money result in real policy rates which
are highly correlated with the natural rate of interest. However, this condition appears to
be only necessary, not sufficient for good policy. Specifically, responding to the interest rate
spread increases the correlation between the real and natural rates of interest but fails to
deliver good policy. Instead, such rules increase the variance of inflation and the resources
allocated to financial intermediation - leading to detrimental welfare effects.
1.4.1 Welfare Evaluation Methodology
The focus of the current literature on optimal simple monetary policy rules has been to
use a micro-founded measure of welfare without imposing any upper bound on the size of
distortions generated in the competitive equilibrium. Following this line of work we use a
second order approximation to the household’s utility function as our metric for ranking
alternative policy rules. Moreover, the appropriate expectation of welfare is the conditional
as this measure takes into account welfare gains and losses accrued while transitioning from
the deterministic steady state to the stochastic steady state implied by the given policy rule
(Kim et al., 2005). This does however give meaning to the initial state at which policy
is evaluated. For this reason we evaluate all policies around the Ramsey planner’s steady
state. Hence, we generally have the following welfare metric, regardless of how preferences
over money are specified.
W0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(Ct,ht,
MAt
Pt
,at,υt)
]
(1.31)
We take a second order approximation to u(Ct,ht,
MAt
Pt
,at,υt) around the Ramsey steady state
allowing for us to express welfare as the weighted sum of conditional means and covariances
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of the arguments in the utility function. We then evaluate these conditional moments using
decision rules found from the second order approximation to the equilibrium conditions.19
We report our results as consumption equivalent shares. Specifically if W∗0 is the welfare
obtained under an optimal policy then Ω is the share of the generic consumption stream the
household would need to equate welfare under the sub-optimal policy to the optimal welfare
W∗0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(Ct(1+Ω),ht,
MAt
Pt
,at,υt)
]
. (1.32)
Given this definition, Ω is simply the welfare cost in consumption terms of sub-optimal
policies.
1.4.2 Optimal Simple Rules
We now turn our attention to optimal simple rules of the form
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φππ̃t+φy(Ỹt− Ỹt−1)+φmµ̃Divisiat −φsS̃t
in log-deviations from steady state with ρr in [0,1] and φπ, φy, φm and φs in [0,∞) and
St = 1+(rLt −rDt ). The most significant departure from policy rules specified in the literature
on optimal simple rules is the inclusion of the (growth rate of the) Divisia monetary aggregate
and the spread between loans and deposits. We show below that optimal policy calls for a
response to the Divisia monetary aggregate but not the interest rate spread. In particular,
we highlight the increased correlation of the real interest rate with the natural rate of interest
when policy reacts to the Divisia aggregate. Moreover, reacting to Divisia achieves this high
correlation at a low inflation volatility compared to rules which react to the interest rate
spread. We also examine optimal policy under additively separable preferences over money
and under the assumption policy makers have knowledge to the efficient output gap and find
19To prevent the order of the forecast, and the forecast itself, from exploding we implement the pruning
method proposed in Kim et al. (2005). More specifically, we use a first order approximation to the equilibrium
conditions to evaluate the conditional variances and then use these conditional variances in the second order
approximation to evaluate the means. See Kim et al. (2005) and specifically Section 7 therein.
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our results to be robust.
1.4.2.1 Baseline Results
We first present our baseline results assuming policy makers only have knowledge of the
growth rate of output, current and past interest rates, inflation and the growth rate of the
monetary aggregate. The results of the central bank’s optimization are presented in Table
1.1.
Table 1.1: Welfare Results for Optimal Simple Rules
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φππ̃t+φy
(
Ỹt− Ỹt−1
)
+φmµ̃
Divisia
t −φsS̃t
Optimal Policy Rule Coefficients Welfare Cost
Policy Rule ρ∗r φ
∗
π φ
∗
y φ
∗
m φ
∗
s Ω
1
Optimal 0 3.234 0 2.366 0 0
Optimal φπ = 0 0 − 0 4.217 0 .0304
Optimal φm = 0 0 3.6780 0.8982 − 0 .1551
Optimal φm = φy = 0 0 4.070 − − 0 .1736
1 Ω is the % of consumption required to equate welfare under any given policy rule
to the one under the optimal policy (see Eq. (1.32)). Welfare is calculated as
conditional to the initial deterministic Ramsey steady state.
Several points are worth noting. (i.) First, responding to the Divisia monetary aggregate
is essential to achieve optimal welfare. Notice the welfare cost of not responding to the
Divisia aggregate is nearly 5 times as large as the welfare cost of not responding to inflation.
One reason for the importance of responding to the Divisia monetary aggregate is due to
its ability to provide an indicator in movement of the natural rate. Section 2.7 shows the
natural rate of interest falls in response to financial shocks calling for expansionary policy.
Only focusing on inflation, or even output growth, fails to provide sufficient expansion. To
verify this, Table 1.2 presents the correlation between the natural rate (See Eq. (1.30)) and
real interest rate under optimal rules with and witohut money.
(ii.) Second, unlike in Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2007) and Faia & Monacelli (2007) - without
considering monetary aggregates (φm = 0) - responding to output growth is welfare enhanc-
ing. The reason for the difference lies in the stochastic rank of our economy versus theirs.
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Table 1.2: Correlation of Real and Natural Interest Rates
Policy Rule Corr(r̃nt , r̃t−Etπ̃t+1)
Optimal .8281
Optimal φπ = 0 .8355
Optimal φm = 0 .0377
Their economies are driven by aggregate demand and technology shocks, which affect the
natural and efficent levels of output symmetrically. In our economy on the other hand, the
presence of financial shocks - which affect the natural level of output but no the efficient
level - induces policy makers to deviate from strict inflation targeting. Our third point
(iii.) responding to the interest rate (loan-deposit) spread decreases welfare. We expand
on this counter-intuitive point below where we consider non-optimized rules, including a
spread-adjusted Taylor rule as advocated by Taylor (2008).
1.4.2.2 Results with Additively Separable Utility
One may wonder if we arrive at the above results due to the specification of non-additively-
separable preferences over money and consumption. As Ireland (2004a) highlights this as-
sumption results in money showing up directly in the IS equation and the NKPC. The
resulting real-balance effect may lead to a bias to stabilize the monetary aggregate. In this
section we directly address this concern. The results below verify that money should enter
the policy rule due to the information it conveys to policy makers regarding developments
in financial markets, not because of the specification of preferences over money.
Interestingly when money enters the policy rule, it ends up in the IS and NKPC as pointed
out by McCallum & Nelson (2011). Hence, Table 1.3 suggests money should enter these
equations from a normative standpoint, regardless of the empirical motivation for money
entering these equations (See e.g. (Ireland, 2004a)). Specifically, under additive separability
the optimal coefficients are qualitatively similar to the optimal coefficients under our baseline
specification. Qualitatively however, optimal policy continues to respond only to inflation
and Divisia. What’s more, under these preferences the welfare cost of not responding to
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Table 1.3: Optimal Simple Rules with Additively Separable Preferences
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φππ̃t+φy
(
Ỹt− Ỹt−1
)
+φmµ̃
Divisia
t −φsS̃t
Optimal Policy Rule Coefficients Welfare Cost
Policy Rule ρ∗r φ
∗
π φ
∗
y φ
∗
m φ
∗
s Ω
1
Optimal 0 3.350 0 2.803 0 0
Optimal φπ = 0 0 − 0 5.012 0 .0290
Optimal φm = 0 0 5.7601 0.881 − 0 .2258
Optimal φm = φy = 0 0 4.044 − − 0 .2398
1 Ω is the % of consumption required to equate welfare under any given policy rule
to the one under the optimal policy (see Eq. (1.32)). Welfare is calculated as
conditional to the initial deterministic Ramsey steady state.
Divisia continues to be nearly 6 times the cost of not responding to inflation.
1.4.2.3 Results when the Efficient Output Gap is Observable
To this point we have followed the mainstream literature studying optimal simple monetary
policy rules and assumed that no measure of the output gap is observable. Although this is
the most conservative assumption regarding the real time information policy makers, one may
argue that assumption is too restrictive. For example, central banks can use standard filtering
techniques to generate measures of the trend and cyclical components of output.20The trend
component presumably represents technological changes to which monetary policy should not
attempt to affect. 21 Indeed, there is some evidence policy makers have this information.
Gali et al. (2003) argue the Volcker-Greenspan Fed’s response to technology shocks was
consistent with optimal policy. In this section we examine the robustness of our results
when we relax this constraint on the policy maker’s information set. In particular, we ask, is
it still necessary for optimal policy to respond to the monetary aggregate when the efficient
20Woodford (2003 p. 615-616) acknowledges that central bank forecast’s of the output gap, “...are usually
measures of real GDP relative to some fairly smooth trend.” He goes on to say that the measurement
appropriate in an optimal policy rule “ ... is the difference between real GDP and a target level that should
vary in response to real disturbances of many sorts..., and it is not obvious these real factors should all be
expected to evolve as a smooth trend.”
21This is the case in our model as well which features a stochastic trend.
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output gap22 is observable?
Table 1.4: Optimal Simple Rules when the Efficient Output Gap1 is observable.
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φππ̃t+φgG̃
e
t +φmµ̃
Divisia
t −φsS̃t
Optimal Policy Rule Coefficients
ρ∗r φ
∗
π φ
∗
g φ
∗
m φ
∗
s
Optimal 0 3.234 0 2.366 0
1 The Efficient Output Gap in levels is given by
Get =
Yt
Y et
= η Yt
Zt
as shwon in the appendix (See Eq.
(1.A.32)).
The results in this section show two things. First, when the efficient output gap is observable
optimal policy still responds to the Divisia monetary aggregate. Second, and more to the
point, knowledge of the efficient output gap has no impact on the optimal policy coefficients
- the only variables in the policy rule with a non-zero coefficient are inflation and the growth
rate of the Divisia aggregate. This result stresses the importance of financial shocks shaping
the optimal simple policy rule. In particular, policy makers must now deal with inefficient
resource costs from financial intermediation in addition to inefficient resource cost stemming
from price adjustment and inefficient rents due to monopolist’s market power.
1.4.3 Non-Optimized Rules
It is insightful at this point to compare the performance of policy rules which have historically
provided a description of actual Fed policy with our optimal rules. In particular, we can
infer the welfare gains of switching from current policy to our prescribed optimal rule. We
examine the performance of the original Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and the forward-looking
rule estimated in Clarida et al. (2000) which provides a good description of Fed policy during
the Volcker-Greenspan era. Not surprisingly, the above rules lack an aggressive enough
response to the financial market shocks and hence lack the necessary correlation with the
natural rate of interest. Addressing this issue, Taylor (2008) recently suggested allowing the
22The level of the efficient output gap is given by Get =
Yt
Y et
= η Yt
Zt
, as shown in the appendix (See Eq.
(1.A.32)).
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intercept of the Taylor rule to vary with the interest rate spread (SATR). In Table 1.5 we
present the welfare performance of the ad-hoc policy rules.
Table 1.5: Non-Optimized Rules
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φπEtπ̃t+i+φgEtG̃
e
t+i−φsS̃t
Policy Rule Coefficients Welfare Cost
PolicyRule1 i ρr φπ φg φs Ω
2
Taylor Rule 0 0 1.5 .125 0 .2084
CGG3 1 0.79 .4515 .1953 0 .2316
SATR φs = 2 0 0 1.5 .125 2 .3834
1 Here we generalize our previous policy rule allowing for forward
(or backward) looking behavior. We use the level of the efficient
output gap in this rule due to indeterminacy problems when φs > 0
associated with the growth rate rule specified in Eq. (1.18).
2 Ω is the % of consumption required to equate welfare under any
given policy rule to the one under the optimal policy (see Eq.
(1.32)). Welfare is calculated as conditional to the initial deter-
ministic Ramsey steady state.
3 CGG refers to Clarida, Gali and Gertler’s (2000) estimated forward-
looking Taylor rule.
Table 1.6 shows that policy rules which lack a response to financial variables lack correlation
with the natural rate and perform poorly. What is perhaps more shocking is the poor
performance of the SATR - despite bringing about a real policy rate which is highly correlated
with the natural rate of interest. This reiterates our previous point; good policy rules in this
economy are correlated with the natural rate of interest, but correlation with the natural
rate of interest is not sufficient to guarantee good policy.
Table 1.6: Correlation of Real and Natural Interest Rates
Policy Rule Corr(r̃nt , r̃t−Etπ̃t+1)
Taylor .1644
CGG .1785
SATR φs = 2 .7269
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1.4.3.1 Creating liquidity without inflation: Why responding to Money Growth
(Not Interest Rate Spreads) Is Optimal
This poor welfare performance of spread adjusted Taylor rules (SATR) at first seems counter-
intuitive. Table 1.2 suggests countercyclical policy is key to optimally responding to financial
shocks, however the point is bit more subtle. Indeed, responding directly the the interest
rate spread by lowering the policy rate fails to deliver good policy. The reason for this failure
can be seen by examining the impulse responses following a negative banking productivity
shock as shown in Figure 1.2 below. The solid lines show the dynamics under the optimal
policy which reacts to inflation and the Divisia aggregate while the dotted and diamond
lines are the dynamics under various SATR’s. Notice the dynamics for inflation are driven
primarily by the Fisher equation and the monetary policy rule. That is, inflation dynamics
look very similar to the variables in the respective policy rules.
Consider first the interest rate spread rules. A negative banking productivity shock increases
the spread between loan and deposit rates resulting in an immediate cut in the policy rate.
The real rate will rise by more or less depending on the expected behavior of inflation.
Since the rise in the spread has some persistence, the policy rate is expected to remain
below steady state and therefore the inflation rate is expected to remain above steady state
into the future - causing the real policy rate to fall below the nominal policy rate.23 This
amplification of the real rate results in positive output gaps as long as the spread remains
above steady state. More importantly here, the monetary aggregate falls as interest bearing
deposits drop, however the expansionary drop in rates is associated with an increase in the
monetary base - a liquidity effect.
Compared to the optimal policy rule, this uptick in the monetary base under the SATR
is dwarfed. The optimal rule which stabilizes µ̃Divisiat , significantly increases the monetary
base by lowering the real interest rate by more than even the SATR with φs = 10! This
23This affect is more amplified when the shock has more serial correlation. In fact, for larger values of ρx
the nominal rate rises on impact due to the large increase in inflation.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse responses to a negative banking producitivty shock that raises the
annualized spread about 25 basis points. All interest rates, the interest rate spread and
inflation are in annualized percentage points. All other variables are in % deviations. The
diamond line shows the response under the SATR with φs = 10 and the dotted line shows
the response under the spread adjusted Taylor rule with φs = 2 and the solid line shows the
response under the optimal simple rule which features a response to inflation and the growth
rate of the Divisa index. (See Table 1.1)
increases welfare by providing a substitute for resource intensive financial assets. Moreover,
this increase in the monetary base is accomplished with less inflation volatility than the
SATR. By committing to adjust interest rates as needed to stabilize the growth rate of
the monetary aggregate the central bank is able to create liquidity without large swings in
inflation.
The welfare from the Divisia rule dominates welfare from the spread rule due to the dif-
30
Table 1.7: Inefficient Resource Costs
PolicyRule1 E0
∑∞
t=0β
tπ̃2t E0
∑∞
t=0β
t(D̃t+ x̃t)
Optimal .0009 -5.19
SATR φs = 2 .0016 -1.57
1 The optimal rule has policy coefficients of φπ = 3.234 and
φm = 2.366 (see Table 1.1).
ferences described above. The spread rule results in larger resource costs associated with
the creation of costly financial assets by failing to provide the proper liquidty needed to
substitute away from deposits. In order to generate a similar rise in the monetary base,
the SATR with φs = 10, inflation becomes more volatile under the SATR compared to the
optimal rule. The result is more resources inefficiently spent on producing financial assets
and adjusting prices. Meanwhile the Divisia rule is able to stabilize the liquidity flow, and
ultimately reduce the resources allocated to creating financial assets, without excessive in-
flation costs. These differences are summarized in Table 1.7 which highlights the intricacy
of optimal monetary policy in this financial/sticky-price economy.
1.5 Comparative Statics, Robustly Optimal Policy and
Determinacy
The analysis up to here has been wed to the baseline calibration of the model. Although
most of the calibrated values are standard in the literature, the values defining the stochastic
processes for the financial sector shocks have not yet been estimated. Therefore in this section
we examine the robustness of our results to changes in these key parameters while also
examining how the coefficients describing the optimal rule change under such perturbations.
First we will perform a simple comparative statics exercise by varying the the parameters
defining the stochastic shocks and analyzing the change in the optimal policy coefficients.
We then offer a robust policy prescription given the uncertainty surrounding the values of
these financial disturbances. The robustly optimal policy features again a positive response
to only inflation and the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate. We conclude by
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Figure 1.3: St = 1 + (rLt − rDt ) is the gross interest rate spread between loans and deposits
(see Eq. (1.11)). The welfare cost Ω are relative to the optimal policy (see Table 1.1). As
we vary φs we keep φπ = 1.5 and φg = .125 as in the original Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993).
examining determinacy properties of this rule - a point of practical concern for policy makers.
We show the reaction to Divisia compliments the reaction to inflation, so far as determinacy
is concerned, resulting in a novel Taylor principle for monetary aggregates.
1.5.1 Comparative Statics
In much the spirit of Poole (1970) we examine how the optimal policy coefficients change
when the shocks driving the economy change. We find that when the standard deviation
of financial shocks increase, the optimal response to the monetary aggregate increases as
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well. This is consistent with Bernanke and Blinder’s (1988) suggestions regarding policy
when financial and money demand shocks are present; a relative increase in financial shocks
should shift the focus to money. Along these same lines, the optimal response to the mon-
etary aggregate decreases when money demand becomes more volatile - the Achilles heel of
monetarism. However, the elasticity of φ∗m with respect to συ - Eφ∗m,σv - is only 12% (in
absolute value) suggesting the tendency to de-emphasize money due to its “instability” has
been over stated, at least in regards to its ability to signal movement in the natural rate.
Table 1.8: Elasticities1 of Optimal Policy Coefficients
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φππ̃t+φmµ̃
Divisia
t
φ∗π φ
∗
m
ρv = 75 ρv = −31
ρa = −193 ρa = −30
ρτ = −11 ρτ = −18
ρx = −103 ρx = −119
σv = 20 σv = −12
σa = 12 σa = 1
σz = 75 σz = −40
στ = −6 στ = 8
σx = −104 σx = 45
1 All elasticities are arc-elasticities in
% computed at the baseline val-
ues and a 10% change from baseline
values.
With regards to the parameters defining the serial correlation of the shocks, we find that
increasing the persistence of the financial shocks calls for a reduction in φ∗m. This may be
surprising at first, however looking to the natural rate of interest (see Eq. (1.30)) notice the
more persistent the financial shocks become the less they influence the natural rate. However,
to the extent that monetary aggregates provide information regarding this variable, we show
in the next section the optimal response to the Divisia aggregate is not null, even if the
financial shocks are very persistent. Returning momentarily to the money demand shocks
notice increasing the persistence of such shocks results in the expected outcome, a decrease
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in φ∗m. Again though, this effect is relatively small as Eφ∗m,σv is only about 30%.
1.5.2 Robustly Optimal Policy
The previous section highlights the fact that the exact coefficients that define the optimal
policy rule depend on the underlying stochastic processes. Hence, one may wonder then,
given our uncertainty over such parameters what is the best policy to follow? We will
provide a first attempt to answer this question using a simple 2 player game zero-sum game.
In particular, following Giannoni (2002), we set up the zero-sum game Γ between the central
bank (CB) and nature (N). The central bank would like to choose policy rule parameters
- φ ∈ Φ - to maximize welfare defined by W0 (see Eq. (4.2)). At the same time, nature is
malevolent and would like to choose shock parameters - σ ∈ Σ - which minimize W0. The
Nash equilibrium represents the worst set of structural parameters possible, given policy
makers choose the best possible policy given the bad state of the world. Intuitively, the
Nash equilibrium of this game provides a policy prescription that does the best under the
worst case scenario. The nature of zero-sum games allows us to consider solving the minimax
problem to find the Nash equilibrium
min
φ∈Φ
{
max
σ∈Σ
{−W0}
}
We numerically approach a solution by iterating over natures problem and over the policy
makers problem until all parameters and the objective function converge.
Before solving this problem we must set bounds on the choice space of nature. For the
money demand, preference and technology process we assume all parameters lie within 2
standard errors using the estimates from Ireland (2004a) with an upper bound of .99 for the
persistence parameters24. Unfortunately, the parameters driving the financial shocks have no
comparable estimates to help determine an appropriately bounded set. Therefore we assume
that ρx ∈ [0, .99] and ρτ ∈ [0, .99]. As for the standard deviations of these shocks we continue
24As with the rest of the paper, we continue to assume a unit-root in the technology shock
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to rely on the observation that large financial disruptions have occurred about every 80 years,
however we relax our normality assumption. In particular, to determine a lower bound for
the standard deviations of the financial shocks, we allow for the possibility that financial
shocks follow a distribution with significantly “fatter-tails” than a normal distribution 25. For
concreteness, suppose that ετt and ε
x
t are distributed according to a student’s t-distribution
with 3 degrees of freedom26 implying we scale our normal standard errors by
√
d.o.f.
d.o.f.−2 =
√
3.
The resulting bounds are given by σx ∈ [.0993, .1720] and στ ∈ (
√
Σ11i=0ρ
2i
τ )
−1[.4965, .8600]
where the upper bounds are the standard deviations under the normality assumption and
the lower bounds are the upper bounds scaled by
√
3. The resulting Nash Equilibrium, or
equivalently, the worst state of the world and the best policy in this state are given in Table
1.9 below.
Table 1.9: Nash Equilibrium in Γ
Nash Equilibrium
Nature’s Strategy Central Bank’s Strategy
ρ∗v = .99 ρ
∗
r = 0
ρ∗a = .99 φ
∗
π = .8940
ρ∗τ = .99 φ
∗
y = 0
ρ∗x = .99 φ
∗
m = .5206
σ∗v = .0102 φ
∗
s = 0
σ∗a = .0352
σ∗z = .0116
σ∗τ = .2621
σ∗x = .1720
Nature chooses to maximize the persistence and volatility of all the shocks in the economy,
leading to the maximum long-run variance possible in these stochastic processes. In partic-
ular nature maximizes the persistence of the financial shocks in the model. How does this
minimize welfare? Recall again the equation for the natural rate of interest - reproduced
25See for example Mandelbrot (1963) or Fama (1965).
26The choice of the degrees of freedom is arbitrary but 3 is the smallest integer for which the student’s
t-distribution has a finite standard error.
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here for convenience.
r̃nt = (1−ρa)ãt− (1−ρz)Z̃t−Ψr
n
x (1−ρx)x̃t−Ψr
n
τ (1−ρτ )τ̃t
By pushing the persistence of the financial shocks to their maximum, nature is trying to
mitigate the financial shocks role in driving the natural rate. Why? When financial shocks
affect the natural rate policy makers reacting to the Divisia aggregate are able to correlate
the real rate with the natural rate. However, by limiting the share of variance in the natural
rate explained by financial shocks, while at the same time maximizing the long-run variance
of money demand shocks, nature is effectively maximizing the noise to signal ratio of Divisia
in signaling movements in the natural rate. Interestingly though welfare is still improved by
including a positive - but weakened - reaction to the Divisia aggregate. Therefore, much in
line with Brainard’s (1967) seminal work on policy under uncertainty we find (in contrast
to Giannoni (2002)) uncertainty calls for an attenuated reaction to both inflation and the
monetary aggregate. However the Divisia response is significant - even in this extreme state
of the world.
1.5.3 Determinacy
Thus far we have found the optimal simple and robust rules feature a positive response
to only inflation and the Divisia monetary aggregate. Clearly if the aforementioned policy
rules are followed “to the letter” then the outcome is determinate in the sense that there
is a unique path for all nominal and real variables. However, a practical concern for policy
makers faced with the policy prescription in this economy is whether reacting to the Divisia
monetary aggregate induces undesirable equilibrium outcomes that an inflation only rule
would preclude. In other words, if policy deviates slightly from the prescribed rule is the
equilibrium outcome still unique? To answer this question we examine the determinacy
properties of the optimal rule in this economy. Unfortunately, analytical solutions are not
available as in Bullard & Mitra (2002) so instead we examine the determinacy properties
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of this rule numerically. We examine determinacy by searching over the values φπ ∈ [0,5]
and φm ∈ [0,5] by .01 increments and and ρr ∈ [0,1) by .1 increments around both the
steady state of the competitive equilibrium and the Ramsey steady state and examining the
necessary and sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness as laid out by Blanchard &
Kahn (1980). The resulting determinacy region is featured in Figure 1.4.
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Figure 1.4: The shadded area to the northeast of the dotted line, defined by φm +φπ > 1,
is determinate when ρr = 0. Moreover, if ρr > 0 then the condition for determinacy under
this rule generalizes to φm+φπ1−ρr > 1, this is a genralized Taylor principle for Divisia monetary
aggregates in interest rate rules.
Looking first along the horizontal axis where φm = 0, the well known Taylor principle con-
37
tinues to hold. That is policy makers can guarantee a unique equilibrium by satisfying
φπ > 1
Moreover, looking at the vertical axis where φπ = 0, we find that policy makers can guarantee
a unique equilibrium outcome by adjusting the policy rate more than one for one with changes
in the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate27. That is, the condition that
φm > 1
is sufficient for determinacy. However, our optimal simple and robust rules feature a positive
response to both inflation and the Divisia monetary aggregate. Therefore, focusing our
attention on the interior Figure 4, where both responses are positive, we find that the above
two conditions are sufficient but clearly not necessary as determinacy is more generally
possible by satisfying the condition
φπ +φm > 1 (1.33)
Reacting to the growth rate of Divisia actually allows policy makers to achieve determinacy
with even weaker inflation responses so long as the reaction to Divisia is increased one for
one. Equation (1.33) provides an extension of the well-known Taylor principle to Taylor
rules featuring a response to the Divisia monetary aggregate - a modified Taylor principle
for Divisia monetary aggregates. Most generally, if policy makers introduce lagged interest
rates into the policy rule we see that condition (1.33) generalizes to
φπ +φm
1−ρr
> 1 (1.34)
27We emphasize this result is not generally true for any monetary aggregate. In fact, we show in the
appendix embedding the simple-sum monetary aggregate (see Eq. (1.22)) tends to result in indeterminacy
and no such modified Taylor principle holds.
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Equations (1.33) and (1.34) show that there are no more concerns regarding determinacy
under optimal rules in this model than there are regarding determinacy in standard NKSP
where φm = 0 and in fact determinacy is more likely when reacting to the Divisia monetary
aggregate.
1.6 Conclusion
We have analyzed optimal monetary policy in a NKSP augmented to include a financial
sector. We showed financial disturbances which decrease banks ability and willingness to
produce financial assets lowers the natural rate of interest calling for countercyclical monetary
policy. The resulting optimal policy deviates from the common inflation only type of Taylor
rule common in this literature. Instead, reacting to the growth rate of the Divisia monetary
aggregate, in addition to inflation, performs significantly better than reacting to inflation
alone. The resulting policy rule produces a real interest rate which is highly correlated with
the natural rate of interest. We showed the spread adjusted Taylor rule as advocated by
Taylor (2008) actually performs worse than inflation only rules despite its high correlation
with the natural rate of interest. This puzzling result is reconciled by the increased inflation
and output gap volatility induced by the spread adjusted Taylor rules which is not present
in the Divisia growth rules. The optimality of reacting positively to the Divisia growth rate
and the inflation rate is shown to hold under different assumption regarding policy maker’s
information sets and preferences over monetary assets. Finally, we offer a robust policy
prescription under parametric uncertainty using the minimax approach proposed in Giannoni
(2002). The resulting policy rule features an attenuated - but positive and economically
significant - response to the growth rate of Divisia and inflation. Moreover, we offer some
insight regarding the ability of such rules to bring about a unique equilibrium outcome by
examining their determinacy region. The result is a modified Taylor principle for Divisia
monetary aggregate which is sufficient to guarantee determinacy.
As much as the seminal work of Taylor (1993) marked the beginning of interest rate rules
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dominating monetary policy we hope this paper can be part of the beginning of re-examining
the usefulness of monetary aggregates in real time policy making. Given the interest in sim-
ple rules and macro policy under financial distress considerable work lies ahead in better
understanding how policy makers can better use the information available in monetary ag-
gregates and other variables available in real time. Specifically, one may wonder in our
environment if Divisia level targeting is superior to reacting to the growth rate of the Divisia
monetary aggregate. Also, expanding the literature on statistical index number theory to
properly track aggregate quantities of credit seems a worthwhile task given the usefulness of
properly constructed monetary aggregates in this model. Furthermore, the zero-lower bound
on nominal interest rates suggests the usefulness of monetary aggregates may extend beyond
informational variables to policy instruments as called for by Taylor (2009). However, an
optimal policy prescription for monetary instrument rules is seriously lacking in this modern
framework due to the exclusive focus on interest rates. This calls for future work to under-
stand how different aggregates perform as instruments from their determinacy properties to
their welfare performance.
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1.A Appendix: The Equilibrium System
In this portion of the appendix we derive the model’s equilibrium conditions and stationarize
the model allowing us to define a recursive (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium. We also
derive expressions for the natural rate level of output and the natural interest rate.
1.A.1 The Representative Household’s FOCS
Non-Separable Preferences: First consider the case when monetary assets are not additively
separable from consumption. In particular, recall from section 2.1.3 that the household faces
the following problem when preferences over monetary assets are defined according to a
shopping time friction;
max
{Ct,ht,MAt ,Nt,Dt,Lt,Bt+1,Mt+1,st+1(i)}
∞
t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtat [ln(Ct)−η(ht+hst )]
subject to (3.1), (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4) taking B0, M0 and s0(i) as given. After substituting
(1.4) into the objective function, we can form the Bellman equation as follows where all the
constraints are expressed in real terms by dividing through by Pt,
V (Bt−1,Mt−1, st−1(i)) =max
{
at
[
ln(Ct)−ηht−
η
χ
(
υtPtCt
MAt
)χ ]
−Λ1t


Dt−Mt−1 −Bt−1 +
´ 1
0 Qt(i)(st(i)− st−1(i))di+Bt/rt+Nt−Lt
Pt


−Λ2t


MAt
Pt
−
[
ν
1
ω (
Nt
Pt
)
ω−1
ω +(1−ν) 1ω (Dt
Pt
)
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1


−Λ3t


Mt−Nt+PtCt−Wtht−
´ 1
0 Ft(i)st(i)di− rDt Dt+ rLt Lt
Pt


+βEt[V (Bt,Mt, st(i))]
}
The first order necessary conditions are given by the following equations. The system of
equations (1.A.1)-(1.A.9) is under-determined in the sense that we have introduced various
derivatives of the value function. However, we can complement these first order necessary
conditions with the Bienveniste-Scheinkman Envelope Conditions to eliminate the value
function from the system above. These envelope conditions are given in equations (1.A.10)-
(1.A.12) below.
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at
[
1−η
(
υtPtCt
MAt
)χ]
−Λ3tCt = 0 (1.A.1)
−atη+Λ3t
Wt
Pt
= 0 (1.A.2)
ηat
(
υtPtCt
MAt
)χ
− Λ
2
tM
A
t
Pt
= 0 (1.A.3)
(
Dt
Pt
)
− (1−ν)
(
MAt
Pt
)[
Λ2t
Λ1t −Λ3t rDt
]ω
= 0 (1.A.4)
(
Nt
Pt
)
−ν
(
MAt
Pt
)[
Λ2t
Λ1t −Λ3t
]ω
= 0 (1.A.5)
Λ1t −Λ3t rLt = 0 (1.A.6)
−Λ1t
rt
+PtβEt[V
′
Bt(Bt,Mt, st(i))] = 0 (1.A.7)
−Λ3t +PtβEt[V
′
Mt(Bt,Mt, st(i))] = 0 (1.A.8)
−Λ1tQt(i)+Λ3tFt(i)+PtβEt[V
′
st(i)
(Bt,Mt, st(i))] = 0 (1.A.9)
Envelope Conditions:
V
′
Bt−1(Bt−1,Mt−1, st(i)) =
Λ1t
Pt
(1.A.10)
V
′
Mt−1(Bt−1,Mt−1, st(i)) =
Λ1t
Pt
(1.A.11)
V
′
st−1(i)
(Bt−1,Mt−1, st(i)) =
Λ1tQt(i)
Pt
(1.A.12)
Now update (1.A.10)-(1.A.12) and substitute the resulting equations into (1.A.6)-(1.A.8)
yielding:
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−Λ1t
rt
+βEt
[
PtΛ
1
t+1
Pt+1
]
= 0 (1.A.13)
−Λ3t +βEt
[
PtΛ
1
t+1
Pt+1
]
= 0 (1.A.14)
−Λ1t
Qt(i)
Pt
+Λ3t
Ft(i)
Pt
+βEt
[
Λ1t+1Qt+1(i)
Pt+1
]
= 0 (1.A.15)
The conditions (1.A.1)-(1.A.6) and (1.A.13)-(1.A.15) define the consumers optimal behavior.
Separable Preferences: Under additively separable preferences over monetary assets the
household’s first order conditions are identical to the above conditions after replacing (1.A.1)
and (1.A.3) with
at
Ct
−Λ3t = 0 (1.A.16)
ηmatυt−Λ2t
MAt
Pt
= 0 (1.A.17)
respectively.
1.A.2 Deriving the User Costs of Monetary Assets
As shown in an infinite planning horizon by Barnett & Singleton (1987), we can derive the
user costs of all monetary assets in the model from the household’s first order necessary
conditions. Specifically, the user costs appear naturally as the price of monetary assets
according to the familiar optimality condition from microeconomics which dictates, at an
optimum, equating the marginal rate of substitution of currency for deposits to the ratio of
the price of currency to the price of deposits.
∂ut
∂Nt
∂ut
∂Dt
=
∂ut
∂MAt
∂MAt
∂Nt
∂ut
∂MAt
∂MAt
∂Dt
=
Λ1t −Λ
3
t
Λ2t
Λ1t −Λ
3
t r
D
t
Λ2t
=
Λ3t r
L
t −Λ3t
Λ3t r
L
t −Λ3t rDt
=
rLt −1
rLt − rDt
≡ u
N
t
uDt
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The second equality follows from equations (1.A.4) and (1.A.5), the household’s first order
conditions for Nt and Dt. The third equality follows from equation (1.A.6), the household’s
first order condition for Lt. The resulting ratio defines the relative user costs.
We can also derive the exact price dual to the true quantity aggregator in a similar fashion.
Instead of considering the price of each monetary assets individually, consider the optimality
condition the monetary aggregate must satisfy. For simplicity, consider the marginal rate of
substitution of the monetary aggregate for consumption. Clearly the price of the consump-
tion good is Pt, hence the numerator must denote the price of the monetary aggregate.
∂ut
∂MAt
∂ut
∂Ct
=
Λ2t
Pt
Λ3t
=
Λ2t
Λ3t
Pt
=
[
ν(rt−1)(1−ω) +(1−ν)(rt− rDt )(1−ω)
] 1
1−ω
Pt
≡ r
L
t − rAt
Pt
uAt = r
L
t − rAt =
[
ν(rt−1)(1−ω) +(1−ν)(rt− rDt )(1−ω)
] 1
1−ω (1.A.18)
The first equality follows from equations (1.A.1) and (1.A.3), the household’s first order con-
ditions for Ct and M
A
t respectively. The third equality follows from solving equation (1.A.4)
for Nt, equation (1.A.5) for Dt and substituting the resulting expressions into equation (1.3).
The resulting expression can be solved for Λ
2
t
Λ3t
yielding the numerator the follows the third
equality. For the last equality we define this expression to be rt−rAt , or the opportunity cost
of holding the aggregate monetary asset MAt . The resulting aggregate user cost (1.A.18)
as defined by Barnett (1978) is of the same form as the individual component user costs in
equations (1.20) and (1.21). It can be verified that (1.A.18) is in fact the true price dual to
the true monetary aggregate in equation (1.3) since it satisfies Fisher’s factor reversal test.
MAt u
A
t = u
N
t Nt+u
D
t Dt (1.A.19)
Equation (1.A.19) states that the true quantity index times the true price index equals total
expenditures, in this sense, (1.A.18) is the exact price dual to (1.3).
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1.A.3 Equilibrium Quantity of the Monetary Aggregate
In this section we derive a condition relating the monetary aggregate to output, a vector
of interest rates and financial shocks. This expression is useful for deriving the natural
rates of output and interest later and also because it highlights the difference between broad
money which depends on a vector of interest rates and the financial sector’s productive
ability versus typical “money demand” specifications which assume the equilibrium quantity
of money depends only agents demand for monetary assets featuring a single interest rate.
All variables with a tilde denote the real detrended variable in log-deviations from steady
state (with the exception of interest rates which are in nominal terms). Combine (1.A.2),
(1.A.3) (or (1.A.16), (1.A.17)) and (1.A.18) to arrive at (up to additive constants)
M̃At = γ
c
mC̃t+γ
w
mW̃t−γu
A
m ũ
A
t +γ
υ
mυ̃t (1.A.20)
where under additively separable preferences γcm = γ
uA
m = γ
υ
m = 1, andγ
w
m = 0 and under non-
additively separable preferences γcm = γ
υ
m =
χ
1+χ , andγ
w
m = γ
uA
m =
1
1+χ . Now log-linearize the
household’s first order condition relating the real wage to the marginal utilities of consump-
tion and leisure and we have that
W̃t = (1+γm)C̃t−γmM̃At +γmυ̃t (1.A.21)
where γm =
u
′′
MA,C
u
′
C
is zero for additively separable preferences. Now substitute (1.A.21) into
(1.A.20) to eliminate the real wage and arrive at
M̃At =
[γcm+γ
w
m(1+γm)]
[1+γwmγm]
C̃t−
γu
A
m
[1+γwmγm]
ũAt +
[γwmγm+γ
υ
m]
[1+γwmγm]
υ̃t (1.A.22)
50
We can express consumption in terms of output and the monetary aggregate by substituting
equation (1.A.5) into equation (3.28) and log-linearizing to arrive at
C̃t =
1
sc
[
Ỹt− (1− sc)
[
x̃t+M̃
A
t +ω
(
ũAt − ũDt
)]]
(1.A.23)
where sc =
C̄
Ȳ
. Our equilibrium condition for the monetary aggregate is obtained by sub-
stituting (1.A.23) into (1.A.22) and noting that under either specification of preferences
γcm+γ
w
m = 1
M̃At = Ỹt−ηuAũAt +ηuD ũDt +ηυυ̃t−ηxx̃t (1.A.24)
where
ηuA = (1− sc)ω+
γu
A
m sc
(1+γmγwm)
ηuD = ω(1− sc)
ηυ = sc
(
1− 1−γ
υ
m
1+γmγwm
)
ηx = (1− sc)
and all the coefficients are positive.
1.A.4 The Representative Intermediate Goods Firm’s FOCS
Recall from section 2.4, the representative intermediate goods producing firm i ∈ [0,1] max-
imizes its share price in every period t= 0,1,2,3, .... Mathematically, we have
max
{ht(i),Pt(i)}∞t=0
Qt(i)
Pt
subjectto(1.14)and(1.15).
To derive the first order necessary conditions for this problem use the equity pricing rela-
tionship (1.A.15) from the representative household’s first order condition to solve for period
t. Solving (1.A.15) forward and assuming no bubbles yields
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Qt(i)
Pt
= Et


∞∑
j=0
βj
Λ3t+jFt+j(i)
Λ1tPt+j

 . (1.A.25)
Equation (1.A.25) is a familiar asset pricing relationship which states that the market share
price of the representative intermediate goods producing firm is proportional to the expected
future stream of dividends adjusted for risk. In particular, the stochastic discount factor is
given by
βjΛ3t+j
Λ1t
. In any period t = 0,1,2,3, ..., intermediate goods producing firm i ∈ [0,1]
pays out all profits as dividends. In real terms, the period t real dividend is given by
Ft(i)
Pt
=
Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i)−
Wt
Pt
ht(i)−
φ
2
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)π
−1
]2
Yt. (1.A.26)
The first term of the above profit function is period t real revenue, the second term in the
firm’s period t real wage bill and the third term will be 0 unless the intermediate goods
producing firm changes its price from period t− 1 to period t an amount different than
the steady-state gross rate of inflation rate, π. Substituting (1.A.26) into (1.A.25), we can
restate the intermediate goods producing firm’s problem as
max
{ht(i),Pt(i)}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtΛ3t
Λ10


Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i)−
Wt
Pt
ht(i)−
φ
2
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)π
−1
]2
Yt


subject to
Yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
Yt and Yt(i) = ztht(i).
The problem can be simplified by substituting the inverse of the technology constraint for
ht(i) and then substituting the factor demand into the resulting expression for Yt(i) so
that now the representative intermediate goods producing firm solves the following recursive
problem defined by Bellman’s equation
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V (Pt−1(i)) = max
Pt(i)



Λ3tYt
Λ10


[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
− Wt
Ptzt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
− φ
2
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)π
−1
]2


+βEt[V (Pt)]
}
The first order necessary condition for the problem is given by
(1− θ)Λ
3
tYt
Λ10
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
1
Pt
+ θ
Λ3tYt
Λ10
Wt
P 2t zt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−1−θ
−φΛ
3
tYt
Λ10
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)π
−1
]
1
Pt−1(i)π
+βEt[V
′
(Pt)] = 0 (1.A.27)
Once again invoking the Bienveniste-Scheinkman Envelope Condition we have
V
′
(Pt−1(i)) =
Λ3tYt
Λ10
φ
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)π
−1
]
Pt(i)
(Pt−1(i))
2π
. (1.A.28)
Updating (1.A.28) one period and substituting into (1.A.27) and then multiplying the re-
sulting equation by Λ10Pt yields
(1− θ)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
+ θ
Wt
Ptzt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−1−θ
−φ
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)π
−1
]
Pt
Pt−1(i)π
+βφEt
[
Λ3t+1Yt+1
Λ3tYt
[
Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)π
−1
]
PtPt+1(i)
(Pt(i))
2π
]
= 0 (1.A.29)
Finally, when (1.A.29) is log-linearized around a symmetric equilibrium where Pt(i) =Pt ∀ t=
0,1,2,3, ... it takes the form of a New-Keynesian Phillips Curve relating current inflation to
the average real marginal cost and expected future inflation.
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1.A.5 The Efficient Level of Output
To find the efficient level of output used to define the efficient output gap we solve the
benevolent social planner’s problem
maxCt,Yt,ht,{Yt(i),ht(i)}i∈[0,1]at [ln(Ct)−ηht]
s.t.(1.12), (1.15)(1.23)andYt = Ct
We can simplify the above constrained maximization problem, into the unconstrained prob-
lem
max,ht(i)}i∈[0,1]at





ln





Zt



1
ˆ
0
ht(i)
θ−1
θ di



θ
θ−1





−η
1
ˆ
0
ht(i)di





The first order condition for this problem is given by
ht(i)
− 1θ = η



1
ˆ
0
ht(i)
θ−1
θ di


 (1.A.30)
Raising each side of (1.A.30) to the (1− θ) power and integrating each side over i, we have
1 = η



1
ˆ
0
ht(i)
θ−1
θ di



θ
θ−1
(1.A.31)
Substituting out ht(i) in (1.A.31) using (1.15) and then using the definition of Yt from (1.12)
we have the social planner’s - or efficient - level of output
Y et =
1
η
Zt
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Then the gross efficient output gap is simply
Get =
Yt
Y et
= η
Yt
Zt
(1.A.32)
1.A.6 The Natural Level of Output
Here we derive the natural level of output in this economy as defined in definition 2 in section
2.7. Assuming prices are flexible, or φ= 0, the monopolistically competitive firm will set its
price a constant “mark-up” - M = θθ−1 - over marginal cost (see Eq. (1.A.29))
Pt = M
Wt
Zt
(1.A.33)
Rearranging a bit and then expressing (1.A.33) in terms of log-deviations from steady state
we have, where all variables with a tilde that follow are real detrended log-deviations from
steady state with the exception of interest rates which are in nominal terms.
0 = W̃t− Z̃t
Now use the household’s first order condition relating the marginal utility of consumption
and leisure to the real wage and log-linearizing we have
0 = (1+γm)C̃t−γmM̃At +γmυ̃t− Z̃t (1.A.34)
where γm =
u
′′
MA,C
u
′
C
is zero for additively separable preferences. Now substitute equation
(1.A.23), the log-linearized market clearing condition, into(1.A.34) to obtain
0 =
(1+γm)
sc
Ỹ nt −
(1− sc)+γm
sc
M̃At −
(1+γm)(1− sc)ω
sc
(ũAt − ũDt )
+γmυ̃t−
(1+γm)(1− sc)
sc
x̃t− Z̃t (1.A.35)
55
Next, substitute equation (1.A.24) into (1.A.35) to eliminate the monetary aggregate and
impose the condition that at the natural rate of output ũAt = 0.
0 = Ỹ nt − Z̃t+ω(1− sc)ũDt − (1− sc)x̃t
+
[
scγm(1−ηυ)− (1− sc)(1+γm)ηυ
sc
]
υ̃t (1.A.36)
≡ Ỹ nt − Z̃t+ω(1− sc)ũDt − (1− sc)x̃t+Ψyυυ̃t
Finally we can eliminate ũDt , and hence r̃t, from (1.A.36) by log-linearizing ũ
D
t = S̃t = γruD r̃t+
γτ
uD
τ̃t + γ
x
uD
x̃t and then eliminate r̃t from this expression using the condition that ũ
A
t = 0
which implies (using Eq. (1.A.18))
0 = ũAt = γuNγ
r
uN r̃t+γuD
[
γruD r̃t+γ
τ
uD τ̃t+γ
x
uD x̃t
]
which defines the policy rate in terms of stochastic shocks. Clearly to stabilize the aggregate
interest rate spread the policy rate must fall when the loan-deposit spread rises. This is
confirmed below.
r̃t = −
[
γuDγ
τ
uD
γuNγ
r
uN
+γuDγ
r
uD
]
τ̃t−
[
γuDγ
x
uD
γuNγ
r
uN
+γuDγ
r
uD
]
x̃t
≡ −sPD
γτ
uD
γr
uD
τ̃t− sPD
γx
uD
γr
uD
x̃t (1.A.37)
Using this expression in ũDt = S̃t = γruD r̃t+γτuD τ̃t+γxuD x̃t we have that
ũDt = (1− sPD)γτuD τ̃t+(1− sPD)γxuD x̃t
≡ sPNγτuD τ̃t+ sPNγxuD x̃t (1.A.38)
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Substituting (1.A.38) into (1.A.36) and solving for Ỹ nt we have
Ỹ nt = z̃t−Ψyτ τ̃t−Ψyxx̃t−Ψyυυ̃t (1.A.39)
where
Ψyτ = (1− sc)ωγτuD
Ψyx = (1− sc)[ωsPNγxuD −1]
Ψyυ =
[
scγm(1−ηυ)− (1− sc)(1+γm)ηυ
sc
]
Although the expression in (1.A.39) is only accurate to first order, it will be useful to define
the equivalent expression in terms of stationary variables in levels for uniformness when
we define the detrended equilibrium system below. It can be easily verified the resulting
expression is proportional to
Y nt =
(
Zt
Zt−1
)
υ−Ψ
y
υ
t x
−Ψyx
t τ
−Ψyτ
t (1.A.40)
1.A.7 The Natural Rate of Interest
Combine equations (1.A.1), (1.A.6) and (1.A.13) and log-linearize the resulting expression
to obtain the consumption Euler expression which is given by
r̃t−Et[π̃t+1] = Et[(1+γm)∆C̃t+1 −γm∆M̃At+1 −∆r̃Lt+1]
+Et[γm∆υ̃t+1 −∆ãt+1] (1.A.41)
Following a similar process that was used to arrive at the natural rate of output we can now
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substitute the market clearing condition (see (1.A.23)) to eliminate C̃t and the equilibrium
monetary aggregate condition (see (1.A.24)) to eliminate M̃At . Then impose the definition of
the natural rate of output (see Def. 2, Section 2.7) on the resulting expression using (1.A.39)
for the natural rate of output and almost all terms cancel leaving us with just
r̃nt = −Et[∆ãt+1]+Et[∆Z̃t+1]−Et[∆r̃Lt+1] (1.A.42)
To eliminate the interest rate from (1.A.42) use equation (1.A.38) to arrive at the expression
for the natural rate of interest
r̃nt = ãt(1−ρa)− z̃t(1−ρz)−Ψrτ τ̃t(1−ρτ )−Ψrxx̃t(1−ρx) (1.A.43)
where
Ψrτ =
[
γuDγ
τ
uD
γuNγ
r
uN
+γuDγ
r
uD
]
=
γτ
uD
γr
uD
(1− spN )
Ψrτ =
[
γuDγ
x
uD
γuNγ
r
uN
+γuDγ
r
uD
]
=
γx
uD
γr
uD
(1− spN )
Although the expression in (1.A.43) is only accurate to first order, it will be useful to define
the equivalent expression in levels and impose the unit root in the technology process for
uniformness when we define the equilibrium system below. It can be easily verified the
resulting expression is proportional to
rnt = a
(1−ρa)
t Z
(1−ρz)
t τ
−Ψrτ (1−ρτ )
t x
−Ψrx(1−ρx)
t (1.A.44)
1.A.8 Calibrated Values
In Table 1.10 we summarize the values assigned to the model’s parameters in the baseline
model. See section 3.1 for a detailed explanation of the calibration. Also, in section 5.2 we
analyze robustly optimal policy in which case the values assigned to the parameters driving
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the model’s stochastic shocks (which play a crucial role in shaping optimal policy) are varied
over a large range of values.
1.A.9 The Detrended Equilibrium System
At this point it is now possible to define a symmetric equilibrium in the model. First, impose
the equilibrium conditions (1.23), (1.25), (1.26), (1.27) and (1.28) on the models equations.
As mentioned in the text, the resulting model, in its current form, is not stationary due to
the unit roots in the technology process and the price level. Hence, we must next detrend
the non-stationary variables and then define an equilibrium in the stationarized model. The
resulting model is described in detail in the Table 1.11.
1.A.10 The Simple-Sum Monetary Aggregate
When the Simple-Sum monetary aggregate (see Eq. 1.22) is embedded in the policy rule
(see Eq. (1.18)) in place of the Divisia monetary aggregate (see Eq. 3.8) the economy is
likely to be indeterminate. In this section we highlight why this occurs. Since issues of
local determinacy can be sufficiently analyzed with a linear approximation to the model
we linearize the Simple-Sum monetary aggregate to quantify its error in tracking the true
aggregate. Begin by substituting (1.A.4) and (1.A.5) into the definition of the growth rate
of the simple sum aggregate to eliminate Nt and Dt.
ln(µSimple−Sumt ) = ln
(
Nt+Dt
Nt−1 +Dt−1
)
= ∆ln(MAt )+ω∆ln(u
A
t ) (1.A.45)
+ ln
(
ν(uNt )
−ω +(1−ν)(uDt )−ω
ν(uNt−1)
−ω +(1−ν)(uDt−1)−ω
)
The expression for the growth rate of the Simple-Sum aggregate to this point is exact. To
gain further insight we now linearize (1.A.45) around the competitive equilibrium.
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ln(µSimple−Sumt ) ≈ ∆ln(M
A
t )+ω∆
[
(γuNγ
r
uN +γuDγ
r
uD)r̃t+γuD(γ
τ
uD τ̃t+γ
x
uD x̃t)
]
−ω∆
[
(γSSuNγ
r
uN +γ
SS
uDγ
r
uD)r̃t+γ
SS
uD (γ
τ
uD τ̃t+γ
x
uD x̃t)
]
= ∆ln(MAt )+ω
[
γruN (γuN −γSSuN )+γruD(γuD −γSSuD )
]
∆r̃t
+ω(γuD −γSSuD )
[
γτuD∆τ̃t+ωγ
x
uD∆x̃t
]
= ∆ln(MAt )+ω(γ
r
uN −γruD)(γuN −γSSuN )∆r̃t
−ω(γuN −γSSuN )
[
γτuD∆τ̃t+ωγ
x
uD∆x̃t
]
≡ ∆ln(MAt )+ΨSSr ∆r̃t−ΨSSτ ∆τ̃t−ΨSSx ∆x̃t (1.A.46)
Its worth noting that γuN −γSSuN = −(γuD −γSSuD ) = 0 when r̄D = 1. That is, when currency
and deposits are prefect one for one substitutes (i.e. their user costs are identical) the simple
sum aggregate tracks the true aggregate without error. However, this environment is at odds
with reality (and this model).28To gain further insight into the determinacy properties of
Taylor rules reacting to the Simple-Sum aggregate, it is useful to evaluate ΨSSr at the models
steady state. 29 In which case we find that ΨSSr ≈ 5. To see why such a large positive value
of ΨSSr is troublesome examine the policy rule when reacting to the (growth rate) of the
Simple-Sum aggregate.
r̃t = φππ̃t+φmµ̃
SS
t
= φππ̃t+φm
[
∆ln(MAt )+Ψ
SS
r ∆r̃t
]
(1.A.47)
Rearranging (1.A.47) so that it can explicitly expressed as an interest rate rule with a unitary
28Meanwhile, carrying out a similar linearization for ln(µDivisiat ) one can verify that γuN − γDivisiauN =
−(γuD − γDivisiauD ) = 0 in general in this model. That is, regardless of whether r̄
D = 1, ln(µDivisiat ) ≈
∆ln(MAt ).
29The values of ΨSSτ and Ψ
SS
x have no bearing on determinacy.
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coefficient on r̃t on the left hand side we have:
r̃t =



−
[
φmΨ
SS
r
1−φmΨSSr
]
r̃t−1 +
[
φπ
1−φmΨSSr
]
π̃t +
[
φm
1−φmΨSSr
]
∆ln(MAt ) 0< φm < 1/Ψ
SS
r
[
φmΨ
SS
r
φmΨSSr −1
]
r̃t−1 −
[
φπ
φmΨSSr −1
]
π̃t −
[
φm
φmΨSSr −1
]
∆ln(MAt ) φm > 1/Ψ
SS
r
Using our baseline calibration, for φm ≈ .2 the sign of the policy rule’s reaction to inflation
is flipped so that higher inflation leads to lower nominal rates. Hence, the sizable error in
tracking the true aggregate is positively related to the policy rate which leads to this reversed
policy rule. Interestingly, the determinacy region displayed in Figure 1.5 shows that the rule
is not always indeterminate despite this perverse reaction to inflation. To see why notice
that for φm > 1/Ψ
SS
r the policy rule is super-inertial with a negative reaction to inflation.
Although the literature on determinacy is scant regarding super-inertial policy rules with
a negative inflation reaction (for good reason), numerical analysis in this model appears to
bring out a relationship sufficient for determinacy as follows:
If φπ < 0 and ρr > 1 then ρr +φπ > 1 is determinate. (1.A.48)
This condition however offers little hope for stabilizing Taylor rules which react to the simple
sum aggregate since as φm → ∞ the policy rule becomes
r̃t = r̃t−1 −∆ln(MAt ) (1.A.49)
which is always indeterminate.30 Instead, the condition in (1.A.48) only explains why the
simple-sum rule is ever determinate. Indeed, the small determinacy region in Figure 1.5 is
described by the condition:
If φπ > 0 and 1> φm >
1
ΨSSr
then φm+φπ < 1 is determinate.
30Interestingly Eq. (1.A.49) is similar to a constant growth rate of Simple-Sum rule, suggesting using
Simple-Sum as an instrument is troublesome as well.
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Figure 1.5: The shadded area to the southwest of the dotted line, defined by φm> 1/Ψ
SS
r and
φm+φπ < 1, is determinate. Here φm denotes the response to the growth rate simple-sum
monetary aggregate.
Not surprisingly, the optimization on this small region of determinacy is not successful hence
no policy prescription for policy rules reacting to simple-sum is available. Since reacting to
simple-sum limits policy makers reaction to inflation (something central bankers would un-
derstandably be adverse to doing), the most practical policy prescription when reacting to
Simple-Sum is to fix φm = 0. This stresses the importance of properly constructing monetary
aggregates for use in policy making, extending the point of Belongia (1996) that “measure-
ment matters” to the policy making realm. Indeed when the properly weighted Divisia
aggregate is embedded in the policy rule, the determinacy region satisfies a novel Taylor
principle for Divisia aggregates.31
31See Figure 1.4 and Eqs. (1.33) and (1.34).
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1.A.11 The Ramsey Problem
In all welfare calculations we approximate the model around the Ramsey planner’s steady
state. We calculate this steady state using the OLS method described in Schmitt-Grohe &
Uribe (2012). Specifically, in terms of detrended variables and equations, define
Et[C(Et+1,Et,St,St−1)] = 0 (1.A.50)
(St−S) = ρ(St−1 −S)+ ǫt (1.A.51)
where (1.A.50) denotes the system of equilibrium conditions defined in Table 1.11 definition
of the stochastic processes which are defined in equation (1.A.51). and hence E denotes
the (1x17) vector of endogenous variables32 and the vector St denotes the (5x1) vector of
exogenous stochastic variables33 implying ǫt is the vector of structural disturbances. The
relevant portion of the Ramsey planners Lagrangian is given by
L = ...−βt−1ΓTt−1C(Et,Et−1,St,St−1)
+βtut(Et,St)−βtΓTt C(Et+1,Et,St+1,St)+ ...
where {Γt}∞t=−1 denotes the sequence of (16x1) Lagrange multipliers for the 16 structural
equations.34The relevant first order condition is given by the (1x17) matrix equation35
32To be explicit the 17 endogenous variables are given by the detrended versions of: πt, rt, Wt,Λ
3
t , Λ
1
t , r
L
t ,
rDt , Ct, Λ
2
t , M
A
t , Nt, Dt, Lt, Yt, ht, Ft, Qt .
33To be explicit the 5 exogenous stochastic variables are given by the detrended versions of: υt, at, xt, τt,
Zt.
34To be explicit the 16 structural equations are given by: (1.3), (1.8), (1.10), (1.15), (3.28), (1.A.1)-(1.A.6),
(1.A.13)-(1.A.15), (1.A.26), (1.A.29).
35All derivatives are computed analytically using MATLAB’s symbolic toolbox.
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∂ut(Et,St)
∂Et
= ΓTt Et
[
∂C(Et+1,Et,St+1,St)
∂Et
]
+β−1ΓTt−1
∂C(Et,Et−1,St,St−1)
∂Et
(1.A.52)
Finding the Ramsey steady state requires finding values of (Ē , Γ̄) that solve
∂ut(Et,St)
∂Et
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(Ē ,S̄)
= Γ̄T
∂C(Et+1,Et,St+1,St)
∂Et
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(Ē ,S̄)
+β−1Γ̄T
∂C(Et,Et−1,St,St−1)
∂Et
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(Ē ,S̄)
(1.A.53)
C(Ē , Ē , S̄, S̄) = 0 (1.A.54)
We guess a value of π̄ and then solve (1.A.54) for the remaining variables in Ē . We then use
Ē to solve (1.A.53) for ˆ̄ΓOLS as proposed in Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2012) and define δ(π̄)
as the resulting residual.36 We then use MATLAB’s fminsearch(-) to minimize δ(π̄)T δ(π̄)
where the minimizing argument is the Ramsey steady state value of inflation. Under our
baseline preferences this value is π̄ = 1.028 and under additively separable preferences this
value is π̄ = 1.033.
36More specifically, ˆ̄ΓOLS is the projection of
[
β−1
∂Ct−1
∂Et
+ ∂Ct
∂Et
]T
onto
[
∂Ut
∂Et
]T
.
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1.B Appendix: Tables
Table 1.10: Baseline1,2 Calibration of Parameters
Parameter Value Source
Discount Rate: β 0.99 Kydland & Prescott (1982)
Disutility of Work: η 2.5 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
Shopping-Time Function: χ 2 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
CES Monetary Aggregate: ν 0.225 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
CES Monetary Aggregate: ω 1.5 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
Final Goods CES: θ 6 Ireland (2000, 2004a,b)
Cost of Price Adjustment: φ 50 Ireland (2004b)
Steady-State Inflation: π 1.005 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
Money Demand Shock: υ 0.4 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
Technology Shock: Z 1.005 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
Reserves Demand Shock: τ 0.02 Ireland (2011)
Banking Productivity Shock: x 0.01 Belongia & Ireland (2006, 2013)
Preference Shock: ρa 0.9579 Ireland (2004a)
Money Demand Shock: ρυ 0.9853 Ireland (2004a)
Reserves Demand Shock: ρτ 0.5 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
Banking Productivity Shock: ρx 0.5 Belongia & Ireland (2013)
Preference Shock: σa 0.0188 Ireland (2004a)
Money Demand Shock: συ 0.0088 Ireland (2004a)
Reserves Demand Shock: στ 0.7448 Dellas et al. (2010)
Banking Productivity Shock: σx 0.1720
Belongia & Ireland (2006)
Dellas et al. (2010)
Technology Shock: σz 0.0098 Ireland (2004a)
1 Here the baseline calibrations are presented. In section 5.2 we analyze robustly
optimal policy and vary the calibrated values of the model’s shocks.
2 Under additively separable prefernces we set ηm = .1 which matches
N+D
P C
= 3.3 in
steady state, the average of Simple-Sum M2 to nominal consumption expenditures
since 1959.
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Table 1.11: Equilibrium Variables and System of Equations1
Variable Detrended Variable Equation
υt υt (1.5)
at at (1.6)
xt xt (1.7)
τt τt (1.9)
Zt Zt/Zt−1 (1.16)
Pt Πt (1.18)
rt rt (1.A.13)
Wt Wt/PtZt−1 (1.A.29)
Λ3t Λ
3
tZt−1 (1.A.2)
Λ1t Λ
1
tZt−1 (1.A.14)
rLt r
L
t (1.A.6)
rDt r
D
t (1.10)
St St (1.11)
Ct CtZt−1 (1.A.1)
MAt M
A
t /PtZt−1 (1.3)
Λ2t Λ
2
tZt−1 (1.A.3)
Nt Nt/PtZt−1 (1.A.4)
Dt Dt/PtZt−1 (1.A.5)
Lt Lt/PtZt−1 (1.8)
Yt Yt/Zt−1 (3.28)
ht ht (1.15)
Ft Ft/PtZt−1 (1.A.26)
Qt Qt/PtZt−1 (1.A.15)
rAt r
A
t (1.A.18)
sNt s
N
t (1.20)
sDt s
D
t (1.21)
µDivisiat µ
Divisia
t (3.8)
µSimple−Sumt µ
Simple−Sum
t (1.22)
Get G
e
t (1.A.32)
−2 Y nt (1.A.40)
−2 rnt (1.A.44)
ut = ln(Ct)−ηht ut = ln(Ct/Zt−1)−ηht
−η 1χ(υtPtCtMAt )
χ −η 1χ(
υtCt/Zt−1
MAt /PtZt−1
)χ −
1 The order of the variables correspond to the order in which to solve
the system to find the steady state. The corresponding equation
number corresponds to the equation used to find the steady state
value of the respective variable. (An exception to this is the steady
state value for inflation which is calibrated and thus the policy rule
is not needed to solve for its steady state value.)
2 The natural rate of output and hence the natural rate of interest
do not have a non-stationary analogue since these variables are only
definded by a linear approximation around the steady state.
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Chapter 2
Determinacy and Indeterminacy in
Monetary Policy Rules with Money1
2.1 Introduction
In his classic (1960) work, A Program for Monetary Stability, Milton Friedman argued the
economy can be stabilized by stabilizing the growth rate of a money at k-percent. This policy
proposal has received considerable attention by monetary theorist.2 Surprisingly though, the
question of whether this rule could be implemented with a broad monetary aggregate in a
manner which delivers a unique rational expectations equilibrium remains unanswered. If
such a rule fails in this capacity, fixing the growth rate of a monetary aggregate may induce
instability by allowing for sunspot equilibria. This paper provides an answer to this question
within the preferred framework of modern monetary policy analysis, a New-Keynesian model.
We show analytically that Friedman’s k-percent rule can deliver a unique rational expecta-
tions equilibrium when the true monetary aggregate is used. Since that aggregate depends
on deep structural parameters, such a rule is not simple in the sense defined by (Gali, 2008).
1This chapter is coauthored with John W. Keating, Department of Economics, The University of Kansas,
Email: jkeating@ku.edu.
2For example, Ireland (1996) has shown that a policy of holding the growth rate of money constant can
be optimal from a welfare perspective when prices are set in advance. Additionally, Carlstrom & Fuerst
(1995, 2003) explore the welfare and determinacy properties of money growth rules in flexible price models.
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A simple rule which could actually be used by central banks,3 would be to fix the growth
rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate. We show that such a rule inherits the determi-
nacy properties of the k-percent rule based on using the true monetary aggregate. Another
well-known non-parametric aggregate is the simple-sum monetary aggregate which was the
method used to compute the M2 measure Friedman advocated. Interestingly, if this aggre-
gate is used in place of the true monetary aggregate,we find Friedman’s k-percent rule is
likely to result in indeterminacy stemming from the simple-sum’s error in tracking the true
aggregate. We conclude that Friedman was correct in his judgment that fixing the growth
rate of a broad monetary aggregate may stabilize the economy. However, we show in the
context of a New-Keynesian model with multiple types of assets which provide monetary
services that aggregation by simple-sum is in general a flawed approach.
Most similar to our work is Evans & Honkapohja (2003). They analyze determinacy prop-
erties of k-percent rules in a New-Keynesian model when money is modeled as a single
monetary asset. In this case, money in the model can be interpreted as base money since
it earns zero interest. They show numerically that fixing the growth rate of this measure of
money is consistent with a unique rational expectations equilibrium under a broad range of
values. However Friedman’s k-percent rule calls for the central bank to fix the growth rate
of a high-level monetary aggregate, not base money. In order to analyze determinacy prop-
erties of broad monetary aggregates, we require a model like the one developed by Belongia
& Ireland (2014) which provides a role for both currency and deposits as competing sources
of monetary services. We use this as our framework to analyze the determinacy properties
of monetary policy rules with broad money.
In addition to providing analytic representations of the determinacy regions of various mon-
etary aggregate growth rules, we also analyze interest rate rules reacting to inflation and the
growth rate of monetary aggregates. Once again we find that "measurement matters” (Belon-
gia, 1996) from a determinacy standpoint. Interest rate rules reacting to the growth rate of
3Arguably, one reason Friedman advocated a k-percent rule was its simplicity.
68
either the true monetary aggregate or the Divisia monetary aggregate satisfy a novel Taylor
principle for monetary aggregates. The simple-sum monetary aggregate’s error in tracking
the true aggregate prevents an interest rate rule reacting to simple-sum from having a similar
determinacy region. Instead, such rules have very small determinacy regions.
Following this introductory section we present our model which is a standard New-Keynesian
framework that allows two different types of assets to provide monetary services. Section 3
examines determinacy properties of k-percent rules and compares outcomes obtained with
different monetary aggregates. The fourth section of the paper investigates interest rate rules
that allow for a reaction to monetary aggregates. Again we address determinacy properties
associated with alternative monetary aggregates. Section 5 performs a numerical analysis
with more complicated monetary policy rules that allow policy to react to more information
making it impossible to derive analytical results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Model
We consider a canonical version of the linearized New-Keynesian (NK) model. Following
Woodford’s (2003) notation we assume all exogenous disturbances are bounded in amplitude
by ‖ξ‖. All variables with a "–" over them denote non-stochastic steady-state values. Also,
variables with a "~" over them denote log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. For
convenience of notation we assume each stochastic disturbance follows a stationary AR(1)
process and is driven by orthogonal white noise shocks. However, this assumption is only
made for convenience as all the results presented hold for general stationary processes. As
usual, this model consists of 3 non-policy equations when money is included in the model.
ỹet = Et{ỹet+1}− [r̃t−Et{π̃t+1}− r̃et ] (2.1)
π̃t = κỹ
e
t +βEt{π̃t+1} (2.2)
m̃t− p̃t = ỹet − ũt+ υ̃t+ z̃t (2.3)
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Equation (2.1) is the dynamic IS curve, equation (2.2) is the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC) and equation (2.3) is the demand for the monetary aggregate. In the above equa-
tions ỹet = yt − zt denotes the efficient output gap and r̃et = Et{∆z̃t+1} −Et{ãt+1} denotes
the efficient interest rate. The variables z̃t, ãt, and υ̃t represent exogenous technology, pref-
erence and money-demand disturbances respectively. We depart from the textbook analysis
of money. Following Belongia & Ireland (2014) we model broad money so that (2.3) is the
demand for the aggregate service flow from currency and interest bearing deposits. For this
reason, (2.3) includes the user-cost of the monetary aggregate ut which in general depends
on a vector of interest rates. Modeling money as a broader measure turns out to play a key
role in our determinacy results. In addition to examining the effects of monetary aggregate
growth rules we will also investigate interest rate rules which react to the growth rate of a
monetary aggregate.
We assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
mt =
[
ν
1
ωn
ω−1
ω
t +(1−ν)
1
ω d
ω−1
ω
t
] ω
ω−1
(2.4)
is the true monetary aggregate where nt and dt are non interest bearing currency and interest
bearing deposits respectively. Meanwhile, ω > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between
currency and deposits and 0< ν < 1 governs the steady-state share of currency and deposits.
The CES function is homogeneous of degree one in terms of nt and dt, an attractive property
since that means changing both nt and dt by a certain percentage will change the monetary
aggregate by exactly that same percentage. Of course, simple-sum has that property. And
when ω → ∞, mt = nt+ dt. Hence, the simple-sum monetary aggregate is the appropriate
monetary aggregate when currency and deposits are perfect substitutes. More generally,
when ω <∞, currency and deposits are not perfect one-for-one substitutes and then simple-
sum will not equal the true aggregate.
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The aggregate dual user-cost is correspondingly defined by
ut =

ν
(
rt−1
rt
)1−ω
+(1−ν)
(
rt− rdt
rt
)1−ω


1
1−ω
. (2.5)
Following the structural model of Belongia & Ireland (2014) with profit maximizing banks,
the user cost of deposits can be expressed as
udt =
rt− rdt
rt
=
(rt−1)τt+xt
rt
(2.6)
where rt is the gross nominal interest rate on loans, r
d
t is the deposit rate and both τt
and xt are exogenous financial disturbances that follow stationary stochastic processes with
orthogonal white noise shocks. Specifically, τt represents reserves demand disturbances with
a mean τ̄ and xt represents deposit cost disturbances with a mean x. To remain empirically
relevant, we will assume throughout the paper that the stochastic processes are bounded so
that at all times rt > r
d
t > 1 ensuring that deposits are “cheaper” than currency. A log-linear
approximation to (2.5) is given by
ũt = ηrr̃t+ητ τ̃t+ηxx̃t+O(‖ξ‖2) (2.7)
where all the coefficients are positive. Substituting (2.7) into (2.3) brings about a five variable
dynamic model with three equations (2.1, 2.2 and 2.8).
m̃t− p̃t = ỹet −ηrr̃t−ητ τ̃t−ηxx̃t+ υ̃t+ z̃t (2.8)
The dimension of the model can be reduced by one variable after defining real balances as
l̃t ≡ m̃t− p̃t. As is standard, we close the model with a specification of monetary policy.
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2.3 Friedman k-percent Rules
In this section we consider the performance of various money growth rules. Initially we close
the model with a constant money growth rule for the true monetary aggregate:
∆m̃t = 0. (2.1)
Such k-percent rules have been examined in New-Keynesian models by Evans & Honkapohja
(2003) and Gali (2008) where they were shown to deliver a unique REE. However, these
studies assume the existence of a single monetary asset. This leaves open the question
of whether the determinacy properties extend to measures that aggregate different types
of monetary assets. Arguably, this is the relevant case to consider. Friedman, for example,
argued for fixing the growth rate of a broad aggregate such as M2, not the monetary base. In
this section we show three main results. First, the k-percent rule is always determinate when
applied to the true monetary aggregate, regardless of the magnitude of the interest semi-
elasticity. Second, this result of general determinacy extends to rules in the true aggregate
is replaced by the Divisia monetary aggregate. Finally, we show that this strong result does
not extend to the simple-sum monetary aggregate. Instead, a constant simple-sum growth
rule is indeterminate unless the interest semi-elasticity is large relative to simple-sum’s error
in tracking the true monetary aggregate. Consider the dynamic system consisting of (2.1),
(2.2), (2.8) and (2.1).
Proposition 2.1. For any 0 < β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any ηr ≥ 0 if the central bank
follows the policy rule ∆m̃t = 0 then there exists a unique REE.
The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix. Unless stated otherwise, the proof for the
remaining propositions, lemma and corollaries will also be found in the Appendix. Proposi-
tion 1 shows that a constant monetary aggregate growth rules always deliver a unique REE
provided it is based on the true monetary aggregate. This result extends results of Evans &
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Honkapohja (2003) to monetary aggregates. This result in of itself is of little use to central
banks who do not know the underlying parameters of the monetary aggregate. To circum-
vent this problem, suppose the central bank fixes the growth rate of the Divisia monetary
aggregate instead of the true monetary aggregate developed initially by Barnett (1980).
Definition 2.1. The growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate is defined by:
ln(gdivisiat ) =
(
snt + s
n
t−1
2
)
ln
(
nt
nt−1
)
+
(
sdt + s
d
t−1
2
)
ln
(
dt
dt−1
)
, (2.2)
where snt and s
d
t are the expenditure shares of currency and interest bearing deposits respec-
tively defined by:
snt =
(rt−1)nt
(rt−1)nt+(rt− rdt )dt
and sdt = 1− snt . (2.3)
The Divisia monetary aggregate is the expenditure share-weighed growth rate of currency
and deposits. In contrast to the true aggregate, the Divisia aggregate is non-parametric and
depends only on current and past observable information. Such a rule is more relevant to
policy makers as it doesn’t require estimating any parameters.4
The following lemma shows that for the general CES specification ofmt, the Divisia monetary
aggregate (locally) tracks the growth rate of the true monetary aggregate to first order
accuracy without error.
Lemma 2.1. For any 0 < ν < 1 and for any ω > 0, the difference between the Divisia
monetary aggregate and the true monetary is given by
ln(gdivisiat )−∆ln(Mt) = O(‖ξ‖2).
The accuracy properties of the Divisia monetary aggregate are well known in Index number
4A central bank could estimate the parameters in equation 4, the monetary aggregator function, but that
would induce parameter uncertainty from sampling error, but using Divisia avoids that concern. Moreover,
this approach leaves a central bank exposed to questions and criticisms with regards to how they estimate
the parameters.
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theory. Most notably, Divisia (1926) showed in continuous time, the Divisia monetary ag-
gregate tracks any linearly homogenous function without error. Moreover, Diewert (1976)
classified the discrete time Divisia monetary aggregate defined above as superlative - mean-
ing that it can track the growth rate of any twice differentiable linearly homogenous function
up to second order accuracy without error. This lemma shows that for the CES function in
particular, a linear approximation to the Divisia monetary aggregate tracks the true mone-
tary aggregate up to first order accuracy without error. This result is very useful in analyzing
local determinacy which requires only a linear approximation to the non-linear model.
Formally, suppose the central bank follows the rule
g̃divisiat = 0 (2.4)
in place of (2.1). The dynamic system consists of (2.1), (2.2), (2.8) and (2.4), and we obtain
the following result.
Corollary 2.1. For any 0 < β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any ηr ≥ 0 if the central bank
follows the policy rule g̃divisiat = 0 then there exists a unique REE.
The proof follows immediately from combining Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. Corollary 1
shows the central bank may replace the true aggregate with the Divisia monetary aggregate
without any change in determinacy. This result obtains because determinacy is a local
condition and Lemma 1 shows that locally, the Divisia monetary aggregate exactly tracks
the growth rate of the true monetary aggregate. Therefore, determinacy properties for
growth rules based on the true monetary aggregate are inherited by rules which instead use
the Divisia monetary aggregate. However, the same can not be said for the more common
simple-sum monetary aggregate.
Definition 2.2. The growth rate of the simple-sum monetary aggregate is defined by
ln(gsimple−sumt ) = ln
(
nt+dt
nt−1 +dt−1
)
. (2.5)
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The simple-sum aggregate treats currency and interest bearing deposits as one for one per-
fect substitutes. Standard microeconomic theory dictates in such a case only the cheapest
monetary asset would have a positive demand in equilibrium. Since this is not the case in
this model, nor reality, it is perhaps not surprising the simple-sum aggregate will locally
track the true aggregate with error. The following lemma defines and quantifies this error.
Lemma 2.2. For any 0 < ν < 1, for any ω > 0 and for any (τ̄ , x) satisfying (r̄− 1) >
(r̄− 1)τ̄ +x so that ūn > ūd > 0, the difference between the growth rate of the simple-sum
monetary aggregate and the growth rate of the true monetary aggregate is given by
ln(gsimple−sumt )−∆ln(mt) = ψr(ω)∆r̃t−ψx(ω)∆x̃t−ψτ (ω)∆τ̃t+O(‖ξ‖2) (2.6)
where
(
ψr(ω), ψx(ω), ψτ (ω)
)
∈ R3++ with limω→∞ψr(ω) = ψx(ω) = ψτ (ω) = 0.
Intuitively, any change in the relative prices of currency and deposits results in a substitution
between these assets from the household. Since the simple-sum monetary aggregate treats
these assets as perfect one for one substitutes it is not able to internalize these relative
changes in the service flow from the monetary aggregate. Only in the limiting case of perfect
substitutes does this error disappear.
From a determinacy standpoint, simple-sum’s error in tracking the true monetary aggregate
arising from the exogenous financial shocks is irrelevant. However, the error that depends
on the endogenous interest rate - ∆r̃t - will influence the determinacy region of a rule uti-
lizing the simple-sum monetary aggregate. In particular, the following corollary summarizes
determinacy properties when instead of (2.1) the policy rule is:
g̃simple−sumt = 0, (2.7)
with the dynamic system now consisting of (2.1), (2.2), (2.8) and (2.7).
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Corollary 2.2. For any 0 < β < 1, for any κ > 0 if the central bank follows the policy rule
g̃simple−sumt = 0 then there exists a unique REE if and only if ψr(ω)< ηr +
1
2 .
Importantly, when using the simple-sum monetary aggregate in place of either the true mon-
etary aggregate or the Divisia monetary aggregate a constant monetary aggregate growth
rule may not be determinate. Indeterminacy will occur when the error term ψr(ω) is large
relative to the interest semi-elasticity of money demand - ηr. This parameter varies signifi-
cantly in the empirical literature. For example Ball (2001) estimates ηr = .05 while Ireland
(2009) estimates ηr = 1.9. Given the wide range of estimates for ηr, central banks may be un-
derstandably averse to implementing this Friedman’s k-percent rule based on a simple-sum
measure. Furthermore, Section 2.5 of this paper presents estimates of ψr(ω) which com-
bined with even the largest plausible estimates of ηr suggest that the determinacy condition
in Corollary 2 is unlikely to be satisfied. On the other hand, a k-percent rule with Divisia
yields no determinacy concerns whatsoever.
2.4 Interest Rate Rules with Money
In this section we consider interest rate feedback rules which react to lagged interest rates and
the growth rate of a monetary aggregate. When Friedman proposed the k-percent rule, he
also advocated changes in bank regulation which would make the rule easily implemented.
For example, Friedman (1960) argued for increasing the reserve requirements to 100% to
make the monetary aggregates more easily controllable. Friedman (1960) went on to say
that:
This [constant money growth] is not, under our present System, an easy thing
to do. It involves a great many technical difficulties and there will be some
deviations from it. If the other changes I suggested were made in the System,
it would make the task easier; but even without those changes, it could be done
under the present System.
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Under a fractional reserve banking system a pragmatic way of targeting the growth rate of
money is with an interest rate reaction function whereby the central bank adjusts the interest
rate as needed to correct deviations of money growth from the desired k-percent target.
More recently a number of studies have included nominal money growth in interest rate
rules such as Canova & Menz (2011), Sims & Zha (2006) and Fahr et al. (2013). Fewer
papers have included Divisia monetary aggregates in interest rate feedback rules. One that
has is Belongia & Ireland (2012) which estimates structural VAR’s with such rules. Keating
& Smith (2013) find that interest rate rules that react to Divisia may be optimal from
a normative perspective if financial shocks are present and the natural rate of interest is
unobservable. This result is consistent with the assertion of McCallum & Nelson (2011) and
Andres et al. (2009) that nominal money growth provides valuable real-time information
regarding the natural rate of interest. Despite this interest, there are no results on the
determinacy properties of such rules to guide policy makers. With this in mind, assume the
central bank sets the policy rate according to
r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φm∆m̃t. (2.1)
Using (2.1) to close the dynamic model that still contains (2.1), (2.2) and (2.8), we have the
following result.
Proposition 2.2. For any 0 < β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any ηr ≥ 0, if the central bank
follows the policy rule r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φm∆m̃t with φm ≥ 0 and φr ≥ 0 then there exists a unique
REE if and only if φm+φr > 1.
Intuitively, this result extends the Taylor Principle to monetary aggregates. Expectations will
remain well-anchored if the central bank reacts more than one for one to nominal aggregate-
money growth, in the long-run. Proposition 1 provides a sufficient condition for determinacy
that is independent of the magnitude of the interest semi-elasticity of money demand which
is important given that the estimates of this parameter vary significantly in the empirical
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literature.
Despite the neutrality of the result with regard to ηr, this rule requires that a central bank
measure the unobservable true monetary aggregate. To circumvent this issue suppose instead
the central bank replaces the true monetary aggregate with the Divisia monetary aggregate
r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φdg̃
divisia
t . (2.2)
The policy rule in (2.2) could more be easily implemented by a central bank compared to
(2.1) as the interest rate is responding to observable information and does not entail the
estimation of any deep structural parameters. Ans the following corollary to Proposition 2
shows that a central bank can replace ∆m̃ with g̃divisiat without changing the determinacy
condition.
Corollary 2.3. For any 0 < β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any ηr ≥ 0 if the central bank
follows the policy rule r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φdg̃
divisia
t with φd ≥ 0 and φr ≥ 0 then there exists a
unique REE if and only if φd+φr > 1.
The proof of this corollary follows immediately by combining Lemma 1 with Proposition 2.
This result is significant in terms of actually implementing interest rate rules reacting to
money growth. Most notably, central banks can use the non-parametric Divisia aggregate
in interest rate feedback rules like (2.2) and guarantee determinacy by setting φd > 1.
The same can not be said, however, for the more common simple-sum monetary aggregate.
In particular, the following corollary summarizes determinacy properties when the policy
rule in (2.3) is used instead of (2.1) or (2.2)
r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φssg̃
simple−sum. (2.3)
Corollary 2.4. For any 0 < β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any ηr ≥ 0 if the central bank
follows the policy rule r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φssg̃
simple−sum with φss ≥ 0 and φr ≥ 0 then there exists
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a unique REE if and only if | φr +φss−φss[ψr(ω)−ηr] |>| 1−φss[ψr(ω)−ηr] |.
A proof of this derives from Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 and is found in the Appendix.
This result highlights how once again simple-sum and Divisia monetary aggregates diverge
in terms of determinacy properties. Namely, the determinacy region for interest rate rules
reacting to the simple-sum monetary aggregate depend on simple-sum’s error in tracking the
true monetary aggregate. Intuitively, if ψr(ω) is relatively large compared to the interest
semi-elasticity of money demand then an upper and lower bound is placed on φss for de-
terminacy. Meanwhile, if ψr(ω) is relatively small compared to the interest semi-elasticity
of money demand then only a lower bound is placed on φss for determinacy. For example,
in the extreme case where the simple-sum and Divisia aggregates coincide (i.e. ω → ∞),
Corollary 3 shows that φss > 1 is sufficient for determinacy. However, in the more general
case, determinacy under the interest rate rule reacting to simple-sum may have a relatively
small determinacy region as summarized below for the case in which ψr(ω) − ηr > 1. The
following section of the paper provides an empirical justification for assuming this inequality
holds.
To get an idea of how likely determinacy is under an interest rate rule reacting to the
simple-sum aggregate Figure 1 plots the determinacy region under the numerical calibration
presented below. There are 2 regions of determinacy. Using Leeper’s (1991) terminology, one
region is in the passive regime while the other is in the active regime. What stands out the
most is how unlikely the condition presented in Corollary 4 is satisfied. Under this interest
rate rule with simple-sum money determinacy occurs within such a narrow band that it is
more the exception than the norm.
2.5 Numerical Analysis
Potentially more realistic policy rules may include not only a response to the growth rate
of a monetary aggregate but also a response to inflation. Unfortunately this slightly more
complicated rule places analytic results out of reach so we must resort to numerical anal-
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Table 2.1: Determinacy Regimes Under
r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φssg̃
simple−sum
t
Regimea Determinacy Conditionsb
Passive φr +φss < 1
φss >
1
ψr(ω)−ηr
φss >
1
ψr(ω)−ηr−1
φr
φss >
1
2(ψr(ω)−ηr)−1
+ 12(ψr(ω)−ηr)−1φr
Active I φr +φss > 1
φss <
1
ψr(ω)−ηr
φss <
1
ψr(ω)−ηr−1
φr
Active II φr +φss > 1
φss >
1
ψr(ω)−ηr
φss <
1
ψr(ω)−ηr−1
φr
φss <
1
2(ψr(ω)−ηr)−1
+ 12(ψr(ω)−ηr)−1φr
a We use the terms "Passive" and "Active" similar to Leeper
(1991) to describe a monetary regime where φr + φss < 1 or
φr +φss > 1 respectively.
b All of these conditions are sufficient for the existence of a unique
REE under the conditions stated in Corollary 4 under the ad-
ditional assumption that ψr(ω) − ηr > 1 The analysis in the
following section shows this to be the empirically relevant case
for the U.S. economy.
ysis of determinacy. Many of the parameters in the model are standard so we take their
values from the previous literature. We vary the remaining parameters over a reasonable
range to understand how determinacy may, or may not, be achieved for the US economy.
More precisely, we set β = .99 and κ = .3. The two key non-policy parameters relevant for
determinacy of the simple-sum rules are ηr - the interest semi-elasticity of money demand
and ψr(ω) - simple-sum’s endogenous error in tracking the true monetary aggregate. There
is a large literature estimating the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. Ball (2001)
estimates ηr = .05 and Ireland (2009) estimates ηr = 1.9. These important papers provide a
reasonable range of parameter values: ηr ∈ [0.05,1.9].
To gain some insight regarding the size of simple-sum’s error term in tracking the true
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Figure 2.1: The shaded areas is determinate while the white area is indeterminate. The
determinacy region above is graphed for ηr = 1.9 with the other parameters fixed at the
values presented in Table 2.3.
monetary aggregate, we interpret
ln(nt+dt)− ln(mt) = β0 +β1r̃t+β2x̃t+β3τ̃t+ εt (2.1)
as a linear econometric relationship with the error in this equation assumed to be a stationary
stochastic process. The linear functional relationship is all that is necessary to address
determinacy issues. The estimate of β1 will provide a calibrated value for ψr(ω). We estimate
(2.1) using monthly data from 1967:01 to 2012:09 from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database.
We use data on simple-sum M2 and the M2 MSI (Divisia) series to form the dependent
variable. As for the independent variables we first construct a reserves ratio series - τ̃t
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- using the St. Louis Adjusted Reserves series and the non-currency components of M2.
We then use this and the commercial and industrial loan rate, the M2 own rate and the
structural equation in (2.6) to back out a time series for x̃t. In this simple model, r̃t is
simultaneously equal to the loan rate, the benchmark rate and the policy rate. Hence,
interpreting r̃t empirically is not straightforward. For this reason, we estimate (2.1) twice
where first we use the 3-Month Treasury Bill secondary market series for r̃t and then we
examine the robustness of our estimates by using the commercial and industrial loan rate
for r̃t. Table 2.2 reveals the point-estimates are surprisingly similar.
Table 2.2: Econometric Estimation of the Simple-Sum Error Term a
ln(nt+dt)− ln(mt) = β0 +β1r̃t+β2x̃t+β3τ̃t+ εt
1967:01-2012:09 β̂0 β̂1 β̂2 β̂3
Measuring r̃t with the 3-Month T-Bill Rate
OLS Estimates -0.2025 11.0377 -0.3444 -0.0509
Standard-Error 0.0164 2.7619 0.0492 0.0164
Measuring r̃t with the C & I Loan Rate
OLS Estimates -0.1518 9.8770 -0.3669 -0.0659
Standard-Error 0.0128 2.5236 0.0560 0.0153
1984:01-2007:09 β̂0 β̂1 β̂2 β̂3
Measuring r̃t with the 3-Month T-Bill Rate
OLS Estimates -0.0462 5.8694 -0.0589 -0.0289
Standard-Error 0.0019 0.6701 0.0071 0.0079
Measuring r̃t with the C & I Loan Rate
OLS Estimates -0.0462 5.6362 -0.0669 -0.0170
Standard-Error 0.0019 0.6427 0.0074 0.0071
a The standard errors are computed as in Newey & West (1987) using T
1
4
lags.
The results in Table 2.2 support the theoretical findings in Lemma 2 as the estimated co-
efficients all have the predicted sign. Moreover, the key parameter for the determinacy of
the constant simple-sum growth rule is estimated to be significantly larger than the interest
semi-elasticity estimates of Ball (2001) and Ireland (2009) over both the full-sample and
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the sub-sample.5 To give further credence to the above estimation, the value of β̂1 over
the 1984:01 - 2007:09 period is nearly identical to the value of ψr(ω) that is implied by the
calibration put forth in Belongia & Ireland (2014). For our numerical analysis we use the
smaller estimate of obtained from this sample period.
It is immediately clear that over the range of values in Table 2.3 the necessary and sufficient
condition for the determinacy of the constant simple-sum growth rule in Corollary 2 is
not met. Moreover, Figure 2.1 above plots the determinacy region under the interest rate
rule reacting to the lagged interest rate and the growth rate of simple-sum and shows the
determinacy region comprises a very small percentage of the parameter space.
Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Calibrated Value
β .99
κ .30
ψr(ω) 5.6
ηr [0.05,1.9]
φr [0,1]
φd [0,5]
φss [0,5]
φπ [0,5]
However, more realistic policy rules focus on inflation as well. A question of more practical
interest may be: How does including a response to the growth rate of money affect the well
known determinacy properties of interest rate rules reacting to the lagged interest rate and
inflation? Concretely, we consider rules such as
r̃ = φrr̃t−1 +φm∆m̃t+φππ̃t (2.2)
5The full sample estimates include heterogeneous monetary regimes and the financial crisis. For this
reason, we also estimate equation (2.1) over a sub-sample which roughly captures the Great Moderation and
stops just before the crisis. The Fed’s policy over that sub-period can be characterized by a predictable
interest rate rule with a low inflation target.
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where we will once again focus on implementable rules which replace the growth rate of the
true monetary aggregate with either the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate or the
growth rate of simple-sum. The main results of this section further emphasize the importance
of using the Divisia monetary aggregate in policymaking as the determinacy regions are
large and invariant to non-policy parameters such as the interest semi-elasticity of money
demand, in contrast rules based on simple-sum money. Importantly, including a response
to the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate doesn’t destabilize the economy by
inducing indeterminacy in an already determinate rule based on the true aggregate. The
same can not be said for the simple-sum aggregate.
Interest Rate Rules Reacting to the Lagged Interest Rate, Divisia
and Inflation
First consider rules which replace the the true aggregate in (2.2) with the Divisia monetary
aggregate.6 We find the results in Corollary 3 above extend to a rule reacting to inflation as
well. By adjusting the nominal rate more than 1 for 1 to changes in the growth rate of the
Divisia monetary aggregate and inflation in the long run, the central bank can bring about
a unique REE as Figure 2.2 concisely shows. We summarize this in the result below.
Conjecture 2.1. For any φr > 0, φd> 0 and φπ > 0, if the central bank follows the policy rule
r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φdg̃
divisia
t +φππ̃t then there exists a unique REE if and only if φr+φd+φπ > 1.
We present this as a conjecture since we are only able to verify this statement numerically.
One interpretation of this result is that including a response to the growth rate of the Divisia
monetary aggregate in a policy rule reacting to inflation and lagged interest rates will not
disrupt the determinacy properties of the original rule. Keating & Smith (2013) provide
reason to consider putting Divisia into a Taylor Rule. They show that adding a response
to the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate in that rule is welfare enhancing as it
6Of course, Lemma 1 implies the determinacy properties are equivalent under both the true aggregate
and the Divisia monetary aggregate.
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Figure 2.2: The shaded area is determinate while the white area is indeterminate. The
determinacy region above is found to hold for all values of 0< β < 1, κ > 0 and ηr ≥ 0.
provides information regarding the unobservable natural rate of interest. Here we stress that
such a change in policy will not destabilize the economy since we can ensure the existence
of a unique REE under this rule. And this determinacy condition represents a modification
to the well-known Taylor Principle.
Interest Rate Rules Reacting to the Lagged Interest Rate, simple-
sum and Inflation
Now we analyze determinacy properties of nominal interest rate rules reacting to inflation
as well as the growth rate of simple-sum and lagged interest rates. Conventional wisdom
suggests that reacting aggressively to inflation will stabilize the economy by ensuring a
unique REE - the so called Taylor principle. Although this is true in this model, we find that
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augmenting an interest rate rule which satisfies the Taylor principle with a positive response
to the growth rate of simple-sum may destabilize the economy by inducing indeterminacy.
Simply put, reacting to the growth rate of simple-sum is likely to be destabilizing regardless
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Figure 2.3: The shaded areas are determinate while the white area is indeterminate. The
determinacy region above are evaluated for the estimated vale of ψr(ω) = 5.6.
of the inflation or lagged interest rate response. Figure 2.3 displays this by plotting the
determinacy region for the policy rule
r̃ = φrr̃t−1 +φssg̃
simple−sum
t +φππ̃t. (2.3)
Comparing Figures 2.2 and 2.3 highlights the difference between placing the growth rate of
the Divisia aggregate and the simple-sum aggregate in an interest rate reaction function.
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Most noticeably, when the Divisia aggregate is embedded in the interest rate rule the de-
terminacy regions are large and independent of non-policy parameters such as the interest
semi-elasticity of money demand. On the other hand, when the simple-sum aggregate is
placed in the interest rate reaction function the economy is more likely to be indetermi-
nate than determinate. Moreover, the determinacy regions depend critically on non-policy
parameters including the interest semi-elasticity of money demand and the portion of simple-
sum’s error related to the policy rate - ψr(ω). To emphasize this point, Figure 2.4 plots the
determinacy regions under the policy defined by (2.3) and ψr(ω) = 3, which is nearly nearly
three standard deviations below the estimated value.
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Figure 2.4: The shaded areas are determinate while the white area is indeterminate. The
determinacy region above are evaluated for ψr(ω) = 3, nearly three standard deviations below
the estimated value.
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Figure 2.4 highlights how sensitive the determinacy regions are to this parameter. Very simi-
lar results are found if we again set ψr(ω) = 5.6 and analyze determinacy under a much larger
value of ηr = 3.8, twice the estimated value from Ireland (2009). This suggests what matters
most for the determinacy properties of simple-sum oriented policy rules is not the policy pa-
rameters, but the size of that aggregate’s error ψr(ω) relative to the interest semi-elasticity
ηr. Also, obeying the Taylor Principle when reacting to the simple-sum will frequently not
result in a determinate equilibrium.
2.6 Conclusion
The ability to achieve a unique rational expectations equilibrium is a fundamental issue
for any policy rule. We show that Friedman’s k-percent rule is determinate so long as the
monetary aggregate is measured accurately. Ironically if the recommended aggregate of
Friedman, a broad simple-sum measure, is used in his k-percent rule the economy is likely
to be unstable due to self-fulfilling expectations. This problem can be remedied in practice
by using the non-parametric Divisia monetary aggregate in the k-percent rule. To be fair to
Friedman, he was aware of flaws in the simple-sum aggregation method and even hinted at
something akin to the Divisia index in Friedman & Schwartz (1971), pp. 151-152:
This [simple-summation] procedure is a very special case of the more general
approach. In brief, the general approach consists of regarding each asset as a
joint product having different degrees of ’moneyness,’ and defining the quantity
of money as the weighted sum of the aggregated value of all assets, the weights
for individual assets varying from zero to unity with a weight of unity assigned
to that asset or assets regarded as having the largest quantity of ’moneyness’
per dollar of aggregate value. The procedure we have followed implies that all
weights are either zero or unity.
In Taylor-type rules in which the interest rate may react Divisia, we find that determinacy
arises under a variant of the Taylor Principle. On the other hand when the interest rate
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may respond to simple-sum the Taylor Principle no longer guarrentess determinacy and the
regions of determinacy are substantially smaller.
The paper’s results provide an alternative perspective on how "measurement matters” (Be-
longia, 1996). Our contribution is to show that the choice of monetary aggregate in a policy
rule may have a substantive effect on the likelihood that monetary policy will be able to
elicit a unique equilibrium outcome for an economy. Placed in the larger literature stressing
the differences between Divisia and simple-sum monetary aggregates,7 the case against the
use of monetary aggregates in policy making rests on the failures of simple-sum monetary
aggregates.
As an example, Barnett & Chauvet (2011b) highlight how the growth rate of simple-sum
and Divisia monetary aggregates differed during the Monetarist Experiment.
Table 2.4: Money Growth Rates During the Period November 1979 to August 1982
Monetary Aggregate Mean Growth Rate
Divisia M2 4.5
simple-sum M2 9.3
Divisia M3 4.8
simple-sum M3 10.0
The growth rates of simple-sum aggregates were above Fed’s targets, while the more accurate
Divisia measures were growing at substantially lower rates. 8 Inflation fell quickly, but over-
tightening led to a more severe recession than was likely needed or desired. When combined
with the theoretical results in this paper, a natural question arises: Had accurate measures
of broad money been used (such as the Divisia quantity aggregates) during the Monetarist
Experiment, would monetary aggregates have fallen from favor among central bankers?
7For more general research examining the Divisia monetary aggregate’s properties relative to alternative
simple-sum measures see the following works. At paper length Barnett & Chauvet (2011b); Belongia (1996),
Barnett et al. (1984) and at book length Barnett & Singleton (1987); Belongia & Binner (2000); Barnett &
Serletis (2000); Barnett & Chauvet (2011a); Barnett (2012).
8The Federal Reserve Bulletin reported target ranges.
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2.A Appendix: Proofs
In this section we present the proofs to our results stated in the paper. The equilibrium
model we use in this paper is based on the model described in Belongia & Ireland (2014),
however we assume additively separable preferences between consumption and monetary
services allowing us to obtain analytic results for the determinacy regions. Also, to arrive at
the standard dynamic IS and NKPC, we slightly alter the timing of the transactions for the
representative household.
Proposition 2.1
Consider the dynamic system defined by equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.8) and (2.1),
AEt[w̃t+1] =Bw̃t+Cst.
A=















1 1 −1 0
0 −β 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 ηr 1















B =















1 0 0 0
κ −1 0 0
0 −1 0 1
1 0 0 0















where w̃t =
[
ỹet , π̃t, r̃t−1, l̃t−1
]T
and where l̃t = mt − pt is real money balances. The
system has two non-predetermined variables and two predetermined variables. Therefore,
the system will have a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE) if, and only if, two
roots λ which satisfy | B−λA |= 0 lie outside the unit circle and remaining two roots lie
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inside the unit circle McCallum (1998). The generalized eigenvalues of the matrix pencil
B−λA are given by
Λ =















0
1
2
β+1+κ−
√
(β−1)2+2βκ+2κ+κ2
β
1+ηr
ηr
1
2
β+1+κ+
√
(β−1)2+2βκ+2κ+κ2
β















. (2.A.1)
The proof to Proposition 1 follows from (A.1) since | λi |< 1 for i ∈ {1,2}, | λ4 |> 1 and
finally | λ3 |> 1 since ηr ≥ 0 by assumption.
Lemma 2.1
From Definition 1, we have the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate is given by
ln(gDivisiat ) =
(
snt + s
n
t−1
2
)
ln
(
nt
nt−1
)
+
(
sdt + s
d
t−1
2
)
ln
(
dt
dt−1
)
.
Now derive the factor demands for nt and dt given the CES monetary aggregate defined in
(2.4). These factor demands can be derived from a two-stage budgeting problem where in
the first stage the household chooses how much of their budget to allocate towards monetary
services mt at price ut and in the second stage the household chooses how to allocate their
monetary expenditures between nt and dt. Suppose the household chooses to allocate mtut =
Z towards monetary services. Then the second stage problem is to:
max
nt,dt
mt subject to u
n
t nt+u
d
t dt = Z and (2.4).
The resulting factor demands are given by:
nt = νmt
(
ut
unt
)ω
dt = (1−ν)mt
(
ut
udt
)ω
. (2.A.2)
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which satisfy the constraint unt nt+u
d
t dt = utmt for
ut =

ν
(
rt−1
rt
)1−ω
+(1−ν)
(
rt− rdt
rt
)1−ω


1
1−ω
.
Substituting these factor demands into the definition of the Divisia monetary aggregate,
we obtain the following useful expression for the difference between the growth rates of the
Divisia monetary aggregate and the true monetary aggregate:
ln(gdivisiat )−∆ln(mt)
= ω
[
∆ln
(
ut(u
n
t ,u
d
t )
)
− 1
2
(
snt + s
n
t−1
)
∆ln(unt )−
1
2
(
sdt + s
d
t−1
)
∆ln
(
udt
)]
≡ EDiv(ln(unt ), ln(udt ), ln(unt−1), ln(udt−1)),
where EDiv is the error-term which quantifies the difference between the Divisia monetary
aggregate and the true monetary aggregate.
To verify the claim, take a first-order Taylor approximation of EDiv around the steady-state,
hence all derivatives below are evaluated at the steady-state.
EDiv =
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt +
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt +
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(unt−1)
]
ũnt−1 +
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(udt−1)
]
ũdt−1 +O(‖ξ‖2)
=
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt +
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt −
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt−1 −
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt−1 +O(‖ξ‖2)
=
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(unt )
]
∆ũnt +
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(udt )
]
∆ũdt +O(‖ξ‖2)
Finally, notice that
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[
∂EDiv
∂ln(unt )
]
=
[
∂ln(ut)
∂ln(unt )
− 1
2
(snt + s
n
t−1)
]
=
ν (ūn)1−ω
ν (ūn)1−ω +(1−ν)
(
ūd
)1−ω −
ν (ūn)1−ω
(ū)1−ω
= 0
and
[
∂EDiv
∂ln(udt )
]
=
[
∂ln(ut)
∂ln(udt )
− 1
2
(sdt + s
d
t−1)
]
=
(1−ν)
(
ūd
)1−ω
ν (ūn)1−ω +(1−ν)
(
ūd
)1−ω −
(1−ν)
(
ūd
)1−ω
(ū)1−ω
= 0
which verifies our claim since we have ln(gdivisiat )−∆ln(mt) = O(‖ξ‖2).
Lemma 2.2
Much like the proof of Lemma 1, substitute the factor demands for currency and deposits
defined in equation (2.A.2) into the definition of the simple-sum aggregate in definition 2 to
arrive at
ln(gsimple−sumt )−∆ln(mt)
= ω∆ln(ut(u
n
t ,u
d
t ))+∆ln(ν(u
n
t )
−ω +(1−ν)(udt )−ω)
≡ ESS(ln(unt ), ln(udt ), ln(unt−1), ln(udt−1)),
where ESS is the error-term which quantifies the difference between the simple-sum monetary
aggregate and the true monetary aggregate.
To verify the claim, take a first-order Taylor approximation of ESS around the steady-state,
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hence all derivatives below are evaluated at the steady-state.
ESS =
[
∂ESS
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt +
[
∂ESS
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt +
[
∂ESS
∂ln(unt−1)
]
ũnt−1 +
[
∂ESS
∂ln(udt−1)
]
ũdt−1 +O(‖ξ‖2)
=
[
∂ESS
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt +
[
∂ESS
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt −
[
∂ESS
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt−1 −
[
∂ESS
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt−1 +O(‖ξ‖2)
=
[
∂ESS
∂ln(unt )
]
∆ũnt +
[
∂ESS
∂ln(udt )
]
∆ũdt +O(‖ξ‖2)
= ω
[
∂ln(ut)
∂ln(unt )
− ∂ln(ν(u
n
t )
−ω +(1−ν)(udt )−ω)
∂ln(unt )
]
∆ũnt
+ω
[
∂ln(ut)
∂ln(udt )
− ∂ln(ν(u
n
t )
−ω +(1−ν)(udt )−ω)
∂ln(udt )
]
∆ũdt +O(‖ξ‖2)
= ω
[
s̄n− ν(ū
n)−ω
ν(ūn)−ω +(1−ν)(ūd)−ω
]
∆ũnt
+ω
[
s̄d− (1−ν)(ū
d)−ω
ν(ūn)−ω +(1−ν)(ūd)−ω
]
∆ũdt +O(‖ξ‖2)
= ω
[
ν(ūn)1−ω
ν(ūn)1−ω +(1−ν)(ūd)1−ω −
ν(ūn)−ω
ν(ūn)−ω +(1−ν)(ūd)−ω
]
∆ũnt
+ω
[
(1−ν)(ūd)1−ω
ν(ūn)1−ω +(1−ν)(ūd)1−ω −
(1−ν)(ūd)−ω
ν(ūn)−ω +(1−ν)(ūd)−ω
]
∆ũdt +O(‖ξ‖2)
Let α= ūd/ūn ∈ (0,1), then we have
ESS = ω
[
ν(α)ω−1
ν(α)ω−1 +(1−ν) −
ν(α)ω
ν(α)ω +(1−ν)
]
∆ũnt
+ω
[
(1−ν)
ν(α)ω−1 +(1−ν) −
(1−ν)
ν(α)ω +(1−ν)
]
∆ũdt +O(‖ξ‖2)
= ω
[
ν(α)ω−1(ν(α)ω +(1−ν))−ν(α)ω(ν(α)ω−1 +(1−ν))
(ν(α)ω +(1−ν))(ν(α)ω−1 +(1−ν))
]
∆ũnt
+ω
[
(1−ν)(ν(α)ω +(1−ν))− (1−ν)(ν(α)ω−1 +(1−ν))
(ν(α)ω +(1−ν))(ν(α)ω−1 +(1−ν))
]
∆ũdt +O(‖ξ‖2).
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Further simplifying this expression, we have:
ESS = ω
[
αω[(α)−1ν(1−ν)−ν(1−ν)]
(ν(α)ω +(1−ν))(ν(α)ω−1 +(1−ν))
][
1
r̄−1 −
(
τ̄ − x̄
(r̄−1)(τ̄(r̄−1)+ x̄)
)]
∆r̃t
−ω
[
αω[(α)−1ν(1−ν)−ν(1−ν)]
(ν(α)ω +(1−ν))(ν(α)ω−1 +(1−ν))
][(
τ̄
α
)
∆τ̃t+
(
x̄
(r̄−1)τ̄ + x̄
)
∆x̃t
]
+O(‖ξ‖2)
≡ ψ(ω)
[
r̄x̄
(r̄−1)(τ̄(r̄−1)+ x̄)
]
∆r̃t−ψ(ω)
(
τ̄
α
)
∆τ̃t−ψ(ω)
(
x̄
(r̄−1)τ̄ + x̄
)
∆x̃t+O(‖ξ‖2)
≡ ψr(ω)∆r̃t−ψτ (ω)∆τ̃t−ψx(ω)∆x̃t+O(‖ξ‖2).
To complete the proof, first notice that since (τ̄ , x̄)> 0 we have that ψr(ω)> 0 and moreover
since ψ(ω) > 0 we have that (ψτ (ω),ψx(ω)) ≫ (0,0). Finally, to obtain the limiting result
apply L’Hospital’s rule to the function
h(ω) = ωeωln(α) =
ω
e−ωln(α)
to find that lim
ω→∞
h(ω) = 0 which implies lim
ω→∞
ψ(ω) = 0 verifying the claim.
Corollary 2.2
By Lemma 2, the constant simple-sum growth rule implies a policy rule of the form
0 = ∆g̃simple−sumt = ∆m̃t+ψr(ω)∆r̃t−ψτ (ω)∆τ̃t−ψx(ω)∆x̃t.
We can rearrange this expression as an interest rate feedback rule.
r̃t = r̃t−1 −
1
ψr(ω)
∆m̃t−
ψτ (ω)
ψr(ω)
∆τ̃t−
ψx(ω)
ψr(ω)
∆x̃t (2.A.3)
This rule is part of a more general class of rules studied in section 4. More generally, consider
rules of the form
r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φm∆m̃t
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which is equation (2.1) where we drop the stochastic terms from (2.A.3) since they have no
impact on the determinacy properties. The dynamic system consisting of (2.1), (2.2), (2.8)
and (2.A.3) can be expressed as
AEt[w̃t+1] =Bw̃t+Cst.
A=















1 1 −1 0
0 −β 0 0
0 0 1 −φm
0 0 ηr 1















B =















1 0 0 0
κ −1 0 0
0 φm φr −φm
1 0 0 0















where w̃t =
[
ỹet , π̃t, r̃t−1, l̃t−1
]T
and where l̃t = mt − pt is real money balances. The
system has two non-predetermined variables and two predetermined variables. Therefore,
the system will have a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE) if, and only if, two
roots λ which satisfy | B−λA |= 0 lie outside the unit circle and remaining two roots lie
inside the unit circle McCallum (1998). The generalized eigenvalues of the matrix pencil
B−λA are given by
Λ =















0
1
2
β+1+κ−
√
(β−1)2+2βκ+2κ+κ2
β
φr+φm+ηrφm
1+ηrφm
1
2
β+1+κ+
√
(β−1)2+2βκ+2κ+κ2
β















. (2.A.4)
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The proof for Corollary 2 follows by letting φr = 1 and φm = − 1ψr(ω) . In which case we have
that | λi |< 1 for i ∈ {1,2}, | λ4 |> 1 and finally | λ3 |> 1 if and only if
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
ψr(ω)−ηr −1
ψr(ω)−ηr
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
> 1.
This condition will be satisfied if and only if ψr(ω) < ηr +
1
2 allowing for a possibly infinite
generalized eigenvalue for ψr(ω) = ηr.
Proposition 2.2
This result follows from examining the eigenvalues presented in (3.B.5) above which considers
the dynamic model consisting of (2.1), (2.2), (2.8) and (2.1). We have that | λi |< 1 for i ∈
{1,2}, | λ4 |> 1 and finally | λ3 |> 1 if and only if
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φr +φm+ηrφm
1+ηrφm
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
> 1.
Since we are assuming all terms are non-negative this is equivalent to having that | λ3 |> 1
if and only if φr +φm > 1.
Corollary 2.4
Applying Lemma 2 to the interest rate rule in (2.3) we have the policy rule
r̃t = φrr̃t−1 +φss[∆m̃t+ψr(ω)∆r̃t−ψτ (ω)∆τ̃t−ψx(ω)∆x̃t].
Rearranging this expression this expression we have a policy rule of the form
r̃t =
[
φr −φssψr(ω)
1−φssψr(ω)
]
r̃t−1 +
[
φss
1−φssψr(ω)
]
∆m̃t (2.A.5)
where we drop the exogenous shock terms since they have no affect on the determinacy
properties of the policy rule. Since the rule in (2.A.5) is of the same general form as (2.1),
we can analyze the eigenvalues in(3.B.5) above. We then have that | λi |< 1 for i ∈ {1,2},
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| λ4 |> 1 and finally | λ3 |> 1 if and only if
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
φr +φss−φss[ψr(ω)−ηr]
1−φss[ψr(ω)−ηr]
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
> 1
or equivalently
|φr +φss−φss[ψr(ω)−ηr]|> |1−φss[ψr(ω)−ηr]|.
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Chapter 3
A Working Solution to Working
Capital Indeterminacy
3.1 Introduction
The advice to central banks that a well designed interest rate reaction function mechanically
adjusts the policy rate more than one for one to deviations of inflation from target (c.f. Taylor
(1993)) is one of the most robust policy prescriptions in monetary theory. So much so that
leading undergraduate textbooks introduce students to the so called Taylor principle, “The
principle that the monetary authorities should raise nominal interest rates by more than the
increase in the inflation rate has been named the Taylor principle, and it is critical to the
success of monetary policy” (Mishkin, 2013).
However, the Taylor principle as described above is not without its caveats. Importantly,
Christiano et al. (2010) show numerically that an upper bound may need to be placed on the
central bank’s reaction to inflation in order to ensure expectations remain well anchored.1
This upper bound arises when there is a timing mismatch between when the firm produces it
product and when it gets paid for the product. When this occurs, firms will typically have to
1Another apparent failure of the Taylor principle involves the interaction of trend-inflation and determi-
nacy. For example, Coibion & Gorodnichenko (2011) show that under the widely used Calvo style pricing
assumption and trend inflation, the Taylor principle breaks down.
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finance inputs with short-term loans called working capital. This environment introduces a
working-capital channel of monetary policy which works counter to the typical transmission
mechanism of monetary policy in New-Keynesian models.2
To illustrate both of these transmission mechanisms, consider for the moment a prototypical
dynamic AS-AD model where expectations are intentionally simplified to allow for graphical
intuition. This model consists of 3 log-linear equations:
ŷt =− R̂t+ εadt
π̂t =



κŷt+βπ̂t−1
κŷt+κrR̂t+βπ̂t−1
R̂t =φππ̂t
where the first equation is an IS equation relating cyclical output to the real interest rate
and an exogenous white noise shock, εadt , the second equation is a dynamic Phillip’s curve
relating inflation to cyclical output and possibly the real policy rate if working capital is
required for production and finally the last equation is a simple real interest rate reaction
function which is assumed to describe the behavior of the central bank.
3.1.1 The Taylor Principle: A lower bound on φπ
Assume the typical Phillips curve governs firms’ price setting behavior so that: π̂t = κŷt+
βπ̂t−1. The Taylor principle is represented in the above system as the requirement on the
magnitude of φπ. Since R̂t is the real interest rate the, the appropriate condition for a stable
dynamic system φπ > 0. To see why this is so, eliminate R̂t from the above system and
plot the resulting aggregate demand and supply curves. Notice that in Figure (3.1a), the
aggregate demand embodies the typical negative relationship between inflation and cyclical
output. This negative relationship emerges from the assumption that φπ > 0 so that when
2Throughout the paper, the terms working-capital channel and cost channel can be used interchangeably.
For consistency, I will refer to this mechanism as the working-capital channel.
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ŷt
π̂t
0
AD0,2,3,...
AD1
AS0,1
AS2
AS3
0
(a) AS-AD with φπ > 0
ŷt
π̂t
0
AD0,2,3,...AD1
AS0,1
AS2
AS3
0
(b) AS-AD with φπ < 0
Figure 3.1: The Taylor Principle
inflation increases the central bank generates an increase in the real interest rate, causing
cyclical output to decline. If the central bank were to violate this condition and set φπ < 0,
the resulting system would consist of two upward sloping curves. To see why this creates
dynamic instability in this simple model, consider the behavior of both models following a
one time increase in εad1 that returns to zero in periods 2,3 and so on.
The dynamics in the model under the Taylor principle are stable with output and inflation
returning to their steady state values. The increase in inflation that results from the aggre-
gate demand disturbance is met with a systematic increase in the real interest rate from the
central bank, which dampens output and therefore inflation. In fact, an excessively aggres-
sive central bank can set φπ arbitrarily large and eliminate any increase in inflation from
the aggregate demand demand disturbance. This policy prescription emerges from several
papers including Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2007).
On the other hand, when the central bank is passive and sets φπ < 0, the aggregate de-
mand disturbance causes inflation to initially increase, which the central bank amplifies by
lowering the real interest rate, causing output to increase further. The increase in output
resulting from passive monetary policy causes firms to set even higher prices resulting in even
more inflation and evermore policy accommodation. Clearly the dynamic system in Figure
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(3.1b) is not stable as inflation and output expand without bounds. To the extent that
the central bank cares about the volatility of inflation and output, this outcome is clearly
undesirable. Thus, the widespread recommendation that central banks should aggressively
combat inflation seems a natural conclusion. In the following section, I will motivate why
this prescription should not be given without pause.
3.1.2 The Taylor principle isn’t sufficient: An upper bound on φπ
Now suppose the working-capital channel of monetary policy is active so that inflation dy-
namics are governed by π̂t = κŷt +κrR̂t + βπ̂t−1. Notice now changes in the real interest
rate directly impact both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. The aggregate demand
channel posits that an increase in the real interest rate will lower aggregate demand, which
indirectly lowers inflation through the Phillips curve. The working-capital channel appends
to this mechanism an aggregate supply mechanism which posits that when the real inter-
est rate increases, so too do firms’ marginal cost and therefore there is upward pressure on
inflation.
Given these opposing channels, it is not surprising that a well intentioned central bank which
aggressively adjusts the policy rate in response to changes in inflation may unintentionally
induce instability through the working-capital channel. To illustrate this possibility, substi-
tute the monetary policy rule into the IS and Phillips curves to eliminate R̂t from the above
system and plot the resulting AS and AD curves. There are two possibilities, both of which
are illustrated in figure 2, κrφπ < 1 or κrφπ > 1. If we perform the same thought experiment
as above and consider the dynamic response to an aggregate demand disturbance then it
becomes clear why the latter condition is to be avoided.
First suppose that 1 > κrφπ. Then the Phillips curve is upward sloping as usual; however,
the slope is larger than would be in the case without the working-capital channel. None the
less, when aggregate demand increases inflation and cyclical output raise above their steady
state level. This rise in inflation results in a mechanical increase in the real policy rate by
the central bank. Over time, the counter-cyclical monetary policy decreases output which
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ŷt
π̂t
0
AD0,2,3,...
AD1
AS0,1
AS2
AS3
0
(a) AS-AD with κrφπ < 1
ŷt
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Figure 3.2: Working Capital Indeterminacy
puts pressure on inflation to fall back to its target.
Now suppose that 1<κrφπ as may be the case for a central bank which seeks to aggressively
target inflation. Then the Phillips curve posits a negative relationship between inflation and
cyclical output, and therefore both AS and AD curves slope downwards. When inflation
increases from the aggregate demand disturbance the central bank mechanically raises the
policy rate. This dampens output through the IS equation; however, it also increases inflation
through the working-capital channel. This additional increase in inflation induces the central
bank to further raise the policy rate which ultimately further increases inflation through the
working-capital channel. The cumulative effect of this feedback loop is higher inflation and
a fall in output. Dynamically, this same mechanism causes inflation to become unstable and
further wander from target while output falls further below the economy’s potential level.
3.1.3 Roadmap
The combination of the above results suggests the Taylor principle alone is not sufficient
to guarantee existence of a unique stable equilibrium. Instead, the central bank’s inflation
response must be bounded below (the Taylor principle) and above when there is an active
working-capital channel. In what follows, I will formalize these bounds and the sense in which
violating them produces instability using the full discipline of a structural New-Keynesian
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model and rational expectations. I also show that Friedman’s k-percent money growth rule
and an interest rate rule reacting to money growth with a coefficient satisfying the lower
bound condition φm > 1 are sufficient for determinacy. In other words, the working capital
induced indeterminacy is a potential pitfall exclusive to inflation targeting regimes. I also
show the above determinacy results are robust to weakening the assumption that firms
borrow at the policy rate. Finally, I augment the standard model with real wage rigidities.
This additional friction further restricts the central bank’s reaction to inflation but has no
impact on the determinacy regions of money growth targeting rules.
3.2 DSGE Model
This section describes the DSGE model used in the paper in detail. The model motivates
the working capital channel through a timing mismatch between when firms pay their wage
bill and receive payment for their output. To align the model as much as possible with the
textbook New-Keynesian model, I assume that all financial transactions are intratemporal
and therefore all interest rates are known at the beginning of the period. This allows firms
to adjust their prices before actually paying back their working capital loans at the end of
the period.3
3.2.1 The Household
The representative household enters any period t= 0,1,2, ... with a portfolio consisting of 3
assets. The household holds maturing bonds bt−1 , shares of monopolistically competitive
firm i ∈ [0,1] st−1(i), and base money totaling mbt−1. The household faces a sequence of
budget constraints in any given period. This budgeting can be described by dividing period
t into 2 separate periods: first a securities trading session and then bank settlement period.
In the securities trading session the household can buy and sell stocks, bonds, receives wages
wt for hours worked ht during the period, purchases consumption goods ct and obtains any
loans lhht needed to facilitate these transactions. Any government transfers are also made
3Christiano et al. (2005) provide an alternative timing assumption in which the policy rate (which equals
the loan rate in their model) is not known when period t prices are set.
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at this time, denoted by tt. Any remaining funds can be allocated between currency nt and
deposits dt. This is summarized in the constraint below.
nt+dt =
mbt−1
πt
+
bt−1
πt
− bt
rt
−
1
ˆ
0
qt (st(i)− st−1(i))di+wtht+ lt− ct+ tt (3.1)
At the end of the period, the household receives dividends ft(i) on shares of stock owned in
period t, st(i), and settles all interest payments with the bank. In particular, the household is
owed interest on deposits made at the beginning of the period, rdt dt and owes the bank interest
on loans taken out, rltl
hh
t . I assume as in Curdia & Woodford (2010) that an exogenous
fraction ξt of all loans to the household and firm will be defaulted upon in which case
the bank is not paid back but the proceeds are instead transfered to the household. Any
remaining funds can be carried over in the form of base money into period t+1, mbt.
mbt = nt+
1
ˆ
0
ft(i)st(i)di+ r
d
t dt− rltlhht + ξt[łhht + lft ]+f bt . (3.2)
I assume the default rate follows an AR(1) (in logs),
ln(ξt) = (1−ρξ)ξ̄+ρξln(ξt−1)+ εξt εξt ∼ N
(
0,σξ
)
. (3.3)
The household seeks to maximize their lifetime utility, discounted at rate β, subject to these
constraints. The period flow utility of the household takes the following form.
ut = at [ln(ct)+υtln(mt)+η (1−ht)]
The time-varying preference parameter at enters the linearized Euler equation as an IS shock
and similarly, υt enters the linearized money demand equation as a money demand shock.
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Both of these processes are assumed to follow an AR(1) (in logs).
ln(at) = ρaln(at−1)+ ε
a
t ε
a
t ∼ N (0,σa) (3.4)
ln(υt) = (1−ρυ)ln(ῡ)+ρυln(υt−1)+ ευt ευt ∼ N (0,συ) (3.5)
The true monetary aggregate, mt, which enters the period utility function takes a rather
general CES form,
mt =
[
ν
1
ω (nt)
ω−1
ω +(1−ν) 1ω (dt)
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
(3.6)
where ν calibrates the relative expenditure shares on currency and deposits and ω calibrates
the elasticity of substitution between the two monetary assets.
The representative household faces the problem of maximizing its lifetime utility subject
to its budget constraints. Letting ζt = [ct,ht,mt,nt,dt, l
hh
t , bt,mbt, st(i)] denote the vector
of choice variables, the household’s optimization problem can be recursively defined using
Bellman’s method.
Vt
(
bt−1,mbt−1, st−1(i)
)
= max
ζt
{
at [ln(ct)+υtln(mt)+η (1−ht)]
−λ1t
(
dt+nt+ ct−wtht− lhht −mbt−1/πt− tt− bt−1 +
1
ˆ
0
qt(i)(st(i)− st−1(i))di+ bt/rt
)
−λ2t
(
mt−
[
ν
1
ω (nt)
ω−1
ω +(1−ν) 1ω (dt)
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
)
−λ3t
(
mbt−nt−
1
ˆ
0
ft(i)st(i)di− rdt dt+ rltlhht − ξt[lhht + lft ]−f bt
)
+βEt
[
Vt+1
(
bt,mbt, st(i)
)]}
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The first order necessary conditions are given by the following equations:
at
ct
= βEt
[
at+1
ct+1
rt
πt+1
]
(3.7)
mrst = ηct (3.8)
wt = w
ρw
t−1mrs
(1−ρw)
t (3.9)
mt = ct
(
λ2t
λ1t
)−1
υt (3.10)
nt = νmt
[
λ2t /λ
1
t
(rt−1)/rt
]ω
(3.11)
dt = (1−ν)mt
[
λ2t /λ
1
t
(rt− rdt )/rt
]ω
(3.12)
rlt = rt+ ξt (3.13)
λ1t qt(i) = λ
3
t ft(i)+βEt[λ
1
t+1qt+1(i)]. (3.14)
The above equations are quite standard with a few exceptions. Notice that equations (5.7)
and (5.8) can be combines to yield the typical condition that the real wage equals the
marginal rate of substitution when ρw = 0. However, when 1 > ρw > 0 this condition only
holds in steady state and there may be short-run deviations from this optimality condition
due to real wage rigidity as in Blanchard & Gali (2007).
Additionally, the demand for the monetary aggregate and the various component quantities
shows that when money is modeled as an aggregate of imperfectly substitutable assets, the
demand for the aggregate and each component asset doesn’t depend exclusively on the short
term policy rate as is typically the case in the standard New-Keynesian economies (see
for e.g. Woodford (1999) and Gali (2008)). Instead, these demand functions depend on
the relative user costs of currency, deposits and the monetary aggregate: unt = (rt − 1)/rt,
udt = (rt − rdt )/rt and ut = λ2t /λ1t . Finally, notice the loan rate deviates from the rate on
1-period bonds by the default rate, giving rise to a time varying finance premium driven
default rates.
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3.2.2 The Goods Producing Sector
The goods producing sector features a final goods firm and an intermediate goods firm.
There are a unit measure of intermediate goods producing firms indexed by i ∈ [0,1] who
produce a differentiated product. The final goods firm produces yt combining inputs yt(i)
using the constant returns to scale technology,
yt =



1
ˆ
0
yt(i)
θt−1
θt di



θt
θt−1
in which θt > 1 governs the elasticity of substitution between inputs, yt(i). As in Smets &
Wouters (2007), I assume this elasticity is time varying:
ln(θt) = (1−ρθ)θ̄+ρθln(θt−1)+ εθt εθt ∼ N (0,σθ) , (3.15)
which results in pure cost-push shocks in the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. The final goods
producing firm sells its product in a perfectly competitive market, hence solving the profit
maximization problem,
max
yt(i)i∈[0,1]
pt



1
ˆ
0
yt(i)
θt−1
θt di



θt
θt−1
−
1
ˆ
0
pt(i)yt(i)di.
The resulting first order condition defines the demand curve for each intermediate goods
producing firm’s product.
yt(i) =
(
pt(i)
pt
)−θt
yt (3.16)
Intermediate Goods Producing Firm
Given the downward sloping demand for its product in (3.16), the intermediate goods pro-
ducing firm has the ability to set the price of its product above marginal cost. Unlike the
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final goods market, the intermediate goods market is not purely competitive as evident by
the downward sloping demand for its product in equation (3.16). To permit aggregation and
allow for the consideration of a representative intermediate goods producing firm i, I assume
all such firms have the same constant returns to scale technology which implies linearity in
the single input labor ht(i),
yt(i) = ztht(i). (3.17)
The zt term in (3.17) is an aggregate technology shock that follows an AR(1) in log differ-
ences,
ln(zt/zt−1) = (1−ρz)z̄+ρzln(zt−1/zt−2)+ εzt εzt ∼ N (0,σz) . (3.18)
The price setting ability of each firm is constrained in two ways. First, each intermediate
goods producing firm faces a demand for its product from the representative final goods
producing firm defined in (3.16). Second, each intermediate goods producing firm faces a
convex cost of price adjustment proportional one unit of the final good defined by Rotemberg
(1982) to take the form,
Φ(pt(i),pt−1(i),pt,yt) =
φ
2
[
pt(i)
π̄pt−1(i)
−1
]2
yt.
The intermediate goods producing firm maximizes its period t real stock price, qt(i). Using
the representative household’s demand for firm i′s stock (3.14) and iterating forward defines
the real (no-bubbles) share price as the discounted sum of future dividend payments,
qt(i) = Et


∞∑
j=0
βj
λ3t+j
λ1t
ft+j(i)

 .
Though the firm maximizes period t share price, the costly price adjustment constraint makes
the intermediate goods producing firm’s problem dynamic. Mathematically summarizing,
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each intermediate goods producing firm solves to following dynamic problem.
max
{yt(i),ht(i),pt(i)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
λ3t+j
λ1t


pt(i)
pt
yt(i)− rltwtht(i)−
φ
2
[
pt(i)
π̄pt−1(i)
−1
]2
yt


subject to
yt(i) =
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θt
yt
yt(i) = ztht(i)
The presence of the gross nominal loan rate in the firm’s profit function is the result of
the timing assumption which stipulates that firms must finance inputs with working capital
loans before being paid for their output. In this case, the firm borrows their entire wage bill
each period:
lft (i) = wtht(i). (3.19)
After paying the loan back with interest the firms total cost of obtaining inputs is given by
rltl
f
t (i)− lft (i)+wtht(i) = rltwtht(i) where the equality follows from (3.19).
The problem can be simplified by substituting the inverse of the technology constraint for
ht(i) and then substituting the factor demand into the resulting expression for yt(i) so
that now the representative intermediate goods producing firm solves the following recursive
problem defined by Bellman’s equation.
Vt(pt−1(i)) = max
pt(i)



λ3t yt
λ1t


[
pt(i)
pt
]1−θt
− rlt
wt
zt
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θt
− φ
2
[
pt(i)
π̄pt−1(i)
−1
]2


+βEt
[
Vt+1(pt(i))
]



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The first order condition for the problem is given by
(1− θt)
[
pt(i)
pt
]−θt
+ θtr
l
t
wt
zt
[
pt(i)
pt
]−1−θt
−φ
[
pt(i)
π̄pt−1(i)
−1
]
pt
π̄pt−1(i)
+βφEt
[
λ3t+1yt+1
λ3t yt
[
pt+1(i)
π̄pt(i)
−1
]
ptpt+1(i)
π̄ (pt(i))
2
]
= 0. (3.20)
In a symmetric equilibrium where pt(i) = pt∀i ∈ [0,1], (3.20) can be log-linearized in which
case it takes the form of a working-capital augmented New-Keynesian Phillips Curve relating
current inflation to the real marginal cost (which depends on real wages, technology and loan
rates) and expected future inflation.
3.2.3 The Financial Firm
The financial firm produces deposits dt and loans lt for its clients, the household and the
firm. Following Belongia & Ireland (2014), I assume that producing dt deposits requires χtdt
units of non-labor inputs. In this case, χt is the marginal cost of producing deposits and
varies according to the AR(1) process (in logs),
ln(χt) = (1−ρχ)ln(χ̄)+ρχln(χt−1)+ εχt εχt ∼ N (0,σχ) . (3.21)
Therefore an increase in χt can be interpreted as an adverse financial productivity shock. To
keep the model as close as possible to the canonical New-Keynesian, I assume these resources
only rented by the firm and none are destroyed in the production process. For this reason,
at the end of period t, they are transfered back to the household in the form of dividends.
This assumption is made without losing any generality regarding the determinacy results.
However, it does have a meaningful change on optimal monetary policy. For example, if
the resources are destroyed in the production process, then these resource costs should be
minimized by an optimizing central bank.
In addition to these non-labor inputs, the financial firm must satisfy the accounting identity
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which specifies assets (loans to households and firms plus reserves) equal liabilities (deposits),
lt+ τtdt = dt. (3.22)
Although changes in banking regulation have effectively eliminated reserve requirements,
banks may often choose to hold reserves in lieu of making loans - a flight to quality of sorts.
Therefore, instead of assuming the central bank controls the reserve ratio τt, assume it varies
exogenously according to the AR(1) process (in logs),
ln(τt) = (1−ρτ )ln(τ̄)+ρτ ln(τt−1)+ ετt ετt ∼ N (0,στ ) . (3.23)
An increase in τt can therefore be interpreted as a reserves demand shock, as opposed to a
change in policy.
The financial firm chooses lt and dt in order to maximize period profits
max
lt,dt
(1− ξt)rltlt− rdt dt− lt+dt−χtdt
subject to the balance sheet constraint (3.22). Since the loan and deposits markets are
perfectly competitive, substiuting the balance-sheet constraint into the profit function and
imposing zero profits due to the perfect competition in the banking sector results in the
loan-deposit spread,
rlt− rdt = rltξt+[rlt(1− ξt)−1]τt+χt. (3.24)
To understand this expression, notice the first term captures the revenues lost to non-
performing loans while the second term captures the foregone revenue of making loans (net
of defaults) when deposits are held as reserves instead of being loaned out. The last term is
the cost of renting χtdt units of the final good to produce dt deposits.
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3.2.4 Central Bank Policy
As is standard in New-Keynesian economies, the system of equations is under determined
without a specification of monetary policy. The goal is this paper is to understand how the
working-capital channel impacts the determinacy regions of various policy rules. One of the
most widely prescribed policy rules (see for e.g. Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2007)) is given by
the simple feedback rule:
(
rt
r̄
)
=
(
πt
π̄
)φπ
eε
r
t .
For values of φπ sufficiently large, this rule can deliver welfare performance arbitrarily close
to optimal Ramsey policies in New-Keynesian models (see for e.g. Faia & Monacelli (2007)).
After showing rules these inflation targeting interest rate rules are subject to both lower and
upper bounds on φπ, I provide analogous results which show that rules reacting the growth
rate of money can achieve determinacy under less stringent conditions. In particular, the
money growth targeting rule is defined by:
(
rt
r̄
)
=
(
rt
r̄
)φr
(
mt
mt−1
πt
π̄
)φm
eε
r
t .
This rule is only subject to a lower bound condition φr +φm > 1 regardless of the strength
of the working-capital channel.
Given that Friedman (1960) to alluded a similar rule to implement his famous k-percent
rule:
mt
mt−1
πt
π̄
= (1+k)eε
r
t (3.25)
it is perhaps not surprising that Friedman’s k-percent rule is also always determinate, re-
gardless of the strength of the working-capital channel.
Although these rules are of interest for understanding the design of policy rules, it is more
widely believed actual Federal reserve policy is best described by a Taylor (1993) rule since
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the late 1980’s (Thornton (2012) provides narrative evidence to this point):
(
rt
r̄
)
=
(
πt
π̄
)φπ (xt
x̄
)φx
eε
r
t ,
where xt is the output gap, the difference between output and the potential level of output.
In this economy, this level of output can be characterized by the efficient level output. In
other words, the level of output arising from the frictionless problem:
max
ct,ht(i)
at[ln(ct)+η(1−
1
ˆ
0
ht(i)di)] subject to ct = zt
(
ht(i)
θt−1
θt
) θt
θt−1
.
The resulting first order condition yields the efficient level of output: y∗t = c
∗
t = zt/η, which
yields the follow expression for the efficient output gap, deonted by xt:
xt =
yt
y∗t
= η
yt
zt
. (3.26)
These various interest rate rules can be concisely embedded in the generalized interest rate
rule:
(
rt
r̄
)
=
(
rt
r̄
)ρr
(
mt
mt−1
πt
π̄
)φm (πt
π̄
)φπ (xt
x̄
)φx
eε
r
t . (3.27)
3.2.5 Market Clearing
It is now possible to define the equilibrium conditions which close the model. Equilibrium
in the final goods market requires that the accounting identity
yt = ct+
φ
2
[
πt
π̄
−1
]2
yt (3.28)
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holds. Equilibrium in the money market, equity market, bond market and loan market
requires that at all times
mbt =
mbt−1
πt
+ tt
st(i) = st−1(i) = 1
bt = bt−1 = 0
lt = l
hh
t +
1
ˆ
0
lft (i)di
respectively. Finally, imposing the symmetry among the intermediate goods producing firms
requires that in equilibrium yt(i) = yt, ht(i) = ht, l
f
t (i) = l
f
t , pt(i) = pt, ft(i) = ft and qt(i) = qt.
3.3 Working Capital Indeterminacy
The equilibrium model presented above has the following log-linear structure:
x̃t = Et[x̃t+1]− (r̃t−Et[π̃t+1])+ (1−ρa)ãt+ρz z̃t (3.1)
π̃t = κx̃t+κrr̃t+κr
ξ̄
r̄
ξ̃t+βEt[π̃t+1]− θ̃t (3.2)
m̃t = x̃t−ηrr̃t−ητ τ̃t−ηξ ξ̃t−ηχχ̃t+ υ̃t+ z̃t (3.3)
The model is fairly standard with one notable exception, the inclusion of the policy rate in
the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve. In what follows, I will show this working-capital channel
alters the determinacy conditions on inflation targeting interest rules so that the Taylor
principle is no longer sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique rational expectations
equilibrium. An additional condition bounding the inflation response from above emerges.
On the other hand, money growth rules and interest rate rules targeting the growth rate of
money are not subject to this additional restriction.
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3.3.1 Inflation targeting when wages are flexible
In this section, I analyze the conditions for equilibrium existence and uniqueness when the
central bank targets inflation. Inflation targeting is a particularly interesting policy regime
to analyze since it has been implemented to some degree by numerous central banks.4 Strict
Inflation Targeting of the sorts advocated by Svensson (1999) can be defined by the targeting
rule:
π̃t = 0 (3.4)
The practice of this sort of policy is well supported by the findings in many New-Keynesian
models. For example, Woodford (1999) (pg. 290) shows that such a criterion replicates many
desirable aspects of optimal monetary policy, including determinacy. However, the following
proposition shows this result is not robust to the inclusion of a working-capital channel.
Proposition 3.1. For ρw = 0, for any 0 < β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any κ ≥ κr ≥ 0 if
the central bank follows the policy rule π̃t = 0 then there exists a unique REE if and only if
κr <
1
2κ.
Unless noted otherwise, all proofs are in the appendix. Proposition (3.1) shows that if a
central bank is committed in the most extreme sense to achieving their inflation target then
equilibrium determinacy is unlikely, unless the working-capital channel is sufficiently weak.
One interesting case, which has received the bulk of attention in the cost-channel literature
is κr = κ. This emerges as a special case in this model when ξt = 0 which then implies rt = r
l
t.
The interpretation of this assumption is that firms borrow at the central bank’s policy rate.
In this restricted case, strict inflation targeting leads to indeterminacy. However, Proposition
(3.1) shows that in a more general case where the loan rate differs from the policy rate, the
condition for equilibrium determinacy depends on the degree to which the loan rate varies
with the policy rate. In Section (3.4), I will show that assuming κr = κ is not far from
4The clearest example is New Zealand which officially adopted inflation targeting in 1990. See Roger
(2010) for a full list of known inflation targeting central banks.
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reality; thus, strict inflation targeting is unlikely to pin down a unique rational expectations
equilibrium.
In practice, strict inflation targeting seems difficult at best. The primary difficulty is that
the central bank must set its policy rate in such a way to achieve the target, before the
current period inflation rate is observed (or at least, determined). For this reason, it may
be more reasonable to describe an inflation targeting regime by way of an interest rate rule
reacting to inflation:
r̃t = φππ̃t. (3.5)
This type of policy not only embodies an implementable approach to inflation targeting,
but it also serves as the basis for exemplifying the Taylor principle; the principle that φπ
should be greater than one. The following proposition shows that this principle is no longer
sufficient for equilibrium uniqueness when the working-capital channel is sufficiently strong.
Proposition 3.2. For ρw = 0, for any 0 < β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any κ ≥ κr ≥ 0 if
the central bank follows the policy rule r̃t = φππ̃t then there exists a unique REE if and only
if
1< φπ ≤



∞ if κr < 12κ
2(1+β)+κ
κ(2α−1) if κr >
1
2κ.
Proposition (3.2) shows that if the central bank is too aggressive in adjusting its policy rate to
movements in inflation, unwanted volatility may emerge due to a multiplicity of equilibria.
This result confirms the intuition from the AD-AS model presented in the introduction
carries over to a fully specified, micro-founded equilibrium model with rational expectations.
When the working-capital channel is sufficiently strong, an over-aggressive central bank may
actually cause inflation to rise when they increase their policy rate in response to inflation
rising above their desired target. This induces higher inflation, thus calling for a further
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mechanical increase in the policy rate leading to ultimately higher inflation and higher policy
rates. Once again, the additional constraint on the policy marker’s reaction to inflation only
emerges when κr >
1
2κ. As I show later, this is the empirically relevant case.
3.3.2 Money growth targeting when wages are flexible
This section shows inflation targeting rules are particularly susceptible to this working-
capital feedback loop. I reach this conclusion by showing that rules which target the growth
rate of the monetary aggregate have stable determinacy regions independent of the strength
of the working-capital channel. Although money growth oriented rules have fallen from
favor amongst central bankers, they have a rich history in monetary theory. Arguably, all
policy rules trace their roots to Friedman’s k-percent money growth rule which called for
the central bank to fix the growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate (such as M2) at k-
percent. Friedman argued that doing so shielded the economy from potential mistakes by
central bankers, such as passively allowing the money supply to collapse, a chief explanation
for the severity of the Great Depression according to Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz
(1971).
Instead of preventing a central bank from becoming too passive, in what follows I show that
money growth rules shield the economy from an overly active central banker. In particular,
if inflation rises above target, a central bank which attempts to stabilize the growth rate of
nominal money will react by increasing interest rates (since nominal money growth implicitly
includes inflation). However, the increase in nominal rates decreases the demand for money.
This opposing effect tempers the central bank’s contraction, preventing the possibility of
sunspot equilibria emerging regardless of the strength of the working-capital channel.
Proceeding in a similar fashion as above, first consider a strict money growth target as
proposed by Friedman (1960) whereby each period the central bank sets the growth rate of
money to the desired rate of k-percent:
∆m̃t+ π̃t = 0, (3.6)
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where k is absorbed into the steady-state growth rate of nominal money. The following
proposition establishes the determinacy properties of Friedman’s k-percent rule.
Proposition 3.3. For ρw = 0, for any ηr ≥ 0, for any 0< β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any
κ≥ κr ≥ 0 if the central bank follows the policy rule ∆m̃t+ π̃t = 0 then there exists a unique
REE.
Unlike the strict inflation targeting rule examined in Proposition (3.1), Friedman’s strict
money targeting rule delivers a unique rational expectations equilibrium, regardless of the
strength of the working capital. One immediate corollary to this result is proven in Keating
& Smith (2013), Friedman’s k-percent rule is determinate when there is no working-capital
channel. However, what is more surprising is the stability of this determinacy condition
across models with and without working capital channels. As Proposition (3.1) shows, strict
inflation targeting rules don’t share this stability across these two models.
Similar to the implementation issues that make strict inflation targeting rules infeasible,
implementing Friedman’s k-percent rule seems difficult at best. Friedman immediately rec-
ognized the primary problem. When he first suggested his k-percent growth rule in 1960, he
also recommended implementing 100% reserve requirements. In this case, the money mul-
tiplier collapses to one and broad monetary aggregates, such as M2 (Friedman’s preferred
measure of money) become perfectly controllable by the central bank. That being said,
Friedman (1960) still believed broad money growth could be stabilized under a fractional
reserve banking system:
This [constant money growth rule] is not, under our present System, an easy
thing to do. It involves a great many technical difficulties and there will be
some deviations from it. If the other changes I suggested [including 100% reserve
requirements] were made in the System, it would make the task easier; but even
without those changes, it could be done under the present System.
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In fact, Friedman believed the stability in the U.S. economy that preceded the financial crisis
was due in large part to the Federal Reserve’s ability to stabilize the growth rate of money
by using the short-term interest rate. This is evident from the following exchange between
Milton Friedman and Russ Roberts in an EconTalk interview in September, 2006.5
Russ Roberts: [Shortly after A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-
1960 was published the central bank’s role was focused on the money supply.]
Something changed in the last 25 or 30 years. That’s not what Alan Greenspan
or Ben Bernanke talk about. They talk about other things and they play with
that short-term interest rate, not the so-called stock of money that you focused
on so intensely in the book.
Friedman: That’s what they talk about but that’s not what they do.
Russ Roberts: What do they do?
Friedman: They use the short-term interest rate as a way of controlling the
quantity of money.
Clearly this interpretation of monetary policy over the great moderation is not consistent
with FOMC transcripts or most of the monetary policy research.6 None the less, it provides
an interesting point to consider the monetary policy rule:
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φm(∆m̃t+ π̃t) (3.7)
as it should be feasible for the central bank to adjust the short term policy rate to achieve its
desired nominal money growth rate. Although money growth targeting rules are typically
considered inferior to inflation targeting rules from a normative perspective, the following
proposition shows this conclusion may be premature.
5Friedman passed away just two months later, on November 16th.
6See for example Kahn & Benolkin (2007) and the quote within from Lawrence Meyer, former Federal
Reserve Governor, “money plays no role in today’s consensus macro model ... and virtually no role in the
conduct of monetary policy, at least in the United States." Moreover, Woodford’s (1999) “cashless” economy
models of monetary policy are pervasively used by academic and central bank researchers.
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Proposition 3.4. For ρw = 0, for any ηr ≥ 0, for any 0< β < 1, for any κ > 0 and for any
κ ≥ κr ≥ 0 if the central bank follows the policy rule r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φm(∆m̃t+ π̃t) then there
exists a unique REE if and only if ρr +φm > 1.
Proposition (3.4) shows that money growth targeting rules satisfy a Taylor principle of their
own sorts. In particular, adjusting the policy rate more than one percentage point for each
one percentage point deviation of nominal money growth from the desired target. This sim-
ple sufficient condition is robust to models with and without the working-capital channel.
Furthermore, in the numerical analysis that follows, I show this condition is sufficient to
anchor expectations on a unique rational expectations equilibrium even when a strong re-
sponse to inflation is added. Hence, aggressive inflation targeting can be implemented once
the central bank is sufficiently committed to stabilizing money growth.
Implementing money growth targeting does face a potential shortcoming relative to inflation
targeting. In particular, the policy rules in Propositions (3.3) and (3.4) require the central
bank to control a monetary aggregate which contains unknown structural parameters such
as ν and ω. A similar issue emerges in small open New-Keynesian models where the CPI
price index is typically modeled as a CES aggregate or domestic and foreign goods. Just as
chain weighted index numbers are used in practice to calculate CPI figures, index number
theory can be combined with monetary aggregation theory to construct a monetary index.
Barnett (1978, 1980) made this possible by deriving the expression for the user-costs of
monetary assets which can then be combined with data on the quantity of each assets to
create a chain-weighted index number. The result is the Divisia monetary aggregate (index)
which is defined as follow in this model economy.
Definition 3.1. The growth rate of the nominal Divisia monetary aggregate is defined by
ln(µt) =
(
snt + s
n
t−1
2
)
ln
(
nt
nt−1
)
+
(
sdt + s
d
t−1
2
)
ln
(
dt
dt−1
)
+ ln(πt), (3.8)
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where snt and s
d
t are the expenditure shares of currency and interest bearing deposits respec-
tively defined by:
snt =
unt nt
unt nt+u
d
t dt
=
[(rt−1)/rt]nt
[(rt−1)/rt]nt+[(rt− rdt )/rt]dt
(3.9)
sdt =
udt dt
unt nt+u
d
t dt
=
[(rt− rdt )/rt]dt
[(rt−1)/rt]nt+[(rt− rdt )/rt]dt
. (3.10)
By weighting the growth rate of the individual assets (with time-varying weights) the Divisia
monetary aggregate is able to successfully account for changes in the composition of the
aggregate which may have no impact on the overall aggregate. This superior accuracy places
the Divisia index amongst Diewart’s (1976) class of superlative index numbers, meaning
the Divisia index has the ability track any linearly homogenous function (with continuous
second-derivatives) up to second-order accuracy. In Lemma (3.1), I show this accuracy is not
lost in this linearized model. In particular, I show a result analogous to Keating & Smith
(2013): A log linear approximation to the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate
tracks the true monetary aggregate to second-order accuracy.
Lemma 3.1. For a given bound on the amplitude of the exogenous structural shocks ‖δ‖,
for any 0< ν < 1, and for any ω > 0, the difference between the Divisia monetary aggregate
and the true monetary aggregate (each in growth rates) is given by
ln(µt)− (ln(mt/mt−1)+ ln(πt/π̄)) = O(‖δ‖2).
Combing Lemma(3.1) with Propositions (3.3) and (3.4) results in two immediate corollaries:
Friedman’s k-percent rule and flexible money growth targeting rules can be implemented with
the Divisia monetary aggregate instead of the true monetary aggregate without any loss of
generality regarding the determinacy results in Propositions (3.3) and (3.4). These results
follow because determinacy is a local property and locally the Divisia monetary aggregate
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perfectly tracks the true monetary aggregate. Thus, implementing money growth targeting
rules is feasible in practice but requires constructing the appropriate index, just as inflation
targeting requires the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the Bureau of Economic Analysis to
construct the appropriate price index. Currently, there are two sources of chain weighted
index monetary aggregates for the United States. One is produced by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St.Louis and the other is produced by the Center for Financial Stability. Both are
constructed using the Divisia index defined above.7
3.4 Adding Real Wage Rigidities
In this section, I relax the assumption that ρw = 0 and allow for real wages to adjust slowly
to the output gap (which is an affine combination of the marginal rate of substitution and
exogenous shocks). Wage rigidities have proven to be an important source of propagating
business cycles and are largely considered a ‘stock’ feature of DSGE models (see: Blanchard
& Gali (2007); Smets & Wouters (2007); Christiano et al. (2005); Taylor (1999)). The
equilibrium model presented above has the following log-linear structure when 0 ≤ ρw < 1 is
generally different from zero:
x̃t = Et[x̃t+1]− (r̃t−Et[π̃t+1])+ (1−ρa)ãt+ρz z̃t (3.1)
π̃t = κ[w̃t− z̃t]+κrr̃t+κr
ξ̄
r̄
ξ̃t+βEt[π̃t+1]− θ̃t (3.2)
w̃t = ρww̃t−1 +(1−ρw)x̃t−ρwz̃t−1 +(1−ρw)z̃t (3.3)
m̃t = x̃t−ηrr̃t−ητ τ̃t−ηξ ξ̃t−ηχχ̃t+ υ̃t+ z̃t. (3.4)
What is especially interesting about wage rigidities in the presence of a working capital
channel is the ability to generate the so called “price puzzle.” This puzzle is said to be
7The Monetary Services Index is produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis for M1, M2, MZM and
MSI-ALL aggregates where the details of the assets included in these aggregates can be found in Anderson &
Jones (2011). The Center for Financial Stability produces M1 - M4 aggregates, providing broader measures
of money. Details of these aggregates can be found in Barnett et al. (2013). Both sources produce the
aggregates at a monthly frequency.
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present when a monetary contraction leads to increases in the price level/inflation. Sims
(1992) first noted the price puzzle as a prevalent feature of monetary vector autoregressions
across multiple countries. Christiano et al. (2005) go on to show that this feature can
be captured by DSGE models with (1) a working capital channel and (2) wage rigidities.
Intuitively, from the Phillips Curve in equation (3.2), if wages adjust slowly to a monetary
contraction then inflation will increase when interest rates rise. To better understand this
interaction, it is useful to analyze the model’s reaction to a monetary contraction under
various assumption on ρw.
The majority of the parameters are quite standard in the DSGE literature; however, this does
not mean there is a consensus of values. I set β = 0.9975 which together with π̄ = 1.005 and
z̄ = 1.0025 implies an annualized nominal bond rate equal to 400 basis points. The choice of
κ is more ambiguous. Schorfheide (2008) highlights a range of estimates from κ ∈ [0.005,4].
For the purpose of analyzing the impulse response I choose a moderate value of κ = 0.25.
Following Ireland (2009), I set ηr = 2. As for κr, the model implies that κr = κ
r̄
r̄l
. From the
data, the average ratio of the gross federal funds rate to the gross C&I loan rate is 0.997.
Hence, I simply set κr = κ.
8
The following impulse response functions to a monetary contraction verify that a model with
a working capital channel and real wage rigidities are capable of generating a price puzzle.
Given the large body of evidence pointing to wage rigidities and the prevalent price puzzle
from the VAR literature, a natural robustness check of the above determinacy results can
be performed by allowing for wage rigidities in this working capital environment.
3.4.1 Inflation targeting with sticky wages
The initial rise in prices following the monetary contraction is evidence that the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy is further altered by the inclusion of wage rigidities. One clear
8One alternative way to interpret a value of κr < κ would be to assume that firms only have to finance a
fraction, α, of their wage bill. If however the household must wait until the end of the period to receive the
remaining fraction of their paycheck then they will be forced to borrow 1−α of their paycheck at the same
loan rate. Hence, the cumulative effect of the working capital/working paycheck channels is equivalent to
assuming α= 1.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse response functions to an exogenous monetary contraction when the
central bank follows the inflation targeting rule: r̃t = φππ̃t. The responses above are graphed
for φπ = 1.5 with the other parameters fixed at the values presented in Table 2.3.
conclusion from Figure (3.3) is that the strength of the working capital channel (relative to
the Euler channel) of monetary policy is amplified by the sluggish response of wages. From
the perspective of this study, this suggests the determinacy regions for inflation targeting
policy rules will be further reduced by the interaction of real wage rigidities and working
capital. Indeed, the following numerical analysis verifies this is indeed the case.
Figure (3.4) shows determinacy regions under four different cases including the extremes of
flexible wages and relatively rigid wages. Notice, in the first case of flexible wages ρw =
0, the bold black line denotes the upper bound defined in Proposition (3.1). Although
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Figure 3.4: Determinacy regions with a working capital channel and various degrees of real
wage rigidity when the central bank follows the inflation targeting rule: r̃t = φππ̃t. The gray
area to the southwest of the respective curves are determinate while the white areas are
indeterminate.
analytic results are out of reach when wages are rigid, the figure clearly illustrates that the
upper bound on the inflation response is a decreasing function of ρw. Thus, even if the
central bank has a prior belief that κ is relatively small - approximately 0.5, if real wages
adjust slowly then a modest inflation reaction around 2 would produce dynamic instability.
Interestingly, this value is well below those recommended in a host of New-Keynesian models
which call for aggressive inflation targeting (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe, 2007; Faia & Monacelli,
2007). Regardless of the upper bound on the inflation reaction term, the lower bound of one
continues to be sufficient for determinacy, but not necessary.
This may be a relatively minor concern if interest rate smoothing can substantially widen
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the determinacy region. For example, it is well known that interest rate smoothing decreases
the lower bound on the inflation response needed to produce a unique rational expectations
equilibrium. This modified Taylor principle states that ρr +φπ > 1 is a sufficient condition
to produce determinacy. Thus, it clearly widens the determinacy region in the sense that a
smaller inflation response may still be determinate. Does it also increase the upper bound on
the inflation response consistent with a unique equilibrium when the working capital channel
is active? The figure below shows the answer is a tepid yes.
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Figure 3.5: Determinacy regions with a working capital channel and various degrees of real
wage rigidity when the central bank follows the inflation targeting rule: r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φππ̃t.
The gray area to the southwest of the respective curves are determinate while the white
areas are indeterminate.
Figure (3.5) shows that interest rate smoothing does, in fact, enlarge the determinacy regions
of inflation targeting rules. However, the smoothing is far more effective at systematically
decreasing the lower bound of one than it is at increasing the upper bound imposed by
working capital and rigid real wages. Specifically, the lower bound is changed to ρr+φπ > 1,
but the impact of the smoothing parameter on the upper bound of the inflation response
depends on the degree of real wage rigidities. When wages are perfectly flexible or only
mildly rigid increasing the smoothing parameter can moderately increase in the upper bound.
However, when ρw = 0.9 (the empirically relevant case (Blanchard & Gali, 2007)) the upper
bound condition is only mildly affected.
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3.4.2 Money growth targeting with sticky wages
Section(3.4.1) shows that adding real wage rigidities shrinks the determinacy regions of
inflation targeting rules. This results from a decrease in the upper bound on the inflation
response due to the interaction of the working capital channel and real wage rigidities. Since
money growth targeting rules are only subject to a lower bound restriction that ρr+φm > 1,
the inclusion of real wage rigidities should have no impact on the determinacy regions of such
rules. Figure (3.6) verifies this is true. The lines which denote the different determinacy
regions for various degrees of wage rigidities all lie on top of one another. In other words,
the monetarists Taylor principle (which states that for the money growth targeting rule:
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φm(∆m̃t+ π̃t) = ρrr̃t−1 +φmµ̃t, ρr+φm > 1 is both necessary and sufficient for
determinacy) holds with and without the working capital channel and slowly adjusting real
wages. The robustness of this result combined with the sensitivity of the inflation targeting
rule’s determinacy region suggests that inflation targeting rules achieve (or fail to achieve)
determinacy in a fundamentally different way than money growth targeting rules.
3.5 Conclusion: A Working Solution to
Working Capital Indeterminacy
When firms have to pay for production inputs prior to receiving the revenue for their out-
put, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is altered. Instead of the usual storyline
regarding how monetary policy works: the central bank increases their policy rate which,
because of sticky prices, increases the real interest rate inducing consumers to shift con-
sumption to the future, decreasing demand and inflation; there is an additional transmission
mechanism - the working capital channel. The above story is augmented to include the
following: the central bank increases their policy rate which increases firms’ borrowing costs
resulting in higher inflation.
This paper shows these competing effects have a significant impact on the determinacy
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regions of inflation targeting rules. Most notably, strict inflation targeting is especially
susceptible to indeterminacy. The more common form of inflation targeting whereby the
central bank adjusts its policy rate to achieve their inflation objective is also vulnerable to
working capital indeterminacy. Typically, such rules are only subject to the well known lower
bound of one on the inflation objective known as the Taylor principle. However, when the
working capital channel is active, the inflation response is also subject to an upper bound.
The exact value depends on the slope of the Phillips curve and the degree of real wage
rigidity and lesser so on the degree of inertia in the policy rule.
What is perhaps more surprising than the sensitivity of the inflation targeting rule’s deter-
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minacy region is the robustness of the determinacy region of money growth targeting rules.
Whether the central bank chooses to fully stabilize the growth rate of nominal money such
as Friedman (1960) suggested when proposing his k-percent rule, or they simply adjust their
policy rate to achieve their money growth objective the determinacy regions are large and
stable. Specifically, for flexible money growth targeting rules r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 +φm(∆m̃t + πt)
the simple condition that ρr +φm > 1 is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a
unique rational expectations equilibrium across models with and without the working capital
channel and sticky real wages.
Given the fact that aggressive inflation targeting is typically considered optimal from a nor-
mative standpoint (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe, 2007; Faia & Monacelli, 2007), the inability of
this rule to bring about a unique rational expectations equilibrium poses a serious hurdle
to implementing inflation targeting. The ability of money growth targeting to anchor ex-
pectations on a unique equilibrium offers one solution to this problem: Augment the typical
inflation targeting interest rate rule with a money growth response. Figure (3.7) shows that
a relatively modest focus on money growth can greatly widen the determinacy regions of in-
flation targeting rules. Unlike interest rate smoothing, the money growth response enlarges
the determinacy region even for large degrees of real wage rigidity.
Although the money growth response stabilizes the determinacy region of inflation targeting
rules across working capital and sticky wage models, the question of whether this response
is optimal still remains. In particular, there is a long standing literature which argues that
reacting to money exposes the economy to the additional volatility of money demand shocks
(Poole, 1970). Thus, money growth targeting is typically thought to be inferior to inflation
targeting (Gali, 2008). However, the inability of inflation targeting rules to pin down a
unique equilibrium may pose a trade-off for policy makers.
Future work should explore the details of this trade-off. By anchoring expectations, some
degree of money growth targeting may be optimal since it enables the central bank to more
aggressively target inflation. However, this is likely an empirical question, as the degree
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of money growth targeting that is optimal depends on the slope of the Phillips curve, the
degree of real wage rigidities and the relative sizes of the standard deviation of money demand
disturbances to drivers of the business cycle. The survey by Schorfheide (2008) suggests there
may be a wide range of estimates of the slope parameter. Given this parameter uncertainty, a
useful exercise would be to analyze robustly optimal monetary policy in this working capital
augmented New-Keynesian model as in Giannoni (2002).
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3.A Appendix: The Stationary, Non-Linear Model
Since the technology shock is modeled as an I(1) process, most variables will inherit a
unit root. Thus, before I can apply standard perturbation procedures and solve the lin-
earized model, I must define a new system of stationary variables as follows: ĉt = ct/zt−1,
m̂rst = mrst/zt−1, ŵt = wt/zt−1, m̂t = mt/zt−1, n̂t = nt/zt−1, d̂t = dt/zt−1, l̂t = lt/zt−1,
m̂bt =mbt/zt−1, ŷt = yt/zt−1, λ̂
1
t = λ
1
t zt−1, λ̂
2
t = λ
2
t zt−1, λ̂
3
t = λ
3
t zt−1, r
l
t, r
d
t , rt, πt, xt, at, υt,
ξt, ẑt = zt/zt−1, θt, τt. Of course, the system is an equation short which is the description of
monetary policy, the focus of the paper.
at
ĉt
= βEt
[
at+1
ĉt+1
1
ẑt
rt
πt+1
]
(3.A.1)
m̂rst = ηĉt (3.A.2)
ŵt = (ŵt−1/ẑt−1)
ρwm̂rs
(1−ρw)
t (3.A.3)
m̂t = ĉtu
−1
t υt (3.A.4)
n̂t = νm̂t
[
ut
(rt−1)/rt
]ω
(3.A.5)
d̂t = (1−ν)m̂t
[
ut
(rt− rdt )/rt
]ω
(3.A.6)
m̂t =
[
ν
1
ω (n̂t)
ω−1
ω +(1−ν) 1ω (d̂t)
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
(3.A.7)
λ̂1t =
at
ĉt
(3.A.8)
ut = λ̂
2
t /λ̂
1
t (3.A.9)
λ̂1t = λ̂
3
t [r
l
t+ ξt] (3.A.10)
rlt = rt+ ξt (3.A.11)
ŷt = ẑtht (3.A.12)
φ
[
πt
π̄
−1
]
πt
π̄
= (1− θt)+ θtrlt
ŵt
ẑt
+βφEt


λ̂3t+1ŷt+1
λ̂3t ŷt
[
πt+1
π̄
−1
]
πt+1
π̄

 (3.A.13)
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l̂t = d̂t(1− τt) (3.A.14)
rlt− rdt = rltξt+[rlt(1− ξt)−1]τt+χt (3.A.15)
xt = η
ŷt
ẑt
(3.A.16)
ŷt = ĉt+
φ
2
[
πt
π̄
−1
]
ŷt (3.A.17)
ln(at) = ρaln(at−1)+ ε
a
t (3.A.18)
ln(υt) = (1−ρυ)ln(ῡ)+ρυln(υt−1)+ ευt (3.A.19)
ln(ξt) = (1−ρξ)ξ̄+ρξln(ξt−1)+ εξt (3.A.20)
ln(ẑt) = (1−ρz)z̄+ρzln(ẑt−1)+ εzt (3.A.21)
ln(θt) = (1−ρθt)ln(θ̄)+ρθtln(θt−1)+ εθt (3.A.22)
ln(τt) = (1−ρτ )ln(τ̄)+ρτ ln(τt−1)+ ετt (3.A.23)
ln(χt) = (1−ρχ)ln(χ̄)+ρχln(χt−1)+ εχt (3.A.24)
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3.B Appendix: Proofs
In this section I present the proofs to our results stated in the paper. All proofs for de-
terminacy omit the possibility that an eigenvalue is exactly equal to one. In such a case,
a log-linear approximation to the non-linear model can not pin down the question of local
existence and uniqueness.
Proposition 3.1
Consider the dynamic system defined by equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4),
AEt[w̃t+1] =Bw̃t+Cs̃t.
A=










1 1 −1
0 β κr
0 0 0










B =










1 0 0
−κ 1 0
0 −1 0










where w̃t =
[
x̃t, π̃t, r̃t−1
]T
and C is a conformable matrix for the vector
s̃t =
[
ãt, z̃t, ξ̃t, θ̃t
]T
. The system has two non-predetermined variables and one prede-
termined variable. Therefore, the system will have a unique rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) if, and only if, two roots λ which satisfy |B−λA |= 0 lie outside the unit circle and
remaining two roots lie inside the unit circle McCallum (1998). The generalized eigenvalues
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of the matrix pencil B−λA are given by
Λ =










0
κr−κ
κr
∞










. (3.B.1)
The proof to Proposition (3.1) follows from (3.B.1) since | λ1 |< 1, | λ3 |> 1 and finally
| λ2 |> 1 if and only if κr < 12κ.
Proposition 3.2
Consider the dynamic system defined by equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.5),
AEt[w̃t+1] =Bw̃t+Cs̃t.
A=





1 1
0 β





B =





1 φπ
−κ 1−κrφπ





where w̃t =
[
x̃t, π̃t
]T
and C is a conformable matrix for the vector s̃t =
[
ãt, z̃t, ξ̃t, θ̃t
]T
.
Since A is invertible define F = A−1B. The system has two non-predetermined variables.
Therefore, from Proposition C.1 in Woodford (1999), the system will have a unique rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) if, and only if all of the following are true:
| F |> 1 (3.B.2)
| F | − tr(F )>−1 (3.B.3)
| F | + tr(F )>−1. (3.B.4)
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Since κ ≥ κr, let κr = ακ where α ∈ [0,1]. First notice that (3.B.2) is satisfied, | F |=
1+κφπ(1−α)
β > 1. Moreover, since tr(F ) =
1+κ(1−αφπ)β
β , it follows that
| F | − tr(F ) = κ(φπ −1)−β
β
>−1 ⇐⇒ κ(φπ −1)> 0 ⇐⇒ φπ > 1.
Finally, for the condition in (3.B.4) to be satisfied, we must have:
| F | + tr(F ) = 2+κ+β+φπκ(1−2α)
β
>−1 ⇐⇒ 2(1+β)+κ+φπκ(1−2α)> 0.
Rearranging the last inequality, the condition from Proposition (3.2) emerges:
φπ <



∞ if α≤ 12
2(1+β)+κ
κ(2α−1) if α >
1
2 .
Proposition 3.3
The dynamic system consisting of (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.7) can be expressed as
AEt[w̃t+1] =Bw̃t+Cst.
A=















1 1 −1 0
0 β κr 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 ηr 1















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B =















1 0 0 0
−κ 1 0 0
0 −1 0 1
1 0 0 0















where w̃t =
[
x̃t, π̃t, r̃t−1, m̃t−1
]T
and C is a conformable matrix for the vector
s̃t =
[
ãt, z̃t, ξ̃t, θ̃t, τ̃t, χ̃t, υ̃t
]T
. The system has two non-predetermined variables
and two predetermined variables. Therefore, the system will have a unique rational expec-
tations equilibrium (REE) if, and only if, two roots λ which satisfy |B−λA |= 0 lie outside
the unit circle and the remaining two roots lie inside the unit circle McCallum (1998). The
generalized eigenvalues of the matrix pencil B−λA are given by
Λ =















0
β+1+κ−
√
(β−1)2+2βκ+2κ+κ2
2β
1+ηr
ηr
β+1+κ+
√
(β−1)2+2βκ+2κ+κ2
2β















. (3.B.5)
The proof to Proposition (3.3) follows from (3.B.5) since | λ1 |< 1, | λ2 |< 1, | λ4 |> 1 and
finally | λ3 |> 1, allowing for a possibly infinite generalized eigenvalue at ηr = 0.
Proposition 3.4
The dynamic system consisting of (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.6) can be expressed as
AEt[w̃t+1] =Bw̃t+Cst.
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A=















1 1 −1 0
0 β κr 0
0 0 1 −φm
0 0 ηr 1















B =















1 0 0 0
−κ 1 0 0
0 φm ρr −φm
1 0 0 0















where w̃t =
[
x̃t, π̃t, r̃t−1, m̃t−1
]T
and C is a conformable matrix for the vector
s̃t =
[
ãt, z̃t, ξ̃t, θ̃t, τ̃t, χ̃t, υ̃t
]T
. The system has two non-predetermined variables
and two predetermined variables. Therefore, the system will have a unique rational expec-
tations equilibrium (REE) if, and only if, two roots λ which satisfy |B−λA |= 0 lie outside
the unit circle and the remaining two roots lie inside the unit circle McCallum (1998). The
generalized eigenvalues of the matrix pencil B−λA are given by
Λ =















0
β+1+κ−
√
(β−1)2+2βκ+2κ+κ2
2β
ρr+φm+ηrφm
1+ηrφm
β+1+κ+
√
(β−1)2+2βκ+2κ+κ2
2β















. (3.B.6)
The proof to Proposition (3.4) follows from (3.B.6) since | λ1 |< 1, | λ2 |< 1, | λ4 |> 1 and
finally | λ3 |> 1 if, and only if, ρr +φm > 1.
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Lemma 3.1
Before deriving the final a result, a few useful observations will allow for a simpler proof.
First, define the user costs of nt and dt respectively by:
unt =
rt−1
rt
(3.B.7)
udt =
rt− rdt
rt
. (3.B.8)
These expressions appear from the first order conditions for currency and deposits; in par-
ticular,
∂ut
∂nt
∂ut
∂dt
=
∂ut
∂mt
∂mt
∂nt
∂ut
∂mt
∂mt
∂dt
=
rt−1
rt
rt−rdt
rt
≡ u
n
t
udt
,
where the last equality uses the representative household’s first order conditions (5.10) and
(3.12). Using these definitions of the user-cost of monetary assets, combine (5.10) and (3.12)
to eliminate nt and dt from (3.6). Solving the resulting expression for λ
2
t /λ
1
t and define the
resulting expression as:
λ2t
λ1t
= ut =
[
ν(unt )
1−ω +(1−ν)(udt )1−ω
] 1
1−ω , (3.B.9)
the user-cost of the entire monetary aggregate. Finally, notice that given the definitions
of (3.B.7), (3.B.8) and (3.B.9), ut satisfies Irving Fisher’s factor reversal test which mathe-
matically states that total expenditures on monetary assets must equal the product of the
quantity and price aggregate:
unt nt+u
d
t dt =mtu
ω
t
[
ν(unt )
1−ω +(1−ν)(udt )1−ω
]
=mtut. (3.B.10)
This expression will prove very useful in the following proof. From Definition (3.1), we have
147
the growth rate of the Divisia monetary aggregate is given by
ln(µt) =
(
snt + s
n
t−1
2
)
ln
(
nt
nt−1
)
+
(
sdt + s
d
t−1
2
)
ln
(
dt
dt−1
)
+ ln(πt).
Now substituting the factor demands ((5.10) and (3.12)) into the definition of the Divisia
monetary aggregate to eliminate nt and dt, we obtain the following useful expression for the
difference between the growth rates of the Divisia monetary aggregate and the true monetary
aggregate:
ln(µt)−∆ln(mt)− ln(πt) = ω
[
∆ln
(
ut(u
n
t ,u
d
t )
)]
−ω
[
1
2
(
snt + s
n
t−1
)
∆ln(unt )−
1
2
(
sdt + s
d
t−1
)
∆ln
(
udt
)]
≡ E(ln(unt ), ln(udt ), ln(unt−1), ln(udt−1)),
where E is the error-term which quantifies the difference between the Divisia monetary
aggregate and the true monetary aggregate. This expression is a function only of user-costs
and completely independent of the quantities of monetary assets. This can easily be seen
since the denominator of the expenditure share weights snt and s
d
t is total expenditures which
depends only on ut and mt from (3.B.10):
snt =
unt nt
unt nt+u
n
t nt
=
mtu
ω
t ν(u
n
t )
1−ω
utmt
= ν
(
unt
ut
)1−ω
sdt =
udt dt
unt nt+u
n
t nt
=
mtu
ω
t (1−ν)(udt )1−ω
utmt
= (1−ν)
(
udt
ut
)1−ω
.
To verify the claim, take a first-order Taylor approximation of E around the steady state,
hence all derivatives below are evaluated at the steady state. For this reason, all derivatives
with respect to the share weights sn(unt ,u
d
t ) and s
d(unt ,u
d
t ) evaluate to zero since in steady
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state, ∆ln(ūn) = ∆ln(ūd) = 0.
E =
[
∂E
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt +
[
∂E
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt +
[
∂E
∂ln(unt−1)
]
ũnt−1 +
[
∂E
∂ln(udt−1)
]
ũdt−1 +O(‖δ‖2)
=
[
∂E
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt +
[
∂E
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt −
[
∂E
∂ln(unt )
]
ũnt−1 −
[
∂E
∂ln(udt )
]
ũdt−1 +O(‖δ‖2)
=
[
∂E
∂ln(unt )
]
∆ũnt +
[
∂E
∂ln(udt )
]
∆ũdt +O(‖δ‖2)
where the second equality makes use of the fact that ∂E/∂ln(unt ) = −∂E/∂ln(unt−1) and
∂E/∂ln(udt ) = −∂E/∂ln(udt−1).
Finally, notice that
[
∂E
∂ln(unt )
]
=
[
∂ln(ut)
∂ln(unt )
− 1
2
(snt + s
n
t−1)
]
=
ν (ūn)1−ω
ν (ūn)1−ω +(1−ν)
(
ūd
)1−ω −
ν (ūn)1−ω
(ū)1−ω
= 0
and
[
∂E
∂ln(udt )
]
=
[
∂ln(ut)
∂ln(udt )
− 1
2
(sdt + s
d
t−1)
]
=
(1−ν)
(
ūd
)1−ω
ν (ūn)1−ω +(1−ν)
(
ūd
)1−ω −
(1−ν)
(
ūd
)1−ω
(ū)1−ω
= 0
which verifies our claim since we have ln(µt)−∆ln(mt)− ln(πt) = E = O(‖δ‖2).
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Chapter 4
House Prices, Heterogeneous Banks
and Unconventional Monetary Policy
Options
4.1 Introduction
The first drop in U.S. home prices since the Great Depression resulted in the 2008 Financial
Crisis, forcing policy makers to ‘Fly Blind,’ and take the exceptional actions of injecting
equity into the largest U.S. financial firms and making a myriad of asset purchases without
a playbook from economists. Little was known regarding the exact financial mechanisms
linking home prices to the rest of the economy, and to date, many questions remain. Why
did a drop in home prices set off a financial panic that forced the largest commercial banks
to shed relatively more assets than their smaller counter-parts? What is the transmission
mechanism of equity injections into these big banks and large-scale asset purchases amidst
a housing-centered credit crunch?
In this paper, I propose an empirically motivated financial mechanism which provides an
answer to both of these questions. I embed this financial structure into an otherwise stan-
150
dard Real Business Cycle model to illustrate its ability to generate salient features of the
U.S. economy. Quantitatively, the model matches empirical correlations that the traditional
financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke et al., 1999) (BGG) fails to capture, including
the correlation of finance premiums with home prices, investment and output. I then test
the model’s qualitative predictions against an estimated VAR. The results of these empirical
comparisons support the model’s financial structure.
I am not alone in my efforts to adapt existing financial accelerator frameworks to simulate
the effects of unconventional monetary policy in light of the financial crisis. However, these
models typically rely on ‘Financial” shocks to generate a crisis scenario and quadratic in-
vestment adjustment costs to propagate the downturn (Gertler & Karadi, 2011). In such
models, no distinction is made between housing secured debt and other assets.
I take the alternative viewpoint that housing, and housing secured debt instruments, played
a particularly important role in the crisis. In particular, the housing and financial sector in
the model I develop are highly integrated – a feature that allows for a financial crunch to
originate from a change in primitives such as preferences over housing. Moreover, the use of
housing as an ultimate source of collateral for financial assets provides a natural source to
propagate downturns as opposed to quadratic investment adjustment costs. Upon default,
the liquidation of housing – a durable – increases the stock of homes and therefore decreases
prices into the future. Furthermore, the time lag between default and liquidation leads
to hump-shaped impulse response functions of output, an empirical feature used to justify
quadratic adjustment costs (cf Christiano et al. (2005)).
Besides treating the housing and the financial sector as independent, other models that have
been used to analyze unconventional monetary policy fail to provide an answer regarding
the effects, and desirability, of equity injections into “Too Big to Fail” banks. These papers
assume either: (i) All banks are the same in terms of size and efficiency (Gertler & Kiyotaki,
2010) or (ii) Banks differ in terms of size and efficiency, but banks face no agency problems
(Hafstead & Smith, 2012).
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However, both of these assumption are at odds with the empirical evidence. Recent estimates
of scale efficiency in the financial sector, including off-balance sheet activities, have found
that “Bigger is Better” (Wheelock & Wilson, 2012; Bos & Kolari, 2013). As for the later
assumption, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) find that bank capital is an important determinant
for the performance of banks, most markedly for big banks – empirical support for over-
turning the Modigliani-Miller theorem.1
With this empirical evidence in mind, I incorporate bank heterogeneity into the financial
sector. Big banks naturally arise in equilibrium due to their superior efficiency intermediating
housing-secured assets, relative to small banks. The only question is: Why do small banks
operate at all in this market if they are technologically dis-advantaged? This is where
eschewing the assumption that banks face no agency problems is key. The big/productive
banks in the model face a moral-hazard problem. Therefore, the amount of housing-secured
assets the productive bank can hold is determined by its capital. In this sense, bank-capital
is key for the operation of big/productive banks, consistent with the empirical evidence.
By capturing the rich interaction between the housing market and the heterogeneous financial
sector, the model is able to offer an explanation as to why the concentration of assets in the
biggest commercial banks decreased with home prices, as illustrated below.
The financial mechanism I propose is capable of endogenously generating the above co-
movement. Beyond simply capturing a correlation, the model provides the insight that the
above redistribution increased the severity and length of the Great Recession. However,
the same feedback mechanism provides traction for equity injections into big banks and
large-scale asset purchase programs.
1The Modigliani-Miller theorem states that how a firm chooses to fund itself (debt vs. equity) is irrelevant.
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Figure 4.1: Real home prices (normalized to pre-recession peak) and the share of
various assets held by the largest commercial banks.
4.2 A DSGE Model with Integrated Housing
and Financial Markets
In this section I develop a general equilibrium model capable of capturing the asset redis-
tribution between big and small banks that occurs when home prices change. The model
implies that bank heterogeneity amplifies typical business cycles when large banks are lever-
age constrained. To the extent these large financial firms can more efficiently intermediate
secured-debt, the asset concentration that occurs during an upswing moves the economy
closer to a Pareto outcome. The other side of this coin however implies that slumps can be
made more severe due to this redistribution.
4.2.1 Related Models and How this Model Differs
The notion that heterogeneity between agents can lead to amplification effects is not new.
Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) (hereafter KM) show that an asset price spiral may occur if pro-
ductive agents are borrowing constrained and the tightness of this constraint depends on
asset prices. If an adverse shock results in decreased output for the productive agent, they
have fewer assets to borrow against which results in unproductive agents absorbing these
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assets, which they are willing to do so only at reduced prices. However, since the productive
agents binding constraint depends on the price of the asset, the decrease in price only further
tightens the collateral constraint - starting the process over.
The model I present here builds on the keen insight of this amplification effect, however the
KM model is silent with regards to default rates since agents in the model never default.
This aspect was critical during the recent crisis where home prices and MBS fell in value
in large part due to rising defaults on risky sub-prime loans. However, Bernanke et al.
(1999) (hereafter BGG) develop a financial friction where risky projects are financed and
each period some share of financed projects will fail resulting in default. However, BGG
features no illiquid collateral, instead all assets are already monetary. This feature of the
model misses the role of market liquidity (or illiquidity) which is elegantly captured by KM.
Moreover, BGG and KM don’t explicitly include banks.2 To the extent that deposits and
bank capital are perfect substitutes, the financial sector can be left in the background as
household’s can then directly fund projects with deposits. On the other hand, if bank capital
serves a special role in mitigating financial frictions faced by the bank (on the supply side),
then these agents must be explicitly modeled.
Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) present a model with financial intermediaries where bank capital
facilitates bank’s ability to obtain funds. Banks in their model face frictions in raising loan-
able funds however, there are no demand side frictions, so that all loans face zero default
risk. Additionally, there is no clear distinction between big banks and small banks. Banks in
their model differ in terms of their investment opportunities but not their efficiency in inter-
mediating loans. Therefore, building on Hafstead & Smith (2012), I include heterogeneous
banks with market power - creating bank capital in the model. Banks in this environment
differ in size due to differences with regards to their efficiency. Along this dimension, my
2In KM the agents can simply be re-interpreted as banks with investment opportunities and this would
capture supply side financial frictions. However, to the extent that there are also demand side financial
frictions this single banker/investor model would understate the role of collateral values in mitigating this
friction.
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work resembles Adrian & Shin (2010) who model supply side financial heterogeneity in terms
of financial firms ability to value assets.
Finally, in contrasts to these previous contributions, I follow Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello
& Neri (2010) who explicitly model a housing market. In particular, I do not interpret
asset prices generally, but instead I model assets whose underlying value as collateral is tied
to home prices. Although my inclusion of demand side and supply side financial frictions
in terms of large productive banks and small unproductive banks is novel, this is one of
the clearest contributions of this paper. By focusing exclusively on assets whose values are
tied to house prices, I am able to generate financial market deterioration from changes in
primitives such as technology and preferences.
4.2.2 Model Description
The model consists of a household, a housing producer, a continuum of entrepreneurs who
produce the final consumption good, a banking sector with 2 types of banks (productive and
unproductive), both of whom finance investment for goods producers and lastly a central
bank is modeled. In this section I will describe the behavior of each agent in turn. Many of
the details including the full set of model equations are in the appendix as to not distract
from the basic mechanism at work in the model. I follow the convention throughout the
model that lower case variables are nominal and uppercase variables are in real terms -
including interest rates.
4.2.2.1 Household
The household earns wages by renting labor to goods producers Lt and home builders L
H
t .
Additionally, they earn non-labor income from banks in the form of dividends ptDivt, transfer
payments ptTranst and principal plus interest payments pt−1Dt−1r
D
t−1 on last periods de-
posits. The monetary authority may transfer any revenue back to the household in lump-sum
form via ptTt. This income can be saved in the form of bank deposits ptDt or spent on con-
sumption ptCt and housing p
H
t Ht. Also, any non-depreciated housing stock, (1− δ)Ht−1, can
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be resold at the market price pHt . The resulting budget constraint in any period t= 0,1,2, ...
is given by,
ptCt+p
H
t
[
Ht−
(
1− δH
)
Ht−1
]
+ptDt ≤wtLt+wHt LHt +pt−1Dt−1rDt +ptDivt+ptTranst+ptTt.
Although I follow Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello & Neri (2010) by modeling a housing
market, I do not include home equity borrowing constraints on the household side. Where
they focus on the wealth effects of housing price changes in terms of financing consumption,
I focus more so on real-estate as collateral for investment and the interaction of house prices
and housing-secured assets. That being said, in general equilibrium changes in home prices
can impact consumption via traditional income and substitution effects, but not through the
home equity channel highlighted by Iacoviello (2005).
The household maximizes their lifetime expected utility subject to the flow budget constraint
above. The household’s lifetime expected utility is specified by
U =
∞∑
i=0
Et
{
ln(Ct+i)+η
H
t+iln(Ht+i)+η
Lln(1−Lt+i)+ηL
H
ln
(
1−LHt+i
)}
,
where ηHt represents a shift in the elasticity of demand for housing. I specify this as an
exogenous process following a first order auto-regressive process, in line with Iacoviello &
Neri (2010).
ln
(
ηHt
)
=
(
1−ρηH
)
ηH +ρηH ln
(
ηHt−1
)
+ εη
H
t ε
ηH
t ∼ N
(
0,σηH
)
(4.1)
4.2.2.2 Goods Production
The goods producing sector is comprised of a continuum of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
have limited resources to finance capital required to produce the final good so they must
borrow from banks. A financial friction arises whereby entrepreneurs borrow funds from
banks this period to purchase capital used in production next period. Their output next
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period is subject to idiosyncratic productivity disturbances only observable by banks after
paying a monitoring cost.
Entrepreneur’s Debt Contract: The Demand Side Financial Friction
A continuum of entrepreneurs j ∈ R+ supply wholesale goods to retailers using capital and
labor. Entrepreneurs only live for 2 periods and only care about their second period utility.
In the first period they have no endowment and no technology but they have a unit of
labor supply. In the second period of their lives they are endowed with 1 unit of an asset
which can be narrowly thought of as land, N , which can be transformed into housing only
by entrepreneurs and banks. However, capital must be purchased this period to be useful
tomorrow. Denote the quantity of capital purchased in period t by entrepreneur j by Kjt
and denote the period t price of capital by qt. To purchase this capital the entrepreneur
will receive financing from the banking sector. More specifically, the entrepreneur uses last
period’s wages ptW
E
t and pledges tomorrows endowment N
j
as collateral for a secured loan
in the amount pNt N
j
and the remaining portion of the capital purchase is financed with an
unsecured loan in the amount ptB
j
t . More concretely,
qtK
j
t = p
N
t N
j
+ptB
j
t +ptW
E
t (4.2)
is entrepreneur j′s budget constraint.
Without default, distinguishing between secured and unsecured loans is trivial. However, in
the second period of their life, entrepreneurs are subjected to an idiosyncratic productivity
shock ωjt+1 which is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and time. I assume throughout the analysis in
this paper, ωjt+1 ∼ lnN
(
−(σωt )
2
2 ,σ
ω
t
)
with CDF at time t denoted by Ft
(
ωjt+1
)
. The choice
of parameters implies E
{
ωjt+1
}
= 1 so that in the aggregate this idiosyncratic shock has
no direct impact on production, but the existence of uncertainty at the firm level impacts
aggregate output through financial imperfections (BGG). To capture exogenous increases in
the cross-sectional dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks I allow σωt to vary over
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time. I posit the simple auto-regressive process,
ln(σωt ) = (1−ρσω)σω +ρσω ln
(
σωt−1
)
+ εσ
ω
t ε
σω
t ∼ N (0,σσω) (4.3)
for this demand-side risk shock. Christiano et al. (2013) show that such shocks have played
a significant role in shaping the U.S. business cycle. Moreover, these shocks prove useful in
the empirical analysis of the paper as they provide a structural interpretation for exogenous
increase in the external finance premium.
Since projects are financed before the idiosyncratic productivity shock can be observed by
either the entrepreneur or the bank, entrepreneurs who receive a low productivity value will
default upon their loan. Denote the real gross interest rate on unsecured loans by RL,jt and
denote the gross real return on capital common to all entrepreneurs by RKt+1. Then for any
entrepreneur j, we can define the cut-off value of ω̄jt+1 by the equation
ω̄jt+1R
K
t+1K
j
t qt = ptB
j
tR
L,j
t . (4.4)
This equation defines the minimum level of productivity needed to pay back the unsecured
loan. For entrepreneur j, the loan will be repaid if ωjt+1 ≥ ω̄jt+1 and will otherwise be
defaulted upon. However, the bank can not observe the level of productivity without paying
an auditing cost in proportion µ ∈ (0,1) to the entrepreneur’s revenue.3 Banks who do not
pay for auditing never find out if the entrepreneur actually received a low productivity draw
or if they simply chose to renege on their loan. Given this arrangement, the optimal debt-
contract dictates that banks will audit only defaulting entrepreneurs and only entrepreneurs
who receive a bad-draw will default on their loans.
To make matters more explicit I define the expected revenue to the bank for loaning ptB
j
t
to entrepreneur j in (5.17). This expected revenue is comprised of 2 terms, the first of
3This follows from Townsend (1979), but has been popularized in this context by Carlstrom & Fuerst
(1997) and BGG.
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which is non-defaulting loan revenue and the second is revenue net of auditing costs on
non-performing loans.
(
1−Ft(ω̄jt+1)
)
ptB
j
tR
L
t
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-Defaulting Payoff
+(1−µ)
ˆ ω̄jt+1
0
ωjt+1dFt(ω
j
t+1)R
K
t+1K
j
t qt
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Defaulting Payoff
(4.5)
For the bank to be willing to make this loan, this expected pay-off must be at least equal to
bank’s cost of making the loan. In BGG the cost of making the loan is simply the cost of
obtaining the funds via deposits - ptB
j
tR
D
t . However since the banking sector in this model
has market power this is no longer the case. For the time being simply define the real cost
per dollar loaned by REt .
4 Then the incentive compatibility constraint can be expressed as,
ptB
j
tR
E
t =
(
1−Ft(ω̄jt+1)
)
ptB
j
tR
L
t +(1−µ)
ˆ ω̄jt+1
0
ωjt+1dFt(ω
j
t+1)R
K
t+1K
j
t qt. (4.6)
We can simplify this expression (and the resulting entrepreneur’s optimization problem) by
defining the following terms. First let Gt(ω̄
j
t+1) be defined as the expected productivity value
for defaulting entrepreneurs.
Gt(ω̄
j
t+1) =
ˆ ω̄jt+1
0
ωjt+1dFt(ω
j
t+1) (4.7)
Also let Γt(ω̄
j
t+1) be defined as the expected share of entrepreneurial profits going to the
bank gross of auditing costs.
Γt(ω̄
j
t+1) =
(
1−Ft(ω̄jt+1)
)
ω̄jt+1 +Gt(ω̄
j
t+1) (4.8)
Now I can combine (4.6) with (5.16), (5.19) and (5.20) to rewrite the bank’s incentive
4REt is explicitly defined in the description of the banking sector in the appendix using the approach laid
out in Hafstead & Smith (2012)
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compatibility as,
ptB
j
tR
E
t =
(
Γt(ω̄
j
t+1)−µGt(ω̄jt+1)
)
RKt+1K
j
t qt. (4.9)
We can now formally state the problem faced by entrepreneur j. To keep the debt-contract
tractable, I assume the entrepreneur is risk-neutral with regards to aggregate consumption.
In particular, I assume they seek to maximize their income and then allocate that income
between consumption and housing services. Entrepreneur j therefore seeks to maximize total
income5 subject to the bank’s IC constraint.
max
Kjt ,ω̄
j
t+1
(
1−Γt(ω̄jt+1)
)
RKt+1K
j
t qt
subject to
[
qtK
j
t −pNt N
j −ptWEt
]
REt =
(
Γt(ω̄
j
t+1)−µGt(ω̄jt+1)
)
RKt+1K
j
t qt
The solution to this optimization problem pins down the cut-off value ω̄jt+1 and the en-
trepreneur’s demand for capital Kjt .
6 The problem is identical in nature to the problem
entrepreneurs face in BGG who show the optimal debt contract has the property that the
default rate and external finance premium move inversely with net-worth. In this model, the
net-worth component is replaced with the collateral value, implying that ∂ω̄jt+1/∂p
N
t < 0 -
finance premiums and default rates will move in the opposite direction of collateral prices.
Aggregate Goods Production
The previous section describes the firm-level behavior in the goods producing sector, specif-
ically it describes the debt-contract problem faced by each producer. In this section, I
describes the industry wide behavior. Each entrepreneur (in the second period of their life)
has access to the production technology, Y jt = ω
j
tZ
G
t
(
Kjt−1
)αG(
LG,jt
)1−αG
, which can be ag-
gregated over due to constant returns to scale. The aggregate goods production technology
5Notice the entrepreneur’s income can be re-written as
´∞
ω̄
j
t+1
ωjt+1dF (ω
j
t+1)R
K
t+1K
j
t qt −
(
1−Ft(ω̄jt+1)
)
RLt B
j
t =
(
1−Γt(ω̄jt+1)
)
RKt+1K
j
t qt where I use (5.16) and (5.20).
6The first order conditions for this problem are in the appendix.
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in any given period t is specified as
Yt = Z
G
t
(
Kt−1
)αG(
LGt
)1−αG
(4.10)
where ZGt is an exogenous technology process which affects all entrepreneurs equally. I
assume this technology follows a first-order autoregressive process.
ln
(
ZGt
)
= (1−ρZG)ZG+ρZGln
(
ZGt−1
)
+ εZ
G
t ε
ZG
t ∼ N (0,σZG) (4.11)
The gross aggregate real return on holding a unit of capital from period t− 1 to period t is
defined by
RKt =
αG
Yt
Kt−1
+(1− δK)Qt
Qt−1
, (4.12)
where I utilize the aggregate marginal product of capital from the Cobb-Douglas specification
above - MPK = αG
Yt
Kt−1
.
The labor aggregate in the production function is a composite of labor supplied by the
household, Lt ,and labor supplied by this periods young entrepreneurs, L
E
t ,
LGt =
(
LEt
)αE(
Lt
)1−αE
. (4.13)
This implies the wage paid to the household’s labor and the wage paid to entrepreneurial
labor are given by,
Wt = (1−αG)(1−αE)
Yt
Lt
(4.14)
WEt = (1−αG)αE
Yt
LEt
(4.15)
I calibrate αE = .01 so that in equilibrium the household receives the majority of wages and
variations in collateral values are the primary sources of movement in entrepreneur’s balance
sheets. The aggregate income of entrepreneurs in period t is (1−Γt−1(ω̄t))RKt Kt−1qt−1.
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I assume entrepreneurs, like the household, receive utility from consuming both the con-
sumption good and housing services. Unlike households, entrepreneurs have the ability to
transform their endowment of ‘land’ - N
j
- into non-tradable housing. Recall however, this
endowment was leveraged last period to secure a loan in the amount pNt−1N
j
. Hence, en-
trepreneurs who are able, choose to payback the secured loan with interest pNt−1N
j
rDt−1 and
then convert N
j
into housing services one for one. If they don’t payback the secured loan
then they default on this contract and the bank takes possession of the collateral N
j
.
I assume in the aggregate, all the entrepreneurs who did not default on their unsecured
loan, payback their secured loan and use the rest of their income on the consumption good.
Those who defaulted on the unsecured loan have lost all income and hence do not consume
anything. More specifically, the aggregate real consumption of entrepreneurs is given by
CEt = (1−Γt−1(ω̄t))RKt Kt−1Qt−1 − (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))PNt−1N
j
RDt−1. (4.16)
“What micro-level preferences would give rise to this aggregate consumption behavior?” is
an interesting question. In the appendix I describe one possible micro-structure that would
lead to this aggregate consumption behavior . An appealing aspect of this description is the
existence of a single default rate in the economy.7
4.2.2.3 New Housing Production
I assume new housing is produced in a purely competitive market and free from financial fric-
tions. In particular, housing producers combine labor LHt with housing specific technology,
ZHt in the production technology,
HNewt = Z
H
t
(
LHt
)1−αH
(4.17)
7That is to say, the default rate on unsecured loans is the same as the default rate on secured loans. I
choose this as a starting point although this assumption can be relaxed.
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where
ln
(
ZHt
)
= (1−ρZH )ZH +ρZH ln
(
ZHt−1
)
+ εZ
H
t ε
ZH
t ∼ N (0,σZH ) . (4.18)
I model housing specific technology independent of technology in the goods producing sector
since much of the economic growth over the last two decades has been IT-driven and housing
production is a non IT-intensive industry. Moreover, this specification allows for goods
technology process, ZGt , to play a significant role in determining output without implying a
counterfactual negative correlation between home prices and GDP (see for example Davis &
Heathcote (2005)). The resulting demand for labor from the housing sector takes the form
WHt = (1−αH)PHt
HNewt
LHt
. (4.19)
4.2.2.4 Banking Sector: The Supply Side Financial Friction
There are a unit measure of banks in the model each belonging to one of two types. I dis-
tinguish bank types by a superscript “P” for productive banks and a superscript “U” for
unproductive banks (who make up ν share of the population). Productive banks represent
the Large commercial banks in the data. These banks are more productive with repossessed
collateral pledged by entrepreneurs to secure loans and hence value these housing-secured
assets more than their unproductive counterparts. However, this efficiency creates a moral
hazard problem for borrowers due to the possibility of productive banks wrongfully repos-
sessing collateral and absconding with the profits. If this occurs, the entrepreneur’s only
recourse is to take the productive banks accumulated capital. To this extent, bank-capital
mitigates the moral hazard concerns and allows the productive banks to hold more of these
collateralized assets. An amplification effect emerges from the endogenous tightening and
loosening of this moral hazard constraint which forces productive banks to adjust their hold-
ing of collateralized assets in response to movements in home prices.
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For ease of exposition I describe factors common to both types of bank before describing each
type’s optimizing behavior. In particular, all banks have some degree of market power, face
a balance sheet constraint and remit a fraction of profits each period back to the household
in the form of dividends and various transfers. In what follows I generically refer to bank i
to reference one of the infinitely many identical banks within either type.
Each bank possesses a degree of market power which is captured by assuming a Dixit-Stiglitz
type aggregator function. As Hafstead & Smith (2012) point out, this has the simplifying
feature that all banks serve all entrepreneurs and therefore face the same ex-ante and ex-post
default rates. More specifically, aggregate loans are a CES index
Bt =
(
ˆ 1
0
Bt(i)
θB−1
θB
) θB
θB−1
(4.20)
where θB is the elasticity of substitution between different bank loans and is calibrated to
match aggregate lending rates. The corresponding price index which is dual8 to this quantity
index is given by
rBt =
(
ˆ 1
0
rBt (i)
1−θB
) 1
1−θB
. (4.21)
This specification of the aggregate indexes implies each bank i of type T ∈ {P,U} faces the
downward sloping demand for loans,
BTt (i) =


rB,Tt (i)
rBt


−θB
Bt. (4.22)
Each bank i must not only satisfy their demand for loans, but they must also abide to the
balance sheet constraint,
ptB
T
t (i)+p
N
t N
T
t (i) = ptD
T
t (i)+pt−1BK
T
t−1(i) (4.23)
8Duality here refers to the price and quantity indexes which satisfy Fisher’s factor reversal test,
´ 1
0 r
B
t (i)Bt(i)di= r
B
t Bt.
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which simply states that assets (bank loans) must equal liabilities (bank deposits) plus bank
capital, respectively.
Since banks use share holder’s retained earnings to fund risky loans, I assume shareholders
(households) require compensation. More specifically, each period the bank is allowed (by
the central bank) to expose a fraction ψt of bank capital to cover expected losses on unsecured
defaulted loans. Each period t, the fraction of loans that actually default is given by Ft−1(ω̄t).
Hence, each period the bank transfers the nominal payment
ptTrans
T
t (i) = Ft−1(ω̄t)pt−1ψt−1BK
T
t−1(i) (4.24)
to shareholders in order to compensate them for the capital that was exposed to covering
losses on loans originated in period t− 1. In this sense, the transfer to shareholders occurs
only on realized, or ex-post, loan losses. Combining this transfer payment with dividend
payments, bank capital evolves according to the following law of motion.
ptBK
T
t (i) = γ
T
t ptΠ
T
t (i)−ptTransTt (i)+(1− δBK)pt−1BKTt−1(i) (4.25)
To summarize this, banks of type T pay out a time varying fraction γTt of period t profits as
dividends and invest the remaining fraction in bank capital. Additionally, banks compensate
shareholders for exposing retained earnings to potential losses via ptTrans
T
t and lose a
fraction of bank capital to depreciation. Following Gerali et al. (2010), I assume bank
investment decisions are made independently from bank profit maximization, however, I
assume this fraction is time varying. In particular, I assume that γTt =
γ̄T
ptΠTt
so that each
period a constant amount of new equity is injected into the banks from shareholders. This
implies realistically that banks respond to falling profits by paying out a smaller share of
profits in dividends. Before proceeding to a specific description of each type of bank’s
problem, it useful to summarize these transfers by defining net investment in the banking
165
sector.
IBKt =
∑
T∈{P,U}
sT
(
γTt ptΠ
T
t −ptTransTt
)
where sT =



ν if T = U
1−ν if T = P
(4.26)
Productive Bank
The productive bank enters each period t with inflows consisting of maturing unsecured
loans rB,Pt−1 (i)ptB
P
t−1(i) and maturing secured loans p
N
t−1N
P
t−1r
D
t−1, of which, (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))
will be repaid in full. Denote the real income of all borrowers who are unable to repay
last periods loan by Φt−1(ω̄t). The productive bank will receives the fraction
BPt−1(i)
Bt−1
of
φt−1(ω̄t) net of auditing costs µ for the unsecured loan defaults. Additionally, the productive
bank repossesses Ft−1(ω̄t)N
P
t−1(i), which is the collateral posted on the secured loans who
defaulted. This repossessed collateral is transformed in to housing using the technology
common to all banks, HRt (i) = Z
RNPt−1(i). Finally, the productive bank also has incoming
deposits totaling ptD
P
t (i). At the same time, the productive bank has outflows of newly
originated unsecured and secured loans totaling ptB
P
t (i) +p
N
t N
P
t (i) and maturing deposits
from period t− 1 totaling pt−1DPt−1(i)rDt−1. This is stated more concisely below in (4.30)
which defines the productive bank’s period t nominal profits.
ptΠ
P
t (i) = (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))rB,Pt−1 (i)ptBPt−1(i)+(1−µ)
BPt−1(i)
Bt−1
ptΦt−1(ω̄t)
+(1−Ft−1(ω̄t))pNt−1NPt−1(i)rDt−1 +Ft−1(ω̄t)pHt ZRNPt−1(i) (4.27)
−ptBPt (i)−pNt NPt (i)−pt−1DPt−1(i)rDt−1 +ptDt(i)
The productive bank’s ability to liquidate repossessed collateral - NPt at zero marginal cost
raises a moral hazard. In particular, if the productive bank were to claim default on all the
secured loans originated in period t and repossess the collateral the following period, they
would earn a gross real return totaling NPt Et
{
ZRPHt+1−(1−Ft(ω̄t+1)R
D
t P
N
t )
PNt
}
. The first term
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represents income from the selling the unlawfully repossessed collateral and the second term
subtracts the foregone income that would have been received from entrepreneurs paying back
their loans. I assume a fraction of this return will be lost when taken so that productive
banks only net a fraction ψN,Pt of this return. This varies stochastically according to the
AR(1) process.
ln
(
ψN,Pt
)
=
(
1−ρψN,P
)
ψN,P +ρψN,P ln
(
ψN,Pt−1
)
+ εψ
N,P
t ε
ψN,P
t ∼ N
(
0,σψN,P
)
(4.28)
These disturbances provide a model equivalent to the large bank share shock from that will
be analyzed in the VAR.
If the productive bank chooses to abscond with the assets, entrepreneurs are entitled to
the remaining equity of the bank after preferred shareholders (households) receive their risk
premium. Hence, entrepreneurs would be entitled to a claim of (1−ψtFt(ω̄t+1))BKPt (i).
Thus, the incentive for productive banks to claim default and abscond with these housing-
secured assets is eliminated when the equity claims of exploited entrepreneurs exceeds the
gross return on unlawful liquidations.
(1−ψtFt(ω̄t+1))BKPt (i)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equity Claim of Exploited Entrepreneurs
≥NPt Et
{
ZRPHt+1 − (1−Ft(ω̄t+1)RDt PNt )
PNt
}
ψN,Pt
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gross Return on Unlawful Repossessions
(4.29)
When (4.29) holds with equality, the productive bank will be limited in how many housing-
secured assets it can hold. Moreover, this constraint will endogenously loosen and tighten
in response to various macroeconomic shocks which affect home prices or default rates. Let
Λt denote the household’s stochastic discount factor used for valuing future real payments.
The problem faced by the productive bank is then defined below.
max{
rB,Pt+j (i),B
P
t+j(i),N
P
t+j(i),D
P
t+j(i)
}∞
j=0
∞∑
j=0
Et
{
Λt+jΠ
P
t+j(i)
}
subject to (4.22), (4.23), (4.29)
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Due to the complications that arise from solving a model with an occasionally binding
constraint, I calibrate the model so that the productive bank’s moral hazard constraint
binds in the non-stochastic steady-state.
Unproductive Bank
The unproductive bank is identical to the productive bank with one noticeable exception -
they are less productive. To make matters more concrete, when a secured loan defaults the
unproductive bank repossesses collateral Ft−1(ω̄t)N
U
t−1(i). Unlike their productive counter-
parts, the unproductive bank liquidates this collateral while bearing an increasing marginal
cost. On defaulted secured loans, the unproductive bank transforms repossessed collateral
into housing yielding revenue pHt Z
RNUt−1(i) at a resource cost of ptµ
R,U
(
NUt−1(i)
)χR,U
. This
captures the heterogeneity between commercial banks (empirically found by (Wheelock &
Wilson, 2012; Bos & Kolari, 2013)) with regards to their ability to evaluate and trade off-
balance sheet assets. Most notably, as unproductive banks increase their holding of these
assets, the value of the assets will fall due to the increasing marginal cost. Hence, the market
liquidity of such assets depends on the distribution of these assets (i.e. it depends on who
is holding the assets). A point first made by KM and applied to here to housing backed
securities within this model.
With this exception, the unproductive bank’s profit function is very similar to the productive
bank’s stated below.
ptΠ
U
t (i) = (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))rB,Ut−1 (i)ptBUt−1(i)+(1−µ)
BUt−1(i)
Bt−1
ptΦt−1(ω̄t)
+(1−Ft−1(ω̄t))pNt−1NUt−1(i)rD,Ut−1 (4.30)
+Ft−1(ω̄t)
[
pHt Z
RNUt−1(i)−ptµR,U
(
NUt−1(i)
)χR,U
]
−ptBUt (i)−χB,UBUt (i)−pNt NUt (i)−pt−1DUt−1(i)rDt−1 +ptDUt (i)
Notice the lack of productivity spills over to unsecured loans. The parameter χB,U is cal-
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ibrated to match the average share of resources allocated to financial intermediation. The
increasing resource cost of repossessing collateral implies the unproductive bank is not sub-
ject to a moral hazard constraint. In particular, if any single unproductive bank i attempted
to purchase a large amount of these assets at a given market price pNt and falsely claim
default, their cost of liquidating the assets would exceed what they paid for them. Therefore
the existence of these increasing marginal cost eliminates any incentive to steal away these
assets.
Let Λt denote the household’s stochastic discount factor used for valuing future real pay-
ments. The problem faced by the unproductive bank is then defined below.
max{
rB,Ut+j (i),B
U
t+j(i),N
U
t+j(i),D
U
t+j(i)
}∞
j=0
∞∑
j=0
Et
{
Λt+jΠ
U
t+j(i)
}
subject to (4.22), (4.23)
4.2.2.5 Central Bank
The central bank is charged with setting a macroprudential policy rule and a monetary
policy rule. The macroprudential policy instrument is the regulatory maximum share of
capital that can be allocated to loan losses. This essentially controls the amount of owners
equity the bank can allocate to cover loan losses. Here, I assume the central bank simply
sets this to a constant level,
ψt = ψ̄. (4.31)
As for the monetary policy instrument I assume the central bank follows the simple interest
rate rule whereby the rate on one-period deposits adjusts to itself lagged, the inflation rate,
and the growth rate of real GDP:
(
rDt
r̄D
)
=
(
rDt−1
r̄D
)ρr(πt
π̄
)ψπ( GDPt
¯GDPt−1
)ψGDP
. (4.32)
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4.2.2.6 Market Clearing
Sections 5.2.1.1 - 5.2.1.8 describe the optimal behavior of all agents in the economy. A
symmetric competitive equilibrium is defined as a sequence of quantities, prices and Lagrange
multipliers (shadow prices) which satisfy all optimality conditions, policy rules and market
clearing conditions. In particular, the demand for housing must equate the supply of housing
on the market which consists of newly built homes, repossessed collateral being liquidated
on the housing market and non-depreciated housing from last period. Put more simply,
Ht =H
New
t +Ft−1(ω̄t)Z
R
(
νNUt−1 +(1−ν)NPt−1
)
+(1− δH)Ht−1. (4.33)
The above expression can be further simplified by noting that the market for secured lending
(or more narrowly, land) clears when
N = νNUt +(1−ν)NPt , (4.34)
where the left hand side is the aggregate endowment of entrepreneurs. By the ex-ante
symmetry among entrepreneurs this is required to equal N = N
j
for all entrepreneurs j.
Similarly, this ex-ante symmetry also implies the demand for capital by entrepreneurs is
identical, or Kt =K
j
t for all entrepreneurs j. I assume that capital can be transformed one
for one from the final good and depreciates at rate δK . Therefore, capital evolves according
to,
Kt = It+(1− δK)Kt−1. (4.35)
Since I do not include adjustment costs, the price of capital equals the price of the final good
at all times, qt = pt. Adjustment costs in the production of capital could easily be added,
as in BGG. However, in this model, they are not needed to generate an amplification effect.
Instead, the asset price spirals occur from the redistribution of assets between agents as in
KM. With this description of the model, the goods market clearing condition is satisfied
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whenever,
Yt = Ct+C
E
t + It+ I
BK
t +µΦt−1(ω̄t)+νµ
R,U
(
NUt−1(i)
)χR,U
+νχB,UBUt , (4.36)
which stipulates that the consumption good must be either consumed by the household or
the entrepreneur, invested in bank capital, or used to audit or repossess the collateral of
defaulting entrepreneurs. It is useful for the purpose of calibration and model inference to
define GDP in this multi-sector model.
GDPt = Ct+ It+P
H
t H
New
t (4.37)
4.2.3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match characteristics of the U.S. economy from 1998 to 2012
and each time period is interpreted as one quarter. In order to numerically solve the model,
there are 23 non-shock parameters and 15 shock parameters which must first be assigned
values. Beginning with the household’s parameters I calibrate β = .99 as to match up the
steady state deposit rate in the model with the average rate on 3-Month U.S. Treasury Bills.
I set the utility on non-housing leisure and housing leisure, ηL
H
= 7.43 and ηL = 1.88 which
matches the share of labor supplied in housing equal to 5%, the U.S. average using data
from the BLS and the total share of time spent working equal to 1/3. Finally, the last
of the preference parameters ηH = .2352 calibrates the steady state real price of housing
so that consumption’s share of GDP = CGDP = .79, which is the average ratio of personal
consumption expenditures to personal consumption expenditures and private investment for
the U.S. Similarly, setting δH = .021 implies the share of housing wealth to annual GDP,
PHH
4×GDP = 1.4.
On the production side, I set the share of income going to labor in the goods producing
sector, 1−αG = .7 and the same share in the housing sector 1−αH = .8 following Iacovello
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and Neri (2010). I normalize the ‘land’ endowment of entrepreneurs, N = 1.As for the
financial accelerator parameters, I collectively set µM = .14 and σω = .21. The auditing cost
parameter falls between the value from Christiano et al. (2013) and BGG and the steady
state value of the variance of the idiosyncratic productivity shock implies an annual steady
state default rate of F (ω̄) = .01 which is the average default rate on C & I loans secured by
real-estate using date obtained from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database.
With regards to the banking sector, I set the share of capital allocated to loan losses, ψ =
.25, the average of loan-loss allocations to the equity of commercial banks over this period
according to data obtained from FRED. I normalize each bank’s share of the population
to be equal by setting ν = 12 . The depreciation rate on capital is set at δ
BK = .08 for
a baseline calibration, following Gerali et al. (2010). The value for νχB,U = .0004954 is
obtained from Hafstead & Smith (2012) who create a time series of banking productivity
in loan intermediation. I set the steady-state rate of return on entrepreneurial loans equal
to the average prime loan rate, rE = 1.017. This pins down the elasticity of substitution
between bank loans, θB = 157.21.
9 There is little agreement over the real return on capital,
I set it equal to equal to 10% per annum which is slightly below the real return on capital
in the U.S. estimated by Oulton & Rincon-Aznar (2009).10 This value also matches the
annualized return on small-cap stocks, representing firms who are likely to be financially
constrained, using data from Morningstar.
I set γ̄P = .003 and γ̄U = .001. These values simply ensure the transfers made to the house-
hold for exposing equity to loan losses, is made up for with equity injections sufficient to
guarantee a positive steady-state level of bank capital. Similarly, setting ψN,P = .12 im-
plies in steady state, the share of housing-secured assets held by the productive banks,
NP
NP +NU
= .92, the average share of total credit exposure concentrated in large banks, as
explained in Section (4.3.2). Additionally, I set χR,U = 1.06, implying strictly convex cost
9Hafstead & Smith (2012) find a similarly high value for θB = 260.
10Oulton & Rincon-Aznar (2009) estimate the average annual real return on capital to be 13%, however
they acknowledge this estimate is potentially biased upwards. Therefore, I follow Hafstead & Smith (2012)
and set the annual return to 10%.
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of repossessing/liquidating collateral for the unproductive bank. This value is adjusted in
the simulations below. This together with setting µR,U = 0.2755 calibrates the steady state
price of the housing-secured assets so that P
NN+B
PNN
= 2.5, or the average ratio of C&I loans
plus total credit exposure to total credit exposure. Finally, normalizing ZR = 1 and setting
Z̄H = 1.14 implies the real-estate owned share, or REO share, F (ω̄)Z
RN
F (ω̄)ZRN+HNew
= .1775 which
is the value in the data according to RealtyTrac.
As for the remaining policy parameters, steady state gross inflation is set equal to unity and
ρr, ψπ = 1.5, ψGDP = 0.125. The remaining shock parameters can not be pinned down by
matching steady state values. The exogenous process, ψN,Pt , which governs the productive
bank’s moral hazard constraint is used to highlight the impact of asset redistribution between
banks, and is largely not structural. Therefore, I set ρψN,P = .9 and σψN,P = .01.
The remaining exogenous processes are calibrated using a moments matching exercise. In
particular, I choose ρZG = 0.9338, σZG = 0.0157, ρZH =0.6998, σZH = 0, ρηH = 0.8959, σηH =
0.0665, ρσω0.8898 and σσω = 0.0455 to match the model’s standard deviation and first-
order autocorrelation of: the external finance premium (proxied by the spread between BAA
corporate bond-rate and 10-year treasuries), real GDP11, real private investment and real
home prices. This exercise not only pins down values for the model’s driving shocks, but since
I do not restrict the calibration strategy to match the model’s implied correlation matrix, it
allows for an empirical examination of the model’s performance.
The model fits the data reasonably well with all moments in the confidence interval. Com-
paring this model to the baseline BGG model augmented with a housing sector, it becomes
clear why the celebrated BGG financial accelerator must be adjusted to analyze the finan-
cial crisis. The BGG financial contract assumes the borrowers wealth is liquid, therefore
(real-estate) secured debt is absent in the model. This explains why BGG has difficulty
capturing the dynamics between the EFP and both PH and Investment. BGG’s counter-
11Real GDP is measured as the model equivalent. Hence, I sum personal consumption expenditures and
private investment and deflate the resulting series by the civilian population over the age of 16 and the
personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy price deflator.
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Table 4.1: Cyclical Properties of the Model
Correlation 5 Percent Median 95 Percent Model BGG (1999)
EFP, GDP -0.89 -0.68 -0.45 -0.82 0.03
EFP, PH -0.87 -0.60 -0.32 -0.68 0.18
EFP, Investment -0.89 -0.63 -0.32 -0.88 -0.18
GDP, PH 0.50 0.76 0.93 0.89 0.84
GDP, Investment 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.79
PH , Investment 0.57 0.81 0.95 0.68 0.42
a The data correlations and confidence intervals are computed using Jeffery’s Prior and 5000 draws
from the resulting posterior distribution of an estimated VAR(2).
factual correlation between GDP and the EFP stems largely from the documented puzzle
that BGG’s debt-contract generates an increases in the EFP following a positive technology
shock. (Shen, 2011). These issues are absent in the model presented here since housing
secured debt, and therefore home prices, play a critical role in the financial contract.
4.2.4 The Model’s Amplifying Effect of Asset Redistribution
In this section I analyze the behavior of the following four variables:
1. External Finance Premium (EFP) = µφt−1(ω̄t)Bt−1
2. Real GDP =GDPt
3. Real house prices = PHt
4. The share of housing-secured assets held by large banks = (1−ν)N
P
t
N
in response to the model’s structural shocks. For each set of impulse response functions,
I present the model’s response when the productive bank’s moral hazard constraint binds
(the solid lines) and when this constraint is relaxed (the dashed lines). Notice that when the
constraint is relaxed, the productive banks hold all of the housing-secured assets since they
are significantly more productive. Hence, for this model, the Large Bank Share variable is
constant.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse response functions from the equilibrium model.
The solid lines denote the dynamic responses when the productive
bank’s moral hazard constraint binds and the dashed lines are the
dynamics when this constraint is relaxed.
Figure 4.2 displays the equilibrium model’s response of the endogenous variables to a detri-
mental risk shock, positive technology and housing demand shocks and an increase in the
share of housing-secured assets held by the productive banks. The dynamics are notice-
ably different when the moral hazard constraint binds compared to the efficient allocation
whereby large banks hold all of the housing-secured assets. In particular, the response of all
the variables are amplified. Changes in the risk-characteristics of borrowers or the household’s
preferences towards housing are magnified by a factor of 2 when assets are redistributed be-
tween large and small banks. Even technology shocks raise GDP by 25% more at peak when
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large banks are able to expand their housing-secured asset holdings. The key factor driving
these changes are movements in home prices, which are themselves amplified.
I highlight this amplification effect in figure 4.3 which illustrates the differences between the
two models simulated in the IRFs. The diagram shows the effect of a drop in home prices on
the price of N . In particular, the equation determining the price of housing-secured assets
is given by the unproductive banks first order condition for NUt ,
PNt =
1
RDt
Et
{
ZRPHt+1 −χR,UµR,UNU
(χR,U −1)
t
}
(4.38)
which for χR,U > 1 looks like a typical demand curve. If expected home prices fall, this will
shift down the demand curve for these assets. Without any redistribution effect, asset prices
fall from PN1 to P
N ′
1 - this is the dynamic captured in the figure on the left.
N
PN
NU1
NP1
DU
PN1
D′U
PN
′
1 ⇓ PH
N
PN
NU1 N
U
2
NP2
DU
PN1
D′U
PN
′
1
PN2
⇒
Figure 4.3: The graph on the left illustrates the impact on asset prices
when home prices drop, without any redistribution effect. The graph
on the right highlights the additional fall in asset prices that results
when the productive bank must reduce its share of housing-secured
secured assets due to the endogenously tightening moral hazard con-
straint.
To understand the amplification effect stemming from the redistribution of housing-secured
assets, notice two things. (i) First, due to the positive marginal cost of liquidating collat-
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eral, asset prices fall by more (in percentage terms) than expected home prices. That is,
EPNt ,Et{PHt+1} > 1.
EPNt ,Et{PHt+1} =
∂PNt
∂Et
{
PHt+1
}
Et
{
PHt+1
}
PNt
=
ZREt
{
PHt+1
}
ZREt
{
PHt+1
}
−χR,UµR,UNU(
χR,U −1)
t
> 1 (4.39)
(ii) Second, the debt contract described in section 4.2.2.2 shows that as the value of the
entrepreneur’s pledgeable assets falls, the probability of default increases.12
∂Ft(ω̄
j
t+1)
∂PNt
=
∂Ft(ω̄
j
t+1)
∂ω̄jt+1
∂ω̄jt+1
∂PNt
< 0 (4.40)
These two effects, (i) and (ii) (Eqs. 4.39 and 4.40 ), both act to tighten the binding moral
hazard constraint for the productive bank (Eq. (4.29)) and hence the large bank share falls.
This is illustrated in the graph on the right of figure 4.3. In particular, a drop in home prices
induces not only a direct fall in asset prices from PN1 to P
N ′
1 but a further drop to P
N
2 due
to an endogenous reduction in NPt (and the downward sloping demand for N
U
t due to the
strictly convex costs). This is the beginning a multiplier effect of sorts. As PNt falls by more
than Et
{
PHt+1
}
, the moral hazard constraint tightens further inducing further reductions in
NPt . All the while, as these forces act to push down the value of secured debt, borrower’s
face an increasing external finance premium. This is the amplification effect highlighted by
the difference between the 2 sets of IRFs in figure 4.2.
This static multiplier effect from asset redistribution may be easiest to spot when I exoge-
nously increase the share of assets held by the productive bank. The dynamics following
this exogenous shock are shown in the the last column of IRFs in figure 4.2. Although, the
shock is set to increase NPt by only 1% the period the shock hits, N
P
t increases more than 5
times as much, above 5%. Again, this amplified response is driven by the asset redistribution
illustrated in figure 4.3. When NPt increases there are two immediate effects, as explained
12The first partial derivative is positive due to the monotonicity of CDFs and the second partial derivative
is negative due to the structure of the optimal debt contract.
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by equations 4.39 and 4.40, both of which act to expound this increase in the productive
bank’s share of housing-secured assets.
One common theme through all the impulse response functions is an amplification effect
stemming from asset redistribution. Although, I have highlighted the static amplification,
there is also a dynamic feature at work which makes the moral-hazard constrained model
more persistent. Since repossessed collateral ultimately is liquidated on the real-estate mar-
ket, this increase in supply lowers home prices into the future to the extent that housing
does not depreciate immediately. These effects re-enforce one another over time. Ultimately
though, these dynamic amplification effects are powered by restarting, period by period, the
engine that drives the static multiplier.
4.3 VAR Tests of the Model’s Amplification Mecha-
nism
In this section, I estimate a series of VAR models to examine the empirical plausibility of the
model’s predictions. The variables included in the VARs are the same variables examined in
the model’s impulse response functions: the external finance premium, real GDP, real home
prices and the share of total credit exposure concentrated in large banks. All variables are
available at a quarterly frequency from 1998:Q2 to 2012:Q4.13 As specified in log-levels, the
Schwarz Bayesian information criterion selects 2 lags for the VAR. In what follows I first
lay-out the model’s testable predictions, then I go on to describe the data and the structural
identification before presenting the impulse response functions for the various models.
4.3.1 The Model’s Empirical Implications
The DSGE model developed in the previous section posits an amplification effect stemming
from the redistribution of assets between large and small banks. In particular, the amplifica-
tion mechanism posits that an initial economic downturn, in which home prices fall, causes
13The time series is limited by the availability of net credit exposure data from the OCC’s Quarterly
Derivatives Report. However, for the removal of trends, I use data going back to 1975:Q1
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the credit exposure of large banks to fall which in turn causes finance premiums to rise.
1. A decrease in real home prices decreases the concentration of housing-secured assets
in big banks.
2. A decrease in the concentration of housing-secured assets in big banks causes finance
premiums to rise.
3. A rise in finance premiums lowers home prices and output.
This mechanism is self re-enforcing, 1. → 2. → 3. → 1. → 2. → 3. → 1. and so forth. At
each completion of the cycle output falls; therefore, as the cycle feeds back on itself output
falls further and further which deepens the recession. To test this qualitative aspect of the
model, I use a factor structural vector auto-regression. The results provide further empirical
support for the integrated housing and financial structure I put forth in the equilibrium
model.
4.3.2 Data Description
One of the model’s key variables, the external finance premium is unobservable. However,
following the recent strategy of Christiano et al. (2013) and Carlstrom et al. (2012), I use
the spread between BAA corporate bonds and 10-year Treasuries to proxy this unobservable
variable. As for real GDP, I use the model equivalent definition. I sum personal consumption
expenditures and private investment (the sum of residential and non-residential investment
in the model) and divide the resulting series by the personal consumption expenditures
excluding food and energy price deflater. I measure real home prices using the Case-Shiller
National Composite Home Price Index divided by the personal consumption expenditures
excluding food and energy price deflater. Both real GDP and real home prices reveal evidence
of a unit root at the 10% confidence level using an ADF test. I therefore, remove any
deterministic and/or stochastic trend by taking the difference between the log of the original
series and a 25 quarter centered moving average of the logged series.
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Finally, I follow Breuer (2000) and construct the large bank share variable using the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) Quarterly Derivatives Report which tracks the
derivative activity of the 25 largest U.S. commercial banks (in terms of notional derivatives
held) and the commercial banking sector as a whole. Specifically, I sum the total credit
exposure of the largest commercial banks and divide this by the total credit exposure of all
commercial banks. The banks I deem as ‘large’ are the six financial firms which consistently
hold the largest amount of notional derivatives. These six banks include: JP Morgan Chase,
Citibank, Bank of America, HSBC, Wachovia and Wells Fargo.14 In the baseline model, the
variable Large Bank Share refers to the share of total credit risk held by these six banks
relative to all U.S. commercial banks. These derivatives contracts are dominated by interest
rate contracts, which were often secured by MBSs.15
As a robustness check, I also compute the large bank share using data obtained directly
from the FR Y-9C Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies collected
quarterly by the Federal Reserve.16 One advantage of using this data is the highly detailed
handling of mergers and acquisitions by the National Information Center.
Ideally, I would like to obtain a time series of the amount of debt securities issued by bank
holding companies which are secured by mortgage backed securities, as this most closely
aligns with the interpretation of these variables in the model. For example, the Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper market provides an ideal example of the type of debt banks issued on
the behalf of firms/investment banks holding MBSs. Unfortunately this data has only been
collected as of 2008. To get a rough measure of the debt banks have extended which are
secured, either directly or indirectly, by housing I use the reported level of loans secured by
real-estate. In the following IRF estimates which refer to ‘Alternative Data,’ the variable
14One challenge to tracking these firms over time is dealing with mergers, acquisitions and the financial
crisis. I handle these issues by adding the off-balance sheet asset’s of acquired banks to the acquiring bank’s
assets to create (as much as is possible) a consistent time series. See Table (4.3) for more details on how this
group evolves over time.
15See for example: http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-
markets/Repo-Markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/6-what-types-of-asset-are-used-as-collateral-in-
the-repo-market/
16I am indebted to Bob DeYoung for recommending this data source.
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Large Bank Share refers to the share of loans secured by real estate held by the six banks
listed above relative to all bank holding companies which file the Y-9C report.
4.3.3 Model A: A Factor Structural VAR
The model’s implications described above calls for the identification of 3 distinct structural
shocks using four variables. Since the number of desired structural shocks is less than the
number of variables for which there are model implications, I employ a factor structural vec-
tor auto-regression following Gorodnichenko (2005). This approach is appropriately fitting
here for a couple of reasons.
First, the four variables in the VAR behave qualitatively similar to technology and housing
demand shocks in the equilibrium model as shown in Figure 4.2. For this reason, imposing
timing restrictions at any horizon to distinguish these shocks proves difficult. Moreover,
there is no need to disentangle these shocks to test the model’s predictions that an aggre-
gate expansion which increases real home prices, loosens both the supply and demand side
financial frictions. Therefore, I choose to simply recognize macroeconomic disturbances as
a single factor, which allows me to test the model’s prediction along this dimension without
imposing arbitrary timing restrictions on the behavior of output and real home prices. Blan-
chard & Quah (1989) make a similar argument that shocks can be aggregated when they
elicit qualitatively similar dynamics.17 Second, the external finance premium in the model is
unobservable. Hence, by using a factor-structural VAR, I can explicitly include measurement
error terms to ensure this proxy for the external finance premium does not contaminate the
structural shocks of study.
In addition to the macroeconomic factor discussed above, I identify a ‘risk’ shock, an increase
in the cross sectional dispersion of borrowers in the model ln(σωt ) and an exogenous increase
in the share of housing-secured assets held by large banks. The latter shock is the model
equivalent of a decrease in ln(ψN,Pt ) which exogenously improves the moral hazard problem
17Their argument is a bit more formal. To summarize, they show that so long as the dynamic responses
of the variables in the VAR to the aggregated shocks differ up to a scalar lag distribution (The responses
need not be identical nor proportional) then the shocks can be aggregated.
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between large banks and borrowers. To summarize, I identify an exogenous tightening of
the demand-side financial friction (the ‘risk’ shock), a beneficial macroeconomic shock and
an exogenous loosening of the supply-side financial friction. Identifying these three shocks
is sufficient to test the three model predictions laid out above.
To identify these three shocks, I impose a recursive scheme that ensures global identification
is achieved18 and allows for home prices and real GDP to behave symmetrically to all the
shocks. In the model, the ex-post observable external finance premium in period t is deter-
mined by fundamentals in period t−1. For this reason, I order the spread, which proxies the
external finance premium first in the VAR to match this feature of the model. Next I order
real GDP and then home prices. The ordering between these two variables is innocuous
since they are treated symmetrically in the identification scheme. Finally, I order the share
of total credit exposure held by large banks. This recursive ordering is consistent with the
equilibrium model. The macroeconomic factor shocks in the DSGE model do not have a
contemporaneous effect on the external finance premium but they do contemporaneously
impact real GDP, real home prices and the large bank share. Additionally, the supply-side
financial shock affects all variables (other than the large bank share) with a lagged response.
To summarize the identification scheme, let et denote the 4×1 vector of reduced form VAR
residuals. Let ǫt denote the 3 × 1 vector of structural shocks and let vt denote the 4 × 1
vector of measurement errors which ensures the rank between the reduced form shocks and
the identify structure match. The matrix A, is a 4 × 3 loading matrix which relates the
structural factors to the reduced form residuals. Summarizing this,
et = Aǫt+vt (4.1)
18Since the 3×3 sub-matrix of A excluding the last row is lower triangular, we can ensure global identifi-
cation (Anderson, 2003; Anderson & Rubin, 1956).
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(4.2)
I assume the measurement error terms, vt are independent of the structural factors ǫt at all
leads and lags and I also assume the covariance matrix of the measurement errors, Ψ , is
diagonal. Equation (4.1) is estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.19
4.3.4 Models for Robustness Checks: VAR Models B and C
To ensure the results obtained from the factor structural vector auto-regression are not
driven by the reduced rank identification scheme, I examine the empirical implications of
two alternative VAR models. Model B tests for the DSGE model’s amplification mechanism
using the approach employed in Ludvigson’s 1998 Journal of Money Credit and Banking
paper. The idea is to first identify the impact an expansionary housing demand disturbance
(i.e. the shock to home prices) has on the large bank share variable. If this share falls with
home prices, then proceed to step two which estimates the response of the external finance
premium to an exogenous decrease in the large bank share when home prices are removed
from the VAR. The idea is to examine how a change in the share of loans intermediated by
large banks impacts the external finance premium independent of the endogenous response
of home prices to this change in the composition of lending. Finally, if the finance premium
increases when the large bank share decreases, I estimate the response of real GDP and real
home prices to an exogenous increase in the external finance premium, excluding the large
bank share. Again, the idea is to trace out the steps in the amplification mechanism while
19In particular, assuming et are i.i.d. Normal, the log-likelihood equation is given by,
log(L) = −4T ln(π)
2
− T
2
ln(|AA′ +Ψ |)− 1
2
T∑
t=1
e
′
t(AA
′
+Ψ)−1et.
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controlling for the endogenous reaction of home prices and the share of credit held by large
banks respectively.
Model C takes this idea one step further and estimates a series of bivariate VARs. The first
VAR has home prices and the large bank share. If falling home prices causes large banks
to withdraw relatively more credit than smaller banks, then I estimate a second bivariate
VAR which includes the external finance premium and the share of credit held by large
banks. If reductions in the large bank share drive-up finance premiums, then I estimate a
third bivariate VAR with the external finance premium and GDP. If this VAr indicates that
rising finance premiums causes real GDP to fall, then this provides evidence in support of
the equilibrium model’s amplification mechanism spelled out in Section (4.3.1). T
Throughout all of these VAR models, I order variables as follows: the external finance
premium, real GDP, real home prices and the large bank share. The motivation for this
ordering follows from the equilibrium model’s impulse response functions in Figure (4.2).
The most delicate issue of this ordering lies in the decision of whether to place real GDP
before real home prices or vis-a-versa. The equilibrium model implies both have a non-
zero response to housing demand and technology shocks. Fortunately all the results for the
recursive models used in Model B and Model C are robust to reversing the ordering of real
GDP and real home prices. Model A treats both of these variables symmetrically and for
this reason is the preferred model.
4.3.5 Model A: IRFs
Impulse response functions trace out the path of the variables in periods t = 0,1,2, ... in
response to a one time structural disturbance in period t= 0. Confidence bands are computed
using Monte Carlo integration techniques assuming a normal likelihood and uninformative
prior.
In order to test the model’s amplification prediction the first step is to examine if a drop in
home prices caused by an aggregate downturn tightens the large banks’ moral hazard con-
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Figure 4.4: Model A: Median Impulse Response to a contractionary
aggregate shock with 68% and 90% confidence bounds.
straint forcing them to shed assets relative to their smaller counterparts. This macroeconomic
factor which simultaneously decreases real home prices and real GDP has the interpretation
of either a housing demand disturbance or a technology shock in the DSGE model. Both
shocks have been attributed as playing a driving role in the evolution of the real economy
(See for example Liu et al. (2013) or Kydland & Prescott (1982)). As the model predicts,
this aggregate downturn tightens the large banks’ moral hazard constraint forcing them to
shed assets relative to their smaller counterparts as shown in Figure (4.4).
The second step in the accelerator mechanism, and in fact the model’s key prediction is that
changes in the distribution of assets between productive and unproductive banks alters the
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Figure 4.5: Model A: Median Impulse Response to an exogenous
decrease in the large bank share with 68% and 90% confidence bounds.
finance terms offered to borrowers. For example, if the assets shift to less productive banks,
which are the small banks in equilibrium, finance premiums will rise as the liquid value of
the borrowers collateral falls when it is held by these unproductive intermediaries. The data
confirms this prediction in Figure (4.5). An exogenous decrease in the share of assets held
by large banks increases the external finance premium, suggesting financing conditions are
worsening.
Since the VAR has confirmed the first two steps of the accelerator mechanism, I proceed to
the third step to examine how rising finance premiums affect the macroeconomy. In partic-
ular, the model predicts that rising financing costs will lead to an increase in defaults and
ultimately lower home price due to the increased supply of homes on the market. Moreover,
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the existence of higher financing costs leads to less investment. Both of these movements
exact a negative effect on real GDP. This is confirmed in Figure (4.6). As home prices fall so
too does real GDP. Therefore the impulse response functions show that when home prices
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Figure 4.6: Model A: Median Impulse Response to an exogenous in-
crease in the external finance premium with 68% and 90% confidence
bounds.
fall, credit exposure shifts from large banks which magnifies the movement of finance pre-
miums and, in turn, amplifies the movement of output and home prices, starting the cycle
over. In summary, the results above provide evidence which supports the hypothesis that the
redistribution of housing-secured assets magnifies the movement of finance premiums, house
prices and output across the business cycle, supporting the model’s predictions.
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4.3.6 Model A: IRFs with Alternative Data
As mentioned above, I perform a robustness check of the above results by estimating the
same factor-structural VAR with the large bank share variable measured by the share of
loans secured by real estate from the Federal Reserve’s Y-9C report. The results below show
that both models behave qualitatively similar. The response of the finance premium to an
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(a) Aggregate shock
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(b) Large bank share shock
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Figure 4.7: Model A with Alternative Data: Median Impulse Response to various contrac-
tionary shocks with 68% and 90% confidence bounds.
exogenous decrease in the share of real estate secured loans issued by large banks loses some
statistical significance in this version. However, the median response is still positive for 8
quarters as is the majority of the posterior density for the first 6 quarters.
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4.3.7 Model B: IRFs
Model A uses a reduced rank identification scheme, which may be driving the results from
the previous section. To examine the implications of the reduced rank identification strategy,
I also test the model by estimating a sequence of VAR models where the response variables
are restricted from the next model (Ludvigson, 1998). I call these sequence of VARs Model
B. The results confirm the equilibrium model’s amplification mechanism is a robust feature
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Figure 4.8: Model B: Median Impulse Response to various contractionary shocks with 68%
and 90% confidence bounds.
of the data, even when the VAR model has full rank and the sequence of estimated models
restricts endogenous responses of real home prices and the large bank share.
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4.3.8 Model B: IRFs with Alternative Data
In this section, I repeat Ludvigson’s (1998) approach to testing for a financial acclerator
mechanism using the alternative measure of the large bank share variable measured by the
share of loans secured by real estate from the Federal Reserve’s Y-9C report. The results
below show that both models behave qualitatively similar. Given the similar behavior of
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Figure 4.9: Model B with Alternative Data: Median Impulse Response to various contrac-
tionary shocks with 68% and 90% confidence bounds.
Model A with both measures of the large bank share variable, this section further confirms the
empirical results are not excessively fragile to the measure of large bank asset concentration.
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4.3.9 Model C: IRFs
In this section, I perform a third robustness check to the VAR model used to test for the
accelerator mechanism spelled out in Section (4.3.1). In Model C, I estimate a sequence of
bivariate VARs. Although this provides a simplistic interpretation of the data, the bivariate
models ensure the IRFs are not influenced by the endogenous responses of variables. For
example, these results confirm (i) the drop in the large bank share following a drop in home
prices and (ii) the response of the EFP to an exogenous drop in the large bank share is
not driven by real GDP. Finally, real GDP falls in response to rising finance premiums even
when there is no explicit real home price channel.
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(c) Step 3: Contractionary Finance Pre-
mium Shock
Figure 4.10: Model C: Median Impulse Response to various contractionary shocks with 68%
and 90% confidence bounds.
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4.3.10 Model C: IRFs with Alternative Data
This section performs one final robustness check by re-estimating Model C with the alter-
native measure of the large bank share. As was the case for Model A and Model B, the
results are not sensitive to how the large bank share variable is measured. The cumulative
evidence of these alternative models shows that over the last 14 years, there has been a tight
relationship between home prices, the concentration of assets in the largest financial firms,
finance premiums and the real economy. The following section returns to the equilibrium
model to study the impact of actions taken by policy makers to break this relationship.
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(c) Step 3: EFP Shock
Figure 4.11: Model C with Alternative Data: Median Impulse Response to various contrac-
tionary shocks with 68% and 90% confidence bounds.
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4.4 Unconventional Monetary Policy
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Figure 4.12: Impulse responses to large contraction in housing de-
mand. The dashed lines represent the dynamics under no policy re-
sponse, the solid lines are the dynamics following a short-term equity
injection and the dotted line displays the dynamics under a persistent
central bank asset purchase policy.
I now turn the focus to analyzing the unprecedented actions taken by policy makers in the
wake of the 2007 Financial Crisis through the lens of this empirically verified model. Since
the model features large financial firms (‘Too Big to Fail’ banks) and housing secured debt
(Mortgage Backed Securities), it can be used to analyze the relative effectiveness of:
(i) Equity injections into big banks similar to TARP
(ii) Central Bank purchases of mortgage backed securities such as QE1 and QE3
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To simulate these policies I hit the economy with a large decrease in housing demand which
generates a 20% drop in real home prices, real GDP and a 3 to 4 fold increase in the external
finance premium – all similar to the magnitude of the Great Recession with the exception of
output which fell by less during the recession, although I am disregarding any expansionary
effects of fiscal policy in the model. I consider three alternative unconventional monetary
policy regimes including no policy as simulated in Figure (4.2). The alternative two regimes
are described below.
Equity Injections To simulate equity injections into ‘Too Big to Fail’ banks I assume
the Central Bank uses a lump-sum tax, Tt, to raise money from the household and
provide an equity injection, INJCBt , to the productive banks. The banks can use the
capital immediately but must pay it back in its entirety. This policy is modeled by
adding/augmenting the following equations to the model.
INJCBt = θBKε
ηH
t (4.1)
Tt = INJ
CB
t − δCB
BKCBt−1
πt
(4.2)
BKCBt = INJ
CB
t +(1− δCB)
BKCBt−1
πt
(4.3)
In any period t, the productive banks now have total capital equal to BKPt +BK
CB
t .
This policy rule only has two parameters to calibrate. I set θBK = .18 which calibrates
the size of the initial equity injection and δCB = .5. This calibration is set so that the
equity injections comprise 20
Quantitative Easing: To simulate large scale asset purchases of mortgage backed securities
(MBS) I assume the Central Bank uses a lump-sum tax, Tt, to raise money from the
household and then purchases PNt N
CB
t units of collateral. As the policy persists, the
household will be responsible for any losses or profits from the central bank’s holding
of these assets. This policy is modeled by adding/augmenting the following equations
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to the model.
NCBt = ρ
NNCBt−1 +
4∑
j=0
θNj ε
ηH
t−j (4.4)
Tt = P
N
t N
CB
t − (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))pNt−1NCBt−1rDt−1 −Ft−1(ω̄t)PHt ZRNCBt−1 (4.5)
In any period t, the market clearing condition for secured lending is now given by,
N = νNUt +(1−ν)NPt +NCBt . (4.6)
This policy rule has six parameters to calibrate. I set θN0 = θ
N
4 = .5, θ
N
1 = θ
N
3 = 1 and
θN2 = 1.4 which calibrates the flow of central bank asset purchases to have a hump-
shaped pattern with the flow of purchases of Mortgage-Backed Securities held outright
by the central bank (using data from the Flow of Funds H.4.1, Factors Affecting Reserve
Balances) peaking at 14% of the total credit exposure of all commercial banks. 20 and
I set ρN = .9 to capture the prolonged nature of the Quantitative Easing policies
implemented by the Federal Reserve. In particular, with ρN = .9 the purchases last for
more than 8 years. In the welfare section I vary this.
Equity Injections vs. Quantitative Easing
The simulations of the large fall in housing demand are illustrated in Figure (4.12) under all
three unconventional policy regimes – including no policy intervention. The results reveal
that both equity injections and large-scale asset purchases (LSAP’s) mitigate the crisis on
impact. However, the duration of the unconventional policies plays a critical role in de-
termining the time it takes to recover from the recession. Since the equity injections are
paid back after 7 quarters, the dynamics under this regime converge towards the no-policy
regime. The length of the recession is essentially unchanged – although the initial severity is
20Credit exposure is computed as explained in Section (4.3.2) using data from the OCC’s Quarterly
Derivatives Reports
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lessened. Comparing equity injections to LSAP’s, the equity injections better mitigate the
initial impact of the crisis; however, the persistence of the LSAP policy serve to speed-up
the recovery.
Which policy is preferred? To answer this question, I analyze (i) the total costs of the
policies and importantly (ii) the welfare rankings of the policies using the household’s utility
function. Table (4.2) reveals that although both unconventional policy regimes are preferred
Table 4.2: Equity Injections vs. Quantitative Easing
Policy Rule Length of Recession Taxpayer Revenue Welfare Cost1
(Quarters) (% of GDP) (% of Consumption)
No Policy 33 0.000% 0.71%
Equity Injections 31 0.000% 0.63%
QE, 5 Quarters 32 0.016% 0.63%
QE, 6 Quarters 31 0.022% 0.61%
QE, 7 Quarters 31 0.025% 0.59%
QE, 8 Quarters 31 0.029% 0.57%
QE, 9 Quarters 30 0.036% 0.55%
QE, 11 Quarters 29 0.046% 0.51%
QE, 13 Quarters 28 0.064% 0.44%
QE, 18 Quarters 25 0.107% 0.32%
QE, 34 Quarters 18 0.300% 0.00%
1 Welfare is computed by evaluating ∂Wt
∂ε
ηH
t
where Wt = ut +βEt{Wt+1} and ut is the household’s
period utility function. the cost is the % of steady-state consumption under the optimal policy
the household would have give-up under a prolonged QE policy to be indifferent to the inferior
policy.
to no policy intervention, the quantitative easing policy outperforms the equity injections in
terms of both cost and welfare. The central bank’s asset purchases actually result in profits
for tax-payers – consistent with the U.S. experience in which the Federal Reserve has made
record transfers to Treasury in light of its balance-sheet expansion. Moreover, this policy is
preferred from a welfare standpoint. Independent of the transfers to the household resulting
from the QE policy, the persistence of the policy speeds-up the recovery from the recession
which improves welfare.
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In addition to these quantitative factors, there is a political aspect to the comparison of
these policies as well. Although not modeled here, equity injections carry a stigma of (i)
Directly benefiting Wall Street as opposed to Main Street and (ii) The government taking an
ownership stake in a private firm. For example, in Figure (4.12) the variable ‘Publicly Owned
Share’ captures the government’s equity stake in the big banks. One could easily argue the
welfare rankings between equity injections and QE could reverse if the equity injections are
larger or more persistent. However, the political ramifications of equity injections makes
such adjustments unrealistic. In totality, QE policies are preferred as they provide sufficient
stimulus to offset the crisis without carrying political costs.
Were equity injections necessary?
The above conclusion that a persistent QE policy outperforms a short-lived equity injection
into big banks raises a natural question: Were the equity injections necessary? In other
words, the results above suggest the economy would be in roughly the same condition with
or without the TARP injections. Recall however the circumstances under which TARP was
passed.21 The economy was quickly deteriorating and urgent action was required to prevent a
total collapse of the financial system. Chairman Ben Bernanke’s reply to a weekend extension
for congress to debate the equity injections was famously recounted as, “If we don’t do this
[pass TARP] tomorrow, we won’t have an economy on Monday." This paper’s inclusion of
heterogeneous banks allows me to analyze the stabilizing role of capitalizing big banks.
In particular, the strength of the asset-price spiral from the redistribution of assets is cal-
ibrated by the slope of the unproductive bank’s demand for housing-backed assets, χR,U .
The baseline calibration is set to χR,U = 1.06. As this value increases the impact of asset
redistribution is strengthened. In fact, for slightly larger values of χR,U the model becomes
indeterminate so that no unique rational expectations equilibrium exists. The amplification
effect becomes so strong that without counter-cyclical policy there are multiple equilibria.
Interestingly, this indeterminacy can be remedied with counter-cyclical equity injections. In
21Outlined nicely in Andrew Ross Sorkin’s book, Too Big to Fail
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Figure 4.13: If the asset-price spiral is strong enough, the economy
becomes indeterminate. Determinacy can be restored with counter-
cyclical equity injections.
particular,
INJCBt = θBK
(
log(PNt )− log(P̄N )
)
with θBK < 0 is sufficient to restore determinacy. This systematic recapitalization of big
banks eliminates the multiple equilibria induced by a strong asset-price spiral. In this sense,
the ranking provided in Table (4.2) should serve as a lower bound of the value of various
unconventional policies.
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4.5 Conclusion
The paper presents a financial mechanism which is able to capture salient features of the
U.S. economy stemming from the interconnectedness of housing and financial markets. The
interaction between the two sectors allows for a more natural interpretation of what set-off the
Great Recession, a drop in housing demand, as opposed to the “Financial Shocks” that other
papers consider. Beyond simply being the source of the initial downturn, the housing market
also plays a fundamental role in prolonging the downturn. Since housing is a durable, when
defaults begin rising due to a drop in home prices, the future price of housing will remain
depressed as it takes time for the stock of homes to return to normal levels. This mechanism
captures the observed empirical relationship between the external finance premium and home
prices, output and investment; a relationship which the traditional Bernanke et al. (1999)
financial accelerator fails to capture.
In addition to integrating housing and financial markets, in this paper I provide insights
for policy makers regarding the treatment of “Too Big to Fail” banks. By eschewing the
assumption that all banks are the same (or similarly, banks face no agency problems), I am
able to show why big banks withdrew relatively more credit during the Great Recession.
The model’s qualitative predictions for the joint behavior of the asset concentration in large
banks, home prices, output and finance premiums are confirmed using an estimated VAR.
Beyond capturing this empirical observation, the model shows the differential behavior be-
tween big banks and their smaller counter parts served to strengthen the Great Recession.
Therefore, the equity injections into the largest financial firms in 2008 are well justified as
they mitigated the severity of the downturn and prevented a potential collapse. Although
this thwarted the initial downturn, policies such as “QE 1/3,” the Fed’s Mortgage Backed
Security purchase programs, play an important role in the model by speeding up the recovery.
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Future Work
Although this paper explains why big banks withdrew relatively more credit when home
prices plunged in 2007 and provides a transmission channel for unconventional monetary
policy, much work lies ahead. In particular, the policy options in this paper are designed
to clean-up after the crash instead of preventing it in the first place. Moving beyond crisis
management, the empirically validated financial structure presented in this paper can be
used to explore the efficacy of macroprudential policy in preventing a build-up of assets in
large financial firms when home prices rise.
A question of empirical importance arises as well from the model. Christiano et al. (2013)
show that “risk shocks” have played a substantial role in shaping the business cycle for the
last 20 years. However, they point out their finding is driven by the ability of risk shocks to
generate the empirical observation that credit contracts during recessions. Due to the novel
debt contract I introduce in this paper, credit contracts following adverse technology and
demand shocks – the usual business cycle suspects. Given the policy implications, it is worth
while to examine the robustness of their results in this housing-centered financial structure.
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Below, in Figure (4.14) I provide the complete set of impulse response functions for the
VAR model described in Section (4.3). I also provide historical decompositions of all three
structural shocks. Since the model is under-identified in the sense that here are less shocks
than variables, projecting the variables on to the space of structural shocks does not yield
the full set of variables. However, this serves as a useful tool to diagnose the extent to
which the structural shocks can explain the observed movement of the endogenous variables.
The inability to explain much of the variation in these variables would seriously call in to
question the identification scheme. The results of this exercise are reported in Figure (5.6)
below which show the three structural shocks can explain nearly all of the movement of the
endogenous variables in the VAR.
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Figure 4.14: Model A: Median Impulse Response Functions with 68%
and 90% confidence bounds computed with 5000 draws from the pos-
terior distribution using Jeffery’s Prior.
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Figure 4.15: Projected historical decompositions with 68% and 90%
confidence bounds computed with 5000 draws from the posterior dis-
tribution using Jeffery’s Prior. Solid lines denote the actual data.
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4.B Appendix: The Stationary, Non-Linear Model
In this section I provide the full set of equations which defines the dynamic equilibrium
model. All upper case variables are real and lower case variables are nominal - including
interest rates. In particular for any nominal interest rate rt, the real interest rate is given
via the Fisher equation, Rt = Et
{
rt
πt+1
}
.
Household - 5
WHt
Ct
=
ηL
H
1−LNewt
(4.B.1)
WG,Ct
Ct
=
ηL
1−LG,Ct
(4.B.2)
ηHt
Ht
=
PHt
Ct
−βEt
{
(1− δH)PHt+1
Ct+1
}
(4.B.3)
1
rDt
= Et {Λt+1} (4.B.4)
Λt = β
Ct−1
πtCt
(4.B.5)
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Aggregate Goods Production - 7
Yt = Z
G
t (Kt−1)
αG
(
LGt
)1−αG
(4.B.6)
LGt = (Lt)
(1−αE)
(
LEt
)αE
(4.B.7)
Wt = (1−αG)(1−αE)
Yt
Lt
(4.B.8)
WEt = (1−αG)αE
Yt
LEt
(4.B.9)
rKt =
αG
Yt
Kt
+(1− δK)Qt
Qt−1
(4.B.10)
CEt = (1−αNt )(1−Γt−1(ω̄t))RKt Kt−1 (4.B.11)
αNt =
(1−Ft−1(ω̄t))PNt−1RDt−1N
(1−Γt−1(ω̄t))RKt Qt−1Kt−1
(4.B.12)
Capital Producers - 1
It =Kt− (1− δK)Kt−1 (4.B.13)
Goods Production: Firm-level Debt Contract - 9
In this section I provide the equations which determine the debt contract. Moreover, I
provide a description of the individual entrepreneur’s problem which leads to the aggre-
gate entrepreneur’s consumption rule defined in equation (4.16). In particular, suppose
entrepreneuer j has preferences over consumption and housing given by a Cobb-Douglas
utility function,
Ut(j) = Ct(j)
1−αNt Nt(j)
αNt
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with
αNt =
(1−Ft−1(ω̄t))PNt−1RDt−1N
(1−Γt−1(ω̄t))RKt Qt−1Kt−1
.
Since entrepreneuer j takes the aggregate default rate Ft−1(ω̄t) and the aggregate choice of
capital, Kt as given, this Walrasian demand bundles given these preferences has the well-
known property of constant expenditure shares on consumption and housing.
Ct(j) =
(
1−αNt
)(
1−Γt−1(ω̄jt )
)
RKt K
j
t−1Qt−1
Aggregating over this equation implies
Ct =
∞̂
0
(
1−αNt
)(
1−Γt−1(ω̄jt )
)
RKt K
j
t−1Qt−1dj
=
(
1−αNt
)
(1−Γt−1(ω̄t))RKt Kt−1Qt−1
= (1−Γt−1(ω̄t))RKt Kt−1Qt−1 − (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))PNt−1RDt−1N.
The second equality follows from the ex-ante homogeneity among entrepreneurs implying
they all will choose the same default cut-off, ω̄jt , and the same level of capital expenditures,
Kjt .
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Et
{
Γ′t(ω̄t+1)R
K
t+1QtKt
}
= λEt Et
{(
Γ′t(ω̄t+1)−µMG′t(ω̄t+1)
)
RKt+1QtKt
}
(4.B.14)
Et
{
[1−Γt(ω̄t+1)]RKt+1
}
= λEt Et
{
REt −Γt(ω̄t+1)RKt+1
}
(4.B.15)
+λEt Et
{
µMGt(ω̄t+1)R
K
t+1
}
REt
(
QtKt−PNt N −WEt
)
= Et
{(
Γt(ω̄t+1)−µMGt(ω̄t+1)
)
RKt+1QtKt
}
(4.B.16)
Bt =QtKt−PNt N −WEt (4.B.17)
zt+1 =
ln(ω̄t+1)+ .5(σ
ω
t )
2
σωt
(4.B.18)
Gt(ω̄t+1) = Φ
N (zt+1 −σωt ) (4.B.19)
Γt(ω̄t+1) = Φ
N (zt+1 −σωt )+ ω̄t+1
(
1−ΦN (zt+1)
)
(4.B.20)
G′t(ω̄t+1) =
(
1
σωt
√
2π
)
e−
z2t+1
2 (4.B.21)
Γ′t(ω̄t+1) = 1−ΦN (zt+1) (4.B.22)
Housing Production: Aggregate Behavior - 2
HNewt = Z
H
t (L
H
t )
(1−αH) (4.B.23)
WHt = P
H
t (1−αH)
HNewt
LHt
(4.B.24)
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Productive Bank - 10
{
(1−ψtFt(ω̄t+1))BKPt
}
=NPt Et
{
ZRPHt+1 − (1−Ft(ω̄t+1))PNt RDt
PNt
}
(4.B.25)
Et
{
Λt+1r̄
E,P
t
}
= Et
{
Λt+1r
D
t
}
(4.B.26)
Et
{
Λt+1r̄
E,P
t
}
=
(
θB −1
θB
)
Et {Λt+1 (1−Ft(ω̄t+1))}rB,Pt (4.B.27)
+Et
{
Λt+1πt+1
(1−µM )Φt(ω̄t+1)
Bt
}
BPt =


rB,Pt
rBt


−θB
Bt (4.B.28)
BPt =D
P
t +
BKPt−1
πt
−PNt NPt (4.B.29)
ΠPt = (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))
rB,Pt−1
πt
BPt−1
+(1−µM )B
P
t−1
Bt−1
Φt(ω̄t+1)
+(1−Ft−1(ω̄t))RDt−1PNt−1NPt−1 (4.B.30)
+Ft−1(ω̄t)P
H
t Z
RNPt−1 −PNt NPt
−RDt−1DPt−1 +DPt −BPt
DIV Pt = Π
P
t (4.B.31)
TRANSPt = Ft−1(ω̄t)ψt−1
BKPt−1
πt
(4.B.32)
INV Pt = T
B,P −TRANSPt (4.B.33)
BKPt = INV
P
t +(1− δBK,P )
BKPt−1
πt
(4.B.34)
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Unproductive Bank - 10
PNt =
1
RDt
Et
{
ZRPHt+1 −χR,UµR,UNU
(χR,U −1)
t
}
(4.B.35)
Et
{
Λt+1r̄
E,U
t
}
= Et
{
Λt+1r
D
t +χ
B,U
}
(4.B.36)
Et
{
Λt+1r̄
E,U
t
}
=
(
θB −1
θB
)
Et {Λt+1 (1−Ft(ω̄t+1))}rB,Ut (4.B.37)
+Et
{
Λt+1πt+1
(1−µM )Φt(ω̄t+1)
Bt
}
BUt =


rB,Ut
rBt


−θB
Bt (4.B.38)
BUt =D
U
t +
BKUt−1
πt
−PNt NPt (4.B.39)
ΠUt = (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))
rB,Ut−1
πt
BUt−1
+(1−µM )B
U
t−1
Bt−1
Φt(ω̄t+1)
+(1−Ft−1(ω̄t))RDt−1PNt−1NUt−1 (4.B.40)
+Ft−1(ω̄t)
[
PHt Z
RNUt−1 −µR,U
(
NUt−1
)χR,U
]
−PNt NUt −RDt−1DUt−1 +DUt −BUt (1+χB,U )
DIV Ut = Π
U
t (4.B.41)
TRANSUt = Ft−1(ω̄t)ψt−1
BKUt−1
πt
(4.B.42)
INV Ut = T
B,U −TRANSUt (4.B.43)
BKUt = INV
U
t +(1− δBK,U )
BKUt−1
πt
(4.B.44)
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Aggregate Bank - 10
r̄Et =
[
ν
(
r̄E,Ut
)
1−θB +(1−ν)
(
r̄E,Pt
)
1−θB
] 1
1−θB (4.B.45)
rEt =
(
θB
θB −1
)
r̄Et −
(
1
θB −1
)
(1−µM )
Et
{
πt+1Φ
H.B.
t+1
}
Bt
(4.B.46)
REt =
rEt
πt+1
(4.B.47)
RDt =
rDt
πt+1
(4.B.48)
rBt =
[
ν
(
rB,Ut
)
1−θB +(1−ν)
(
rB,Pt
)
1−θB
] 1
1−θB (4.B.49)
Dt = νD
U
t +(1−ν)DPt (4.B.50)
DIVt = νDIV
U
t +(1−ν)DIV Pt (4.B.51)
TRANSt = νTRANS
U
t +(1−ν)TRANSPt (4.B.52)
INVt = νINV
U
t +(1−ν)INV Pt (4.B.53)
Φt−1(ω̄t) =Gt−1(ω̄t)R
K
t Qt−1Kt−1 (4.B.54)
Market Clearing - 4
Ht =H
New
t +Ft−1(ω̄t)Z
RN +(1− δH)Ht−1 (4.B.55)
N = νNPt +(1−ν)NUt (4.B.56)
Yt = Ct+C
E
t + It+ I
BK
t +µ
MΦt−1(ω̄t)+νFt−1(ω̄t)µ
R,U
(
NUt−1
)χR,U
+νχB,UBUt
(4.B.57)
GDPt = Ct+ It+P
H
t H
INV
t (4.B.58)
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Monetary Policy - 2
ψt = ψ̄ (4.B.59)
rDt
r̄D
=
(
πt
π̄
)φπ
(4.B.60)
Exogenous Shocks - 5
ln
(
ηHt
)
=
(
1−ρηH
)
ηH +ρηH ln
(
ηHt−1
)
+ εη
H
t (4.B.61)
ln
(
ZGt
)
= (1−ρZG)ZG+ρZGln
(
ZGt−1
)
+ εZ
G
t (4.B.62)
ln(σωt ) = (1−ρσω)σω +ρσω ln
(
σωt−1
)
+ εσ
ω
t (4.B.63)
ln
(
ZHt
)
= (1−ρZH )ZH +ρZH ln
(
ZHt−1
)
+ εZ
H
t (4.B.64)
ln
(
ψN,Pt
)
=
(
1−ρψN,P
)
ψN,P +ρψN,P ln
(
ψN,Pt−1
)
+ εψ
N,P
t (4.B.65)
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Chapter 5
The Foreclosure Accelerator versus
the Financial Accelerator: Housing
and Borrower’s Net Worth
5.1 Introduction
Newspaper articles, documentaries and general discussions about the 2008 financial crisis
center largely on the housing boom and bust now synonymous with the Great Recession.
However, much of the recent business cycle literature which has focused on integrating finan-
cial factors into general equilibrium models don’t feature housing markets (Christiano et al.,
2013; Justiniano et al., 2011). Figure (5.1) highlights the connection between the timing of
the fall in home prices, drop in output and pre-recession trough of finance premiums.
The disconnect between the general narrative regarding the role of housing in the worst
postwar recession and the analysis of business cycles is bridged in this paper. In order to
capture the above relationships, I develop a novel financial mechanism whereby firms rely on
housing secured debt instruments to finance their investment projects. When home prices
fall, the amount of secured debt firms can issue based upon a fixed amount of collateral
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Figure 5.1: Housing, Finance Premiums and Real GDP
falls, forcing borrowers to turn to costly unsecured debt. This drives up finance premiums
as default is more likely given the diminished financial position of the borrower. The unfa-
vorable loan terms drive down investment and output. This mechanism is self re-enforcing
since debt is secured by housing. When loan terms worsen, defaults increase resulting in
more liquidated homes, further decreasing home prices and collateral values. I call this the
foreclosure accelerator.
When I confront the data with this model, I find that home prices have played a significant
role in shaping finance premiums, secured debt and output over the business cycle. Further-
more, unlike Christiano et al. (2013), I find that risk shocks have played only a marginal role
in driving the business cycle. Instead, these shocks only explain high frequency movements
in finance premiums. I additionally explore the implication for monetary policy makers and
find the argument that the Fed should have tightened during the run-up in home prices
has little empirical footing. Conversely, contractionary deviations from the estimated Taylor
rule due to the binding zero lower bound caused a sharp contraction in output and spike in
finance premiums.
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5.2 A DSGE Model with Integrated Housing
and Financial Markets
Here I take a medium-sized DSGE model and compliment it with a financial mechanism
which integrates housing and financial markets. The basic model, features sticky prices,
sticky wages, costly capital utilization, investment adjustment costs and habit-formation in
consumption. These factors significantly improve the model’s fit when it is confronted with
the data (See for e.g. Christiano et al. (2005); Smets & Wouters (2007)).
5.2.1 Model Description
The model consists of a continuum of infinitely lived households, a continuum of short-lived
entrepreneurs who produce the wholesale good using capital. New capital is produced by
perfectly competitive firms who use inputs from the perfectly competitive investment goods
producing sector. The introduction of these agents allows for time variation in the price of
investment goods and the price of capital. The financial sector is comprised by a continuum
of competitive banks which finances investment for goods producers. Lastly a central bank
is modeled. In this section I will describe the behavior of each agent in turn. I follow the
convention throughout the model that lower case variables are stationary and upper-case
variables are non-stationary.
5.2.1.1 Household
There are a continuum of households indexed by i ∈ [0,1] where each household i supplies
a differentiated labor. I assume as in Erceg et al. (2000) that household’s have access to a
complete state-contingent securities market so that households are homogeneous with respect
to consumption and asset holdings, but possibly heterogeneous with respect to their labor
income. This is reflected in my notation as I will index each household type i’s wage rate
and labor hours supplied, but not other household level variables.
The household earns labor income by renting labor to goods producers lt(i) and home builders
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lht (i). Since household i supplies a differentiated type of labor they have some degree of
market power and therefore face the downward sloping demand for their labor variety:
lt(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)−θl
lt l
h
t (i) =
(
W ht (i)
W ht
)−θl
lht (5.1)
In order to introduce sticky nominal wages I assume that households must pay an adjustment
cost similar to Rotemberg (1982). The specification of adjustment costs allows for the partial
indexation of wages to lagged wage inflation, πWt−1 and π
W,h
t−1 , and the central bank’s inflation
target, π̄t.
Households earn non-labor income from their ownership stake in retail firms, Ptst, and
principal plus interest payments Pt−1dt−1r
D
t−1 on last periods deposits. This income can be
saved in the form of bank deposits Ptdt or spent on consumption Ptct and housing P
h
t ht.
Also, any non-depreciated housing stock, (1− δ)ht−1, can be resold at the market price P ht .
The resulting budget constraint in any period t= 0,1,2, ... is given by:
Ptct+Ptdt+
φW
2


Wt(i)
Wt−1(i)π
Wϕl
t−1 π̄
1−ϕl
t
−1


2
Ptlt+
φW
2


W ht (i)
W ht−1(i)π
W,hϕl
t−1 π̄
1−ϕl
t
−1


2
Ptl
h
t
=Wt(i)lt(i)+W
h
t (i)l
h
t (i)+Pt−1dt−1r
d
t−1 −P ht
[
ht−
(
1− δh
)
ht−1
]
+Ptst.
The household maximizes their lifetime expected utility by choosing sequences for the vari-
ables
{
ct,ht,dt, lt(i), l
h
t (i),Wt(i),W
h
t (i)
}∞
t=0
while satisfying the flow budget constraint along
with the demands for their variety of labor. The household’s lifetime expected utility is
specified by:
U(i) =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{
ηct
[
ln(ct−̺ct−1)+ηht ln(ht)−ηl,t
lt(i)
1+νl
1+νl
−ηhl,t
lht (i)
1+νl
1+νl
]}
,
ηct , η
h
t , ηl,t and η
h
l,t represent shifts in the preferences over consumption goods, housing and
leisure. I specify these as exogenous processes, each of which follows a first order auto-
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regressive process:
ln(ηct ) = ρηcln(η
c
t−1)+ ε
ηc
t ε
ηc
t ∼ N (0,σηc) , (5.2)
ln(ηht ) = (1−ρηh)ln(ηh)+ρηhln(ηht−1)+ εη
h
t ε
ηh
t ∼ N
(
0,σηh
)
, (5.3)
ln(ηl,t) = (1−ρηl)ln(ηl)+ρηlln(ηl,t−1)+ ε
ηl
t ε
ηl
t ∼ N (0,σηl) , (5.4)
ln(ηhl,t) = (1−ρηh
l
)ln(ηhl )+ρηh
l
ln(ηhl,t−1)+ ε
ηl
t . (5.5)
Although I follow Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello & Neri (2010) by modeling a housing
market, I do not include household home equity borrowing constraints. I focus more so
on real-estate secured assets as collateral for investment and the interaction of house prices
and these assets. That being said, in general equilibrium changes in home prices can impact
consumption via traditional income and substitution effects, but not through the home equity
channel highlighted by Iacoviello (2005).
λt = Et
{
ηct
ct−̺ct−1
−β̺ η
c
t+1
ct+1 −̺ct
}
(5.6)
λtp
h
t =
ηctη
h
t
ht
+β(1− δh)Et
{
λt+1p
h
t+1
}
(5.7)
λt = βEt
{
λt+1r
d
t
πt+1
}
(5.8)
(1− θl)wt+
ηl,tlt(i)
νl
λt
θl = φW


πWt (i)
πWϕlt−1 π̄
1−ϕl
t
−1


πWt (i)
πWϕlt−1 π̄
1−ϕl
t
Wt
Wt(i)
−βφWEt



λt+1lt+1
λtlt


πWt+1(i)
πWϕlt π̄
1−ϕl
t+1
−1


πWt+1(i)
πWϕlt π̄
1−ϕl
t+1
Wt
Wt(i)



(5.9)
(1− θl)wht +
ηhl,tl
h
t (i)
νl
λt
θl = φW


πW,ht (i)
πW,hϕlt−1 π̄
1−ϕl
t
−1


πW,ht (i)
πW,hϕlt−1 π̄
1−ϕl
t
W ht
W ht (i)
−βφhWEt



λt+1lt+1
λtlt


πW,ht+1 (i)
πW,hϕlt π̄
1−ϕl
t+1
−1


πW,ht+1 (i)
πW,hϕlt π̄
1−ϕl
t+1
W ht
W ht (i)



(5.10)
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5.2.1.2 The Financial Sector
I assume a continuum of banks populate the financial sector. These banks, indexed by z,
make secured and unsecured loans to entrepreneurs who produce the consumption good.
These loans are funded entirely by deposits raised from the household. However, households
can not loan directly to entrepreneurs because they don’t have access to the monitoring and
liquidation technologies. Banks on the other hand are assumed to have access to technologies
which allow them to (1) monitor loan projects in order to verify default on unsecured loans
and (2) repossess and liquidate collateral posted for secured loans.
Since every bank z produces homogeneous outputs, no single bank has any degree of market
power. Thus, banks take as given the interest rate paid on deposits along with the interest
rate charged on secured and unsecured loans. Furthermore, I assume each bank can perfectly
diversify any idiosyncratic risk and therefore depositors can be guaranteed the same rate of
return across all banks. More specifically, borrowers who default on loans made in period
t−1, which occurs with probability Ft−1(ω̄t), have their assets seized by a collections agency
who distributes the proceeds, Υt−1(ω̄t), to banks in proportion to their loan market share
bzt−1/bt−1. Banks still bear the monitoring costs of confirming repayment was not possible
and therefore net only a fraction 1−µ of these proceeds.
Meanwhile, borrowers who default on their secured loan, which also occurs with probability
Ft−1(ω̄t), have their collateral repossessed by the bank and liquidated in the housing market.
Banks have access to technology which enables them to transform repossessed collateral into
housing at rate zr while bearing the time-varying real marginal liquidation costs of χrt :
ln(χrt ) = (1−ρχr)χrρχr ln(χrt−1)+ εχ
r
t ε
χr
t ∼ N (0,σχr) . (5.11)
Movements in χrt provide a proxy for financial innovation or differences in collateral from its
fundamental value that may arise in times of market illiquidity.
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These receipts and outlays are summarized in bank z’s period t profit function below:
Πzt = (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))rbt−1Pt−1bzt−1 +(1−µ)Υt−1(ω̄t)
bzt−1
bt−1
+(1−Ft−1(ω̄t))Pnt−1nzt−1rdt−1 +Ft−1(ω̄t)
[
P ht z
rnzt−1 −Ptχrt−1nzt−1
]
−Pt−1dzt−1rdt−1 +Ptdzt −Pnt nzt −Ptbzt .
Bank z seeks to maximize the discounted present value of their profits subject to the balance
sheet constraint which stipulates that assets equal liabilities at all times. More formally, the
bank solves:
max
{bzt ,nzt ,dzt }∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
E0
{
M0|t
Πzt
Pt
}
subject to Ptb
z
t +P
n
t n
z
t = Ptd
z
t ,
where M0|t = βt λtλ0 is the stochastic discount factor derived from the household’s optimization
problem. The first order conditions from the bank’s problem will be useful when describing
the entrepreneurs in the following section. Therefore, they are provided below.
Et
{
Mt|t+1
rdt
πt+1
bt
}
= Et
{
Mt|t+1
(
(1−Ft(ω̄t+1))
rbt
πt+1
bt+(1−µ)
Υt(ω̄t+1)
Pt+1
)}
(5.12)
Et
{
Mt|t+1
rdt
πt+1
pnt
}
= Et
{
Mt|t+1
(
pHt+1z
r −χrt
)}
(5.13)
5.2.1.3 Wholesale Goods Production
The goods producing sector is comprised of a continuum of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs
have limited resources to finance capital required to produce the final good so they must
borrow from banks. A financial friction arises whereby entrepreneurs borrow funds from
banks this period to purchase capital used in production next period. Their output next
period is subject to idiosyncratic productivity disturbances only observable by banks after
paying a monitoring cost.
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Entrepreneur’s Debt Contract: Housing Secured Debt
Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral agents who supply wholesale goods to retailers using capital
and labor. Here I use the large-family metaphor and assume that each household type i has
a large number of entrepreneurs.1 These entrepreneurs are indexed by j ∈ R+, where the
index corresponds to their liquid assets, denoted ajt at the beginning of period t. In addition
to these liquid assets, each entrepreneur is endowed with 1 unit of labor supply in period t
and n units of an asset which can be transformed into housing only by entrepreneurs and
banks in period t+1. However, capital must be purchased in period t to be useful in period
t+ 1. Denote the quantity of capital purchased in period t by entrepreneur j by kjt and
denote the period t nominal price of capital by Qt. To purchase this capital the entrepreneur
will receive financing from the banking sector. More specifically, the entrepreneur use their
liquid assets (which includes their wages earned in period t) and pledges their t+1 housing
security endowment n as collateral for a secured loan in the amount Pnt n. The remaining
portion of the capital purchase is financed with an unsecured loan in the amount Ptb
j
t . More
concretely,
Qtk
j
t = P
n
t n+Ptb
j
t +Pta
j
t (5.14)
is entrepreneur j’s budget constraint.
Without default, distinguishing between secured and unsecured loans is trivial. However, in
period t+ 1, entrepreneurs are subjected to an idiosyncratic productivity shock ωjt+1 which
is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs and time. I assume throughout the analysis in this paper,
ωjt+1 ∼ lnN
(
−(σωt )
2
2 ,σ
ω
t
)
with CDF at time t denoted by Ft (ωt+1). The choice of parameters
implies E
{
ωjt+1
}
= 1 so that in the aggregate this idiosyncratic shock has no direct impact
on production, but the existence of uncertainty at the firm level impacts aggregate output
through financial imperfections (BGG).
1This assumption, as in Christiano et al. (2013), makes only 1 minor change to the equilibrium equations
when compared to the set-up in Bernanke et al. (1999) who don’t assume the entrepreneurs live with the
household.
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To capture exogenous changes in the cross-sectional dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity
shocks I allow σωt to vary over time. I posit the simple auto-regressive process,
ln(σωt ) = (1−ρσω)ln(σω)+ρσω ln(σωt−1)+ εσ
ω
t ε
σω
t ∼ N (0,σσω) (5.15)
for this demand-side risk shock. Christiano et al. (2013) show that such shocks have played
a significant role in shaping the U.S. business cycle.
Since projects are financed before the idiosyncratic productivity shock can be observed by
either the entrepreneur or the bank, entrepreneurs who receive a low productivity value
will default upon their loan. Denote the gross interest rate on unsecured loans paid by
entrepreneur j by rb,jt and denote the gross return on capital common to all entrepreneurs
by rkt+1. Then for any entrepreneur j, we can define the cut-off value of ω̄
j
t+1 by the equation
ω̄jt+1r
k
t+1k
j
tQt = Ptb
j
tr
b,j
t . (5.16)
This equation defines the minimum level of productivity needed to pay back the unsecured
loan. For entrepreneur j, the loan will be repaid if ωjt+1 ≥ ω̄jt+1 and will otherwise be
defaulted upon. However, the bank can not observe the level of productivity without paying
an auditing cost in proportion µ ∈ (0,1) to the entrepreneur’s revenue.2 Banks who do
not pay for auditing never find out if the entrepreneur actually received a low productivity
draw or if they simply chose to renege on their loan. Given this arrangement, the optimal
debt-contract from the borrowers perspective dictates that banks will audit only defaulting
entrepreneurs and only entrepreneurs who receive a bad-draw will default on their loans.
Although the contract is optimal from the borrower’s perspective, the entrepreneur must
ensure the bank’s profit maximization condition from (5.12) is satisfied. More strictly, the
debt-contract must be individually rational from the bank’s perspective in every state of
2This follows from Townsend (1979), but has been popularized in this context by Carlstrom & Fuerst
(1997) and BGG.
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nature since the banks are owned by risk-averse households. This implies the risk-neutral
entrepreneurs bear all the aggregate risk, and the bank’s optimality condition (5.12) holds
both in and out of expectation:
rdt b
j
t
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Funding Cost
=
(
1−Ft(ω̄jt+1)
)
rb,jt b
j
t
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-Defaulting Payoff
+(1−µ)
ˆ ω̄jt+1
0
ωjt+1dFt(ω
j
t+1)r
k
t+1k
j
t qt
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Defaulting Payoff
(5.17)
where
υt(ω̄t+1) ≡
Υt(ω̄t+1)
Pt+1
=
ˆ ω̄jt+1
0
ωjt+1dFt(ω
j
t+1)
rkt+1
πt+1
kjt qt. (5.18)
We can simplify this expression (and the resulting entrepreneur’s optimization problem) by
defining the following terms. First let Gt(ω̄
j
t+1) be defined as the expected productivity value
for defaulting entrepreneurs.
Gt(ω̄
j
t+1) =
ˆ ω̄jt+1
0
ωjt+1dFt(ω
j
t+1) (5.19)
Also let Γt(ω̄
j
t+1) be defined as the expected share of entrepreneurial profits going to the
bank gross of auditing costs.
Γt(ω̄
j
t+1) =
(
1−Ft(ω̄jt+1)
)
ω̄jt+1 +Gt(ω̄
j
t+1) (5.20)
Now I can combine (5.17) with (5.14), (5.16), (5.19) and (5.20) to rewrite the bank’s indi-
vidual rationality constraint as follows:
rdt
(
qtk
j
t −pnt n−ajt
)
=
(
Γt(ω̄
j
t+1)−µGt(ω̄jt+1)
)
rkt+1k
j
t qt. (5.21)
We can now formally state the problem faced by entrepreneur j. To keep the debt-contract
tractable, I assume the entrepreneur is instructed by the household to maximize their period
t+ 1 income (as a random fraction, 1 − γt, is transferred to households) and in exchange
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entrepreneurs receive consumption insurance from household’s. Entrepreneurs who succeed,
are contractually obligated to pay-back their secured loan, prior to transferring funds to
homeowners. Since homeowners own the banks, they yield to the seniority of the debt
structure.
Entrepreneur j therefore seeks to maximize the gross expected income (of which the fraction
(1−γt) is transferred to their household), subject to (5.21):
max
kjt ,ω̄
j
t+1
Et
{(
1−Γt(ω̄jt+1)
)
rkt+1k
j
t qt
}
subject to rdt
(
qtk
j
t −pnt n−ajt
)
=
(
Γt(ω̄
j
t+1)−µGt(ω̄jt+1)
)
rkt+1k
j
t qt
Where I use (5.16) and (5.20) to write Et
{
´∞
ω̄jt+1
ωjt+1dF (ω
j
t+1)r
k
t+1k
j
t qt− (1−Ft(ω̄jt+1))rb,jt bjt
}
= Et
{
(1−Γt(ω̄jt+1))rkt+1kjt qt
}
. The solution to this optimization problem pins down the cut-
off value ω̄jt+1 and the entrepreneur’s demand for capital k
j
t .
Et



(
1−Γt(ω̄jt+1)
)
rkt+1 −
Γ′t(ω̄
j
t+1)
Γ′t(ω̄
j
t+1)−µG′t(ω̄jt+1)
[
rdt −
(
Γt(ω̄
j
t+1)−µGt(ω̄jt+1)
)
rkt+1
]



= 0
(5.22)
The problem is identical in nature to the problem entrepreneurs face in BGG who show the
optimal debt contract has the property that the default rate, Ft(ω̄
j
t+1), and external finance
premium, rkt /r
d
t−1, move inversely with net-worth. In this model, the net-worth component is
replaced with the collateral value and wage earnings, pnt n+w
E
t , implying that ∂ω̄
j
t+1/∂p
n
t < 0
- finance premiums and default rates will move in the opposite direction of collateral prices.
From (5.13), this implies finance premiums will move in the opposite direction of home prices.
Aggregate Wholesale Goods Production
The previous section describes the firm-level behavior in the wholesale goods producing sec-
tor, specifically it describes the debt-contracting problem faced by each producer. In this
section, I describes the industry wide behavior. Since each entrepreneur (in the second period
of their life) has access to the homogeneous production technology, yjt = ω
j
t
(
kjt−1
)α(
l′jt
)1−α
,
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which can be aggregated over due to constant returns to scale. The aggregate goods pro-
duction technology in any given period t is specified as
yt = zt
(
kt−1
)α(
l′t
)1−α
(5.23)
where zt is an exogenous technology process which affects all entrepreneurs equally. I assume
this technology follows a first-order autoregressive process.
ln(zt) = ρzln(zt−1)+ ε
z
t ε
z
t ∼ N (0,σz) (5.24)
Wholesale producers use this technology to produce the wholesale good which is purchased
by retailers. This wholesale goods market is perfectly competitive and therefore the wholesale
price, PWt , is taken as given. We can now consider the determination of factor demands for
capital and labor.
The labor aggregate in the production function is a composite of labor supplied by the
household, lt ,and labor supplied by this periods young entrepreneurs, l
E
t ,
l′t =
(
lEt
)αE(
lt
)1−αE
, (5.25)
where αE captures the share of goods producing income received by entrepreneurs. This
implies the wage paid to the household’s labor and the wage paid to entrepreneurial labor
are given by:
Wt = P
W
t (1−α)(1−αEt )
yt
lt
(5.26)
WEt = P
W (1−α)αEt
yt
lEt
. (5.27)
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Similarly, the marginal product of capital is given by:
mpkt = α
yt
kt−1
(5.28)
The gross nominal return on holding a unit of capital from period t−1 to period t is defined
by
rkt =
utmp
k
tP
W
t −a(ut)Pt+(1− δk)Qt
Qt−1
, (5.29)
where ut is the utilization rate chosen by the producers and a(ut) are the real resources spent
to support this utilization rate:
a(ut) =
mpk
χa
[
eχ
a(ut−1) −1
]
. (5.30)
The only way the utilization rate impacts entrepreneurs is through (5.29). Therefore, en-
trepreneurs solve the problem:
max
ut
rkt (5.31)
Hence, from this point on, ut represents the optimal utilization rate and satisfies the first
order condition:
mpkt p
W
t =mp
kp̄W eχ
a(ut−1), (5.32)
where the specification of a(ut) ensures that ū= 1 so steady state utilization costs are zero.
Notice that in (5.32), the first order condition for choosing ut to maximize r
k
t , and in (5.22),
the optimal choice of ω̄j are both independent of each entrepreneur’s liquid assets. Hence,
the distribution of the liquid assets across entrepreneurs is not needed to determine aggre-
gate capital stock and loans.3 Hence, the aggregate income of entrepreneurs in period t is
(1−Γt−1(ω̄t)) r
k
t
πt+1
kt−1qt−1. Entrepreneurs have the ability to transform their endowment n
- into non-tradable housing. Recall however, this endowment was leveraged last period to
3See equations 2.15 and 2.16 in Christiano et al. (2013) for more details on the aggregation across en-
trepreneurs.
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secure a loan in the amount pnt−1n. Hence, entrepreneurs who are able, choose to payback
the secured loan with interest pnt−1nr
d
t−1 and then convert n into housing services one for
one. If they don’t payback the secured loan then they default on this contract and the bank
takes possession of the collateral n.
I assume in the aggregate, all the entrepreneurs who did not default on their unsecured
loan, payback their secured loan and divide the rest of their income between transfers to
households and liquid assets next period so that at evolves according to:
at = γ
[
(1−Γt−1(ω̄t))
rkt
πt
kt−1qt−1 − (1−Ft−1(ω̄t))pnt−1n
rdt−1
πt
]
+wEt . (5.33)
A more elaborate specification would make the entrepreneur’s decision of whether to pay-back
their secured loan a strategic choice of the entrepreneur; whereas, this specification implies
the only source of default on secured loan is due to insufficient income. An appealing aspect
of this description is the existence of a single default rate in the economy.4 Moreover, this
specification captures the essence of securing debt with mortgage backed securities. When
the default rate of mortgages rise, financial firms (investment banks for example) who rely
on these payments to fund their debt (which further fund MBS purchases and nonfinancial
firms projects) are more likely to default. These risk cause secured loan markets to dry-
up. Interpreting the entrepreneur as an investment bank who funds non-financial firms in a
market without imperfections yields such an interpretation.
5.2.1.4 Retail Goods Producers
Retailers are monopolistically competitive firms who purchase the generic wholesale good at
price PWt and transform it into a unique variety. Due to the differentiated nature of each
firm’s, f ∈ [0,1], output they face a downward sloping demand for their variety of the final
4That is to say, the default rate on unsecured loans is the same as the default rate on secured loans. I
choose this as a starting point although this assumption can be relaxed.
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good:
yt(f) =
(
Pt(f)
Pt
)−θt
yt (5.34)
where variations in θt appear as “Cost Push,” or non-technology supply shocks in the log-
linearized New-Keynesian Phillips Curve that emerges from the retailer’s first order condi-
tion. I assume as in Smets & Wouters (2007):
ln(θt) = (1−ρθ)θ+ρθln(θt−1)+ εθt εθt ∼ N (0,σθ) . (5.35)
Given the market power of retail firms, each firm f would like to sell their variety for a rent
maximizing mark-up over marginal cost. However, to introduce nominal price rigidities, I
assume firms also bear a convex cost of adjusting their price relative to the rate of inflation
as in Rotemberg (1982). More specifically, retailers seek to maximize the discounted sum of
their real dividend stream:
max
{Pt(f)}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
E0



M0|t



Pt(f)
Pt
yt(f)−
PWt
Pt
− φ
2


Pt(f)
Pt−1(f)π
ϕ
t−1π̄
1−ϕ
t
−1


2
yt






subject to (5.34).
(5.36)
In a symmetric equilibrium where Pt(f) = Pt∀f , the resulting first order condition defines
the typical forward-looking aggregate supply relationship relating inflation to real marginal
cost. In other words, the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve emerges from the firm’s problem.
θtp
W
t
(
Pt(f)
Pt
)−θt−1
− (θt−1)
(
Pt(f)
Pt
)−θt
= φ


πt(f)
πϕt−1π̄
1−ϕ
t
−1


πt(f)
πϕt−1π̄
1−ϕ
t
Pt
Pt(f)
(5.37)
−φEt
{
yt+1Mt,t+1
ytMt,t
[
πt+1(f)
πϕt π̄
1−ϕ
t
−1
]
πt+1(f)
πϕt π̄
1−ϕ
t
Pt
Pt(f)
}
5.2.1.5 New Housing Production
I assume new housing is produced in a purely competitive market and free from financial
frictions. In particular, housing producers combine labor lht with housing specific technology,
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zht in the production technology,
hnewt = z
h
t (l
h
t )
1−αh (5.38)
where
ln(zht ) = ρzhln(z
h
t−1)+ ε
zh
t ε
zh
t ∼ N (0,σzh) . (5.39)
I model housing specific technology independent of technology in the goods producing sec-
tor since much of the economic growth over the last two decades has been IT-driven and
housing production is a non IT-intensive industry. Moreover, this specification allows for
the technology process in the goods producing sector, zt, to potentially play a significant
role in determining output without implying a counterfactual negative correlation between
home prices and GDP (see for example Davis & Heathcote (2005)). The resulting demand
for labor from the housing sector takes the form:
W ht = P
h
t (1−αh)
hnewt
lht
. (5.40)
5.2.1.6 Investment Goods Production
Perfectly competitive firms purchase yit units of the final retail good at a price of Pt and use
the linear, time-varying technology:
it = z
i
ty
i
t (5.41)
to transform these retails goods into investment goods, which they sell to capital goods
producers for a market determined price P it . The representative investment goods producing
firm solves the following problem:
max
yit
P it z
i
ty
i
t −Ptyit, (5.42)
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which pins down the relative price of investment as:
P it
Pt
=
1
zit
. (5.43)
The purpose of explicitly including this sector in the model is to examine the role investment-
specific technology play in shaping the business cycle. During the estimation the price of
investment goods relative to consumption goods, pit = P
i
t /Pt is treated as an observable
variable which disciplines the estimation of the zit process:
ln(zit) = ρziln(z
i
t−1)+ ε
zi
t ε
zi
t ∼ N (0,σzi) . (5.44)
5.2.1.7 Capital Goods Production
In period t, the capital goods producing firm purchases any non-depreciated capital from
period t− 1 at the market price Qt and produces new capital using the investment good
which is purchased at the price P it . The sum of these two components comprises the total
capital stock at the end of period t, which is sold to entrepreneurs at the price Qt. The rate at
which the capital goods producers can transform the investment good and old, undepreciated
capital into new capital is constrained by the technology:
kt =
(
it−S
(
it
zkt kt−1
)
zkt kt−1
)
+(1− δk)kt−1 (5.45)
where S(·) captures cost of adjusting the level of investment. This function has the properties
that S(δk) = S′(δk) = 0 and S′′(δk)> 0. In practice, these derivatives can be matched with
the function:
S
(
it
zkt kt−1
)
=
χS
2
[
it
zkt kt−1
− δk
]2
where χS > 0. (5.46)
In the financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2013), this
function plays a critical role in the propagation of downturns by endogenously decreasing
the price of capital when investment falls. This drop in asset prices decreases th net worth
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of entrepreneurs in these models which ultimately leads to further reductions in investment,
starting the cycle over. This is the celebrated financial accelerator mechanism.
Meanwhile the term zkt in (5.45) captures variations in the efficiency at which the investment
goods can be transformed into installed capital:
ln(zkt ) = ρzk ln(z
k
t−1)+ ε
zk
t ε
zk
t ∼ N (0,σzk) . (5.47)
In Justiniano et al. (2011), movements in zkt make the largest contribution to output, in-
vestment and labor dynamics at business cycle frequencies. However, the bulk of these
movements correspond to financial distress. Therefore it is perhaps not surprising that when
these shocks are included in the estimation of the enriched BGG/financial accelerator model
of Christiano et al. (2013), movements in σωt overtake movements in z
k
t as the most important
shocks at business cycle frequencies. The framework presented in this paper allows these
shocks to compete with housing demand disturbances in driving the business cycle. The
capital goods producer solves:
max
kt,it
Qtkt−Qt(1− δk)kt−1 −P it it subject to (5.45), (5.48)
which implies the following Tobin’s Q relationship:
Qt =
P it
1−S′
(
it
zkt kt
) . (5.49)
5.2.1.8 Central Bank
The central bank is charged with setting monetary policy. The monetary policy instrument
is the rate on 1-period deposits, rdt , which is assumed to follow a linear (in logs) feedback
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rule of the type specified by Taylor (1993):
rdt
r̄d
=
(
rdt−1
r̄d
)ρr(πt
π̄t
)ψπ( yt
yt−1
)ψy
ǫrt ǫ
r
t,4 (5.50)
where,
ln(ǫrt ) = ε
r
t ε
r
t ∼ N (0,σr) (5.51)
ln(ǫr,4t ) = ρr,4 ln(ǫ
r,4
t−1)+ ε
r,4
t−4 ε
r,4
t ∼ N (0,σr,4) . (5.52)
There are three senses in which this rule evolves stochastically. First, there is a typical
monetary policy shock, ǫrt which is completely unforecastable by agents. However, I also
allow for the possibility that agents learn the central bank is going to deviate from their
policy rule in the future through the exogenous term ǫr,4t . Although the solution method
employed to estimate the model parameters doesn’t allow for explicitly incorporating agents’
knowledge of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, these news shocks allow for
deviations which are not a surprise to agents.
A third sense in which the policy rule evolves stochastically arises from the central bank’s
inflation target, π̄t which evolves according to an AR(1) process:
ln(π̄t) = (1−ρπ̄)π̄+ρπ̄ln(π̄t−1)+ επ̄t επ̄t ∼ N (0,σπ̄) . (5.53)
This shock is introduced as a means of capturing the downward trend in inflation in the
early part of the sample. To this end, I set ρπ̄ = 0.975 and σπ̄ = 0.0001 (Christiano et al.,
2013).
5.2.1.9 Market Clearing
Sections 5.2.1.1 - 5.2.1.8 describe the optimal behavior of all agents in the economy. A
symmetric competitive equilibrium is defined as a sequence of quantities, prices and Lagrange
multipliers (shadow prices) which satisfy all optimality conditions, policy rules and market
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clearing conditions. In particular, symmetry across households implies that:
lt(i) = lt (5.54)
Wt(i) =Wt (5.55)
lht (i) = l
h
t (5.56)
W ht (i) =W
h
t . (5.57)
Symmetry across banks implies:
bzt = bt (5.58)
dzt = dt (5.59)
nzt = nt. (5.60)
Symmetry across entrepreneurs implies:
bjt = bt (5.61)
kjt = kt. (5.62)
Similarly, symmetry across retailers implies:
Pt(f) = Pt (5.63)
yt(f) = yt. (5.64)
The market clearing condition in the collateralized loan market requires that at all times:
nt = n. (5.65)
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Using this requirement, the housing market clearing condition can be expressed as:
ht = h
new
t +Ft−1(ω̄t)z
rn+(1− δh)ht−1. (5.66)
Using the collateralized loan market clearing again, the goods market clearing condition can
be expressed by the resource constraint:
yt = ct+p
i
tit+Ft−1(ω̄t)χ
rn+µυt−1(ω̄t)+a(ut)+act, (5.67)
where act defines the real-resource cost of adjusting prices and wages:
act =
φ
2


πt
πϕt−1π̄
1−ϕ
t
−1


2
yt+
φW
2


πWt
πϕlt−1π̄
1−ϕl
t
−1


2
lt+
φW
2

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πW
h
t
πϕlt−1π̄
1−ϕl
t
−1


2
lht . (5.68)
Since act is of second-order, in a linear approximation we have that act ≈ 0.
It is useful for the purpose of model inference to define gross domestic product in this multi-
sector model:
gdpt = ct+p
i
tit+p
h
t h
new
t . (5.69)
5.3 Model Inference
In this section I describe the econometric strategy employed to estimate the model’s param-
eters. I discuss the data used in this analysis, the choice of priors with an emphasis on the
relative tightness of the prior specifications and finally the specification of news shocks and
examination of model fit.
5.3.1 Data
I use quarterly data on 11 variables spanning 1990:Q1 to 2013:Q4. 7 variables are standard
macroeconomic time-series including: consumption, non-residential investment, the relative
price of non-residential investment goods, the federal funds rate, inflation, the real wage
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rate and hours worked. Since there are multiple sectors in the model, including the real
wage rate and hours worked in both sectors would require bringing in more variables to
the analysis, limiting the number of financial variables I could introduce without inducing
stochastic singularity. To avoid this issue I compute the aggregate real wage rate, wat , and
hours worked, lat , as a Tornquist-Thiel (or Divisia) index number:
ln
(
lat
lat−1
)
=
1
2
(sht + s
h
t−1)ln
(
lht
lht−1
)
+
1
2
(st+ st−1)ln
(
lt
lt−1
)
(5.1)
ln
(
wat
wat−1
)
=
1
2
(sht + s
h
t−1)ln
(
wht
wht−1
)
+
1
2
(st+ st−1)ln
(
wt
wt−1
)
. (5.2)
where st = wtlt/(wtlt +w
h
t l
h
t ) is the share of income earned in the goods producing sector
and sht = 1−st is the share of income earned in the housing sector. For the data component,
I use BLS aggregate measures of hours worked and wages earned in the private sector.
The remaining 4 variables consist of housing and financial market variables. The 2 housing
market variables include residential fixed investment and real home prices, measured using
the S&P/Case-Shiller National Composite Home Price Index. The remaining 2 variables
are financial variables. As Christiano et al. (2013) show, including financial variables in the
estimation is critical to capturing the role credit frictions play in the business cycle. Most
critical of these variables is the external finance premium, rkt /r
d
t−1 − 1 = µυt−1(ω̄t)bt−1 which
is measured empirically as the difference between BAA-rated corporate bonds and the 10-
year U.S. government bond rate. Again, similar to Christiano et al. (2013) I inform my
estimation on the measure of credit using data on credit to non-financial firms from the
Flow of Funds dataset. In particular, bt+p
n
t n is measured as the (first log difference in) the
‘credit market instruments’ measure of total liabilities for nonfarm, nonfinancial corporate
and noncorporate business.
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5.3.2 Parameters: Calibration and Prior Specification
The model has a total of 54 parameters. I will divide these parameters into 3 groups:
calibrated parameters, parameters with tight priors, parameters with loose priors. The logic
of the partition is as follows. Several pairs of parameters are likely to not be jointly identified
and therefore one of the pair must be calibrated prior to estimation. Also, several parameters
such as capital’s share in the production function and the depreciation rate of capital are
standard in macroeconomic models and therefore can be easily calibrated. Moreover, the
model variables are by construction in log-deviations from steady state and therefore are
mean zero. Hence, for the data to align with the construction of the model variables all data
is demeaned. That being said, the information contained in the first moment need not be
disposed. Instead, this information can be brought into the model by specifying the values
of parameters which determine the model’s steady state. This information thus plays a role
in the calibration and specification of priors.
5.3.2.1 Calibrated Parameters
It is well known the discount rate β and depreciation rates δh and δk are not jointly identified.
To avoid this potential pitfall, I use the consensus value of δk = 0.025. At the same time,
I set n to ensure the steady state return on capital is r̄k = 1.025. Moreover, I fix β so that
r̄d = π̄/β = 1.015 where π̄ represents the mean of the central bank’s inflation target. These
two facts imply a steady-state difference between the risky loan rate and the policy rate
equals to 4.00% annually, the average spread between the BAA-corporate bond rate and the
federal funds rate, according to data obtained from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database.
The housing depreciation parameter, δh is calibrated to 0.0123 which implies, along with
the other means of the prior distributions, that the steady state ratio of housing wealth to
annual GDP equals 1.4. In other words, δh = p̄
h(hnew+F (ω)zrn)
1.4×4×gdp . Following Christiano et al.
(2013) I fix the inflation target at π̄ = 1.0051 so that inflation averages 2.4% per year. As
noted in the text, to capture the downward trend in inflation during the early part of the
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sample, I set ρπ̄ = 0.975 and σπ̄ = 0.0001.
Table 5.1: Model Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Name Parameter Calibrated Value(a)
Steady State Inflation Target π̄ 1.0051
Inflation Target Shock ρπ̄ 0.9750
σπ̄ 0.0001
Household Discount Factor β 0.9902
Capital Depreciation Rate δk 0.0250
Housing Depreciation Rate δh 0.0123
Entrepreneur’s Housing Secured Assets n rk = 1.025
Dispersion of Entrepreneur Producitvity σσω 0.1596
CES across Retail Goods θ 6
CES across Labor Types θl 21
Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor νl 1
Labor’s Share in Goods Production 1−α 0.60
Labor’s Share in Housing Production 1−αh 0.70
Entrepreneur’s Share of Labor Input αE 0.01
Disutility of Goods Labor Supply ηl l̄ = 1
Disutility of Housing Labor Supply ηhl l̄
h/(l̄+ l̄h) = 0.065
Bank’s Liquidation Technology zr 1
Bank’s Monitoring Cost µ 0.1617
(a) Parameters which are defined by a given equality condition are adjusted to satisfy the
given condition at every iteration.
Along these same lines, the slopes of the price and wage Phillips curves are given by:
κπ =
θ−1
φ
κπW =
θl−1
φW
.
Therefore, the elasticity of substitution and the parameter governing the cost of price ad-
justment are not both identified. Thus, I estimate φ and φW while calibrating θ and θl.
More specifically, I set θ = 6 which implies a steady state mark-up of 20% on retail goods
and θl = 21 which implies a steady state mark-up of 5% on wages.
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As for the production technologies, I set α= 0.4 which implies labor’s share of income in the
goods producing sector is 60%. Following Iacoviello & Neri (2010), I set αh = 0.3. Finally,
as in Bernanke et al. (1999), I set αE = 0.01. The household’s preferences over labor are
specified so that the curvature on the disutility of labor, νl = 1. There are no natural units
of hours worked in the model. Hence, I normalize the steady state hours worked in the goods
producing sector to 1 and use the empirical fact that the average share of hours worked in
construction relative to all sectors is l̄h/(l̄h + l̄) = 0.065. This value is found in U.S. data
produced by the BLS. I adjust ηl and η
h
l so that the household’s preferences are consistent
with this steady state. As for the banking parameters, zr and χr are likely to be weakly
identified jointly. Therefore, I normalize zr = 1 and estimate χr.
5.3.2.2 Prior Specification
The remaining 38 parameters are estimated using Bayesian methods. Of these parameters, 24
govern of the persistence and standard deviation of the exogenous shock processes. Since the
central question of this paper is the relative importance of housing secured debt instruments
and therefore the importance of shocks which drive home prices and the business cycle,
I remain agnostic about the prior importance of all shocks. For all of these processes, I
specify a Beta prior on the auto-correlation terms with mean 0.8 and a standard deviation
of 0.1. For the standard deviation of the white noise shocks which drive the model, I take a
similar agnostic stand and specify and Inverse-Gamma prior with mean 0.001 and standard
deviation 0.01.
The 14 remaining parameters allow for considerably more information to be imparted into
the prior. Beginning with the costs of price and wage adjustment, there are wide ranging
estimates (see for example Keen & Wang (2007)). One obvious way to interpret the value is to
use the implied equivalence between the Calvo and Rotemberg approach to nominal rigidities.
In particular, the two approaches yield identical New-Keynesian Phillips Curves, when the
slope terms are calibrated so that: (1−ξ)(1−βξ)ξ =
θ−1
φ . This equality implies that for a given
probability of prices remaining fixed ξ ∈ [0,1], the corresponding cost of price adjustment φ
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lies in [0,∞). To keep the supports of the priors for φ and φW compact, I specify a Beta
prior for ξ and ξW and apply the above transformation to find the corresponding cost of
price and wage adjustment. The prior means are consistent with prices and wages remain
unchanged for on average 2 quarters and 4 quarters respectively.
The prior for the steady state fraction of liquid assets retained by entrepreneurs, γ, monitor-
ing costs µ, repossession cost χr and cross-sectional variance of productivity shocks across
entrepreneurs σω, are calibrated to match the following empirical facts (with all other pa-
rameters set to their prior mean): The average ratio of liquid assets to secured loans is equal
to 0.42, the average ratio of secured loans to all firm liabilities is 0.21, the average annual
business failure rate is 0.04 and residential investment’s share of GDP is 0.0541.5
The model is able to exactly match these facts and for this reason I calibrate µ= 0.1617 and
σω = 0.1596, which can be interpreted from the Bayesian perspective as specifying extremely
tight priors.6 For the remaining parameters, the implied values from this moments matching
exercise implies the following specifications of the prior distributions: γ is distributed as
a Beta with mean 0.9103 and standard deviation 0.10 and χr is distributed Log-Normally
with mean 0.3109 and standard deviation 0.10. Although many of these variables are used
as observables in the estimation, all of the data are demeaned. Hence, matching the model’s
steady state with these sample means does not contaminate the priors.
The remaining parameters do not determine any steady state outcomes. Therefore, I specify
rather loose priors for these parameters so that the econometrics specification has consider-
able flexibility to match the dynamics in the data. I specify the elasticity of the adjustment
cost function, χa, as a Log-Normal with mean 1.0 and standard deviation 1.0. Similarly,
the elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function χS , is specified as a Log-Normal with
mean 5.0 and standard deviation 5.0. Similarly, I set the prior for the price indexation, wage
5The housing preference shock’s mean ηh, is set so that p
n = 1 in steady state. This normalization is
necessary since n and pn are not separately identifiable given this information.
6Calibrating these parameters, as opposed to estimating them, also leads to a considerably more efficient
algorithm to solve for the model’s steady state. This therefore speeds-up the estimation significantly.
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indexation and habit parameters to Beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation
0.40.
Finally, regarding the specification of monetary policy, I set the priors for the parameters
ρr, φπ and ψg which allow for considerable smoothing but contemporaneous reactions to
inflation and real economic activity which are largely consistent with Taylor’s (1993) values.
In particular, I specify a Beta prior for ρr with mean 0.8 and standard deviation 0.1. Since
ψπ and ψg are assumed to be positive, I set Log-Normal priors with means 1.5 and 0.125
and standard deviations 0.05 and 0.01 respectively.
5.3.3 Empirical Results
Table 5.2: Model Parameters Priors and Posteriors - Economic Parameters
Prior Posterior
Parameter Name Parameter Prior Mean StDv Mode StDv
Policy Smoothing ρr Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9353 0.0016
Policy Weight on Inflation ψπ lnN 1.50 0.05 1.4095 0.0189
Policy Weight on Output Growth ψg lnN 0.125 0.01 0.1211 0.0022
Habit in Consumption ̺ Beta 0.50 0.40 0.6575 0.0255
Calvo Wage Stickiness ξW Beta 0.75 0.25 0.9620 0.0029
Wage Indexation ϕW Beta 0.50 0.40 0.0020 0.0050
Calvo Price Stickiness ξ Beta 0.50 0.25 0.6554 0.0139
Price Indexation ϕ Beta 0.50 0.40 0.0011 0.0214
Entrepreneur Wealth Transfer γ Beta 0.91 0.10 0.5932 0.0070
Curvature of Utilization Cost χa lnN 1.00 0.50 0.8205 0.2137
Curvature of Adjustment Cost χS lnN 5.00 1.00 5.6935 0.7182
Bank Liquidation Cost χr lnN 0.31 0.10 0.1782 0.0386
The parameters describing the preferences, price and wage setting, monetary policy and
adjustment costs are all quite standard. In particular, there is significant evidence the Federal
Reserve adjusts their policy rate slowly over time. In particular, the data suggests policy
changes are fully implemented after about 14 quarters. Meanwhile, the contemporaneous
responses to inflation and the real economy are in line with Taylor’s (1993) historical values.
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Since the prior distributions were centered at these values, it may seem the data can’t
clearly identify these parameters. However, the standard errors of the posterior estimates
are considerably smaller than the standard errors of the prior distributions - suggesting the
parameters are well identified. The point estimate of the consumption habit parameter is a
bit smaller than the value found in Smets & Wouters (2007), but still lies within their 95%
confidence region. Moreover, it is within one standard deviation of the estimates by Fuhrer
(2000).
There is considerable evidence in the data of nominal price and wage rigidities. Using the
mapping from the Rotemberg (1982) price/wage adjustment cost parameterization and the
Calvo (1983) parameterization, wages remain fixed for more than 6 years, while prices are
adjusted slightly more often than twice a year. There is very little evidence that these pricing
decisions are made with reference to previous wage/price inflation measures. This suggests
the Federal Reserve’s target rate of inflation plays an important role in goods and labor
market contracts. These extreme values for the parameters governing wage dynamics are
similar to the findings of Smets & Wouters (2007) when they specify less informative prior
distributions over the wage setting dynamics.7
The curvature of the investment adjustment cost function, χS , and the share of assets re-
tained by entrepreneurs, γ, are both significantly smaller than those found in Christiano
et al. (2013). The smaller value of the investment adjustment cost function is likely driven
by the differences between the foreclosure accelerator specified in this paper and the financial
accelerator embedded in Christiano et al. (2013). In the BGG financial accelerator model,
adverse economic shocks are propagated over time through adjustment costs. As borrowers
face higher margins between the return on their investment and the cost of external funds,
they scale down their investment projects. When changing investment is costly this reduction
in investment lowers the price of capital, which decreases the net worth of existing owners
of capital – the borrowers. This reduction in the borrower’s net worth further increases the
7See for example footnote (9) in their paper.
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margin between the return on their investment and the cost of external funds. This feedback
mechanism is the celebrated financial accelerator.
The exact strength of the financial accelerator depends critically on the curvature of the
adjustment cost function. If adjusting the rate of investment is costless, the financial ac-
celerator collapses into the model of Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997). The large value of χS
found by Christiano et al. (2013) suggests the financial accelerator plays an important role
in explaining business cycle dynamics. Does the smaller value found in this study contradict
this conclusion? No, because the financial accelerator is augmented in this model with the
foreclosure accelerator.
Although the value of the capital stock plays some role in determining the net-worth of the
entrepreneurs, in the foreclosure accelerator so too does the value of housing-secured assets.
When an adverse shock occurs which elicits a drop in pnt , borrowers can not issue as much
housing-secured debt and instead must rely on costly unsecured external financing. This
leads to higher default rates on unsecured loans (due to the unfavorable loan terms) which
ultimately leads the borrower to default on their secured debt, forcing the bank to liquidate
the collateral backing the secured debt. This liquidation occurs on the housing market,
which further drops home prices, leading to less secured debt relative to unsecured debt.
This feeback mechanism differs from the financial accelerator in that is does not require
falling capital values. Thus, the smaller value of χS found in this study does not contradict
the importance of financial frictions in propagating business cycles. Instead, the smaller
adjustment cost function curvature combined with the smaller value of γ simply suggests
the foreclosure accelerator and the financial accelerator both play a prominent role in driving
the business cycle.
Table (5.3) describes the prior and posterior distributions for the 13 exogenous shock pro-
cesses which drive the model. Consistent with the findings of Ireland (2004a), the neutral
technology shock is by far the most persistent disturbance. Mark-up shocks, housing and
investment-specific technology disturbances and the bank liquidation shocks also show con-
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Table 5.3: Model Parameters Priors and Posteriors - Shocks
Prior Posterior
Parameter Name Parameter Prior Mean StDv Mode StDv
Policy σr IG 0.001 0.01 0.0018 0.0001
Policy News ρr,4 Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9486 0.0088
σr,4 IG 0.001 0.01 0.0006 0.0001
Consumption Preference ρηc Beta 0.80 0.10 0.5250 0.0061
σηc IG 0.001 0.01 0.0182 0.0010
Housing Demand ρηh Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9457 0.0087
σηh IG 0.001 0.01 0.0804 0.0135
Consumption Labor Supply ρηl Beta 0.80 0.10 0.5353 0.0131
σηl IG 0.001 0.01 0.2095 0.0301
Housing Labor Supply ρηh
l
Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7276 0.0194
Mark-Up ρθ Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9715 0.0032
σθ IG 0.001 0.01 0.0390 0.0006
Bank Liquidtion ρχr Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9563 0.0025
σχr IG 0.001 0.01 1.9043 0.4707
Risk ρσω Beta 0.80 0.10 0.7576 0.0193
σσω IG 0.001 0.01 0.0176 0.0008
Neutral Technology ρz Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9872 0.0171
σz IG 0.001 0.01 0.0060 0.0002
Housing Technology ρzh Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9633 0.0131
σzh IG 0.001 0.01 0.0082 0.0002
Invesment-Specific Technology ρzi Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9616 0.0090
σzi IG 0.001 0.01 0.0043 0.0001
Investment-Efficiency Technology ρzk Beta 0.80 0.10 0.9349 0.0063
σzk IG 0.001 0.01 0.0023 0.0004
siderable persistence. Interestingly, the risk shock shows considerably less serial correlation
than that found in Christiano et al. (2013). Moreover, the estimated standard deviations
of the risk shock are considerably smaller than those of the bank liquidation and housing-
demand disturbances. Of course, size of the standard deviations do not necessarily correlate
to the relative importance of these shocks in explaining business cycle fluctuations. To
analyze this question, I turn to impulse response functions, historical decompositions and
forecast-error variance decompositions.
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5.4 Dissecting the Great Recession
Interest in understanding the source of business cycles has significantly increased since the
Great Recession. Much of this interest is due to the desire to explain why the recent recession
was more severe and prolonged than all of the other postwar recessions. This has led to a
horse-race of sorts. Dating back to Kydland & Prescott (1982), technology shocks have been
an elegant and simple explanation of business cycles. However, the relative importance of
total factor productivity in explaining output at business cycle frequencies has declined in
the New-Keynesian framework (see for example Ireland (2004b); Smets & Wouters (2007)).
This has led to a resurgence in developing concise explanations of business cycles.
In a series of papers, Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio Primiceri and Andrea Tambalotti (JPT)
have introduced various investment specific technology shocks into otherwise standard medium
scale DSGE models. These shocks impact either the rate at which consumption goods can
be transformed into investment goods (2010) or the rate at which investment goods can
be transformed into installed, usable capital (2011). Very similar in spirit to Kydland &
Prescott (1982), JPT find simple and elegant explanations of the business cycle in each
paper.
In JPT (2010), they find that when a medium-scale DSGE model with investment-specific
technology (IST) shocks is confronted with the data, these IST shocks explain the majority
of the variation in output. However, the estimation strategy employed implies these shocks
are unconstrained. However, variations in the IST process have direct implications for the
price of investment goods relative to consumption goods. In other words, the real price of
investment goods can be brought to bear on the estimation to discipline the exogenous IST
process. This is precisely the exercise performed in JPT (2011). However, the authors add
another shock which directly impacts the rate at which the investment good can be trans-
formed into installed capital (these are called Marginal Efficiency of Investment shocks, or
MEI). Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that once the real price of investment disciplines the
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IST shocks, the MEI shocks take-over in importance in explaining business cycles. More-
over, JPT (2011) point out that these shocks are highly correlated with interest-rate spreads,
suggesting they serve as a plausible explanation of the financially driven Great Recession .
Given that the transformation of goods into installed capital occurs in frictionless markets
in JPT’s papers, the resulting shocks which drive the business cycle are likely proxying for a
more fundamental friction which inhibits the rate at which entrepreneurs (those who demand
capital/investment goods) can transform consumption goods into inputs for production. In-
terestingly the financial accelerator literature, and more specifically the work of Carlstrom &
Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999), provides an endogenous
explanation for why the process of transforming savings into investment may be impaired.
Christiano et al. (2013) subsequently embed the Bernanke et al. (1999) financial friction into
a medium-scale DSGE model. The resulting model leads to a novel explanation of business
cycles - risk shocks.
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Figure 5.2: Illustrating risk shocks. The shaded gray area denotes the probability
of default, or mathematically
´ ω̄t+1
0 f(ωt+1)dωt+1 = Ft(ω̄t+1).
Risk shocks are represented in this model, as in CMR, by the exogenous process for σωt . For
a concrete example, suppose there is an increase in σωt to σ̂
ω
t > σ
ω
t . This increase the cross-
sectional dispersion of the idiosyncratic productivity values across the j entrepreneurs, ωjt+1.
As shown in Figure (5.2), this can be represented graphically by a “flattening-out” of the
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distribution of potential ωt+1 draws from which each entrepreneur j receives their produc-
tivity value. What this means for the entrepreneur is that for a given threshold productivity
value ω̄t+1 there is now a greater probability the entrepreneur will receive a productivity
draw ωt+1 < ω̄t+1. More simply, the default probability increases since F̂t(ω̄t+1)> Ft(ω̄t+1).
Since default is costly due to the costly-state verification the interest rate the bank charges
on unsecured external financing increases to cover the expected higher cost. This induces
the entrepreneur to decrease their borrowing of external funds, leading credit to contract.
The combination of increasing finance premiums, falling credit and ultimately falling output
make risk shocks a prime candidate to explain business cycles. In fact, the inclusion of
finance premiums and credit in the estimation is precisely why CMR find that risk shocks
explain the bulk of the movement in output at business cycle frequencies. They show this
by estimating the model without these financial market variables and find that JPT’s MEI
shocks explain the majority of business cycle movements. The model presented in this paper,
and the foreclosure accelerator mechanism in particular, provides an alternative framework
(which nests these previous models as special cases) to examine the source of business cycle
movements. In contrast to these previous estimation results, I find that home prices play a
significant role in explaining the behavior of finance premiums, credit and output. However,
the debt-contract allows for neutral technology shocks explain the majority of the movements
in GDP without implying empirically inconsistent relationships between financial variables.
Finally, in contrast to CMR (2013), risk shocks play virtually no role in driving real variables
and only explain the high frequency movements in finance premiums.
5.4.1 What are plausible sources of business cycles?
In what follows, I present impulse response functions from the model estimated in this paper,
the model estimated in CMR (2013) and variations of these two models to gain some intuition
for the different econometric conclusions reached in this paper.
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Risk shocks
Figure (5.3) displays the response of output, home prices, finance premiums and various
forms of credit to a contractionary risk shock as illustrated in Figure (5.2). As noted in CMR
(2013), an exogenous increase in risk causes output and credit to fall, and finance premiums
rise. These qualitative features are robust across both models. However, examining the
behavior of home prices, qualitative differences emerge between these various models. In
particular, home prices increase following this increase in risk.
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Figure 5.3: Impulse Responses to a Contractionary Risk Shock
To highlight the implausible relationship between home prices and finance premiums implied
by the CMR (2013) model, consider for a moments the correlations between home prices and
finance premiums when the models are only driven by risk shocks. The CMR model predicts
the correlation between home prices and the external finance premium is 10% if χS = 10.78
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and rises to 28% when χS = 5.69. The value in the data over the sample period is 21% and
falls to -61% when computed since 2000. The value in the model estimated in this paper is
-39%. Thus, once home prices are included in the estimation, it seems that risk shocks can
no longer be the primary driver of finance premiums in the CMR model.
Neutral technology shocks
Figure (5.4) displays the response of output, home prices, finance premiums and various
forms of credit to a contractionary TFP technology shock. As expected, a drop in TFP
causes GDP to fall, along with home prices and credit in all models. However, the behavior
of finance premiums is qualitatively different across models, especially across CMR’s model
with alternative values of the curvature of the investment adjustment cost function.
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Figure 5.4: Impulse Responses to a Contractionary Technology Shock
On impact, finance premiums rise across all model specifications. However, in the CMR
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model, the lower level of aggregate technology induces borrowers to scale down their invest-
ment projects. This decrease in the leverage position of borrowers, all other things equal,
leads to lower finance premiums. When investment adjustment costs are large, scaling down
the investment project leads to a drop in the price of capital, which ultimately decreases the
borrowers net worth, leading to higher finance premiums. In the foreclosure accelerator the
drop in technology lowers income which decreases the demand for housing, leading to a drop
in home prices. This decreases the amount of secured credit which borrowers can issue. This
alone is sufficient to drive up finance premiums regardless of the curvature of the investment
adjustment cost function in the model presented in this paper.
Housing demand shocks
Figure (5.5) displays the response of output, home prices, finance premiums and various
forms of credit to a contractionary housing demand shock. Although the exogenous process
driving housing demand disturbance is identical in all models, there is a considerable amount
of endogenous amplification and persistence in the model presented in this paper relative
to the CMR models. In particular, the drop in home prices leads to an immediate rise in
the finance premium. Through the foreclosure accelerator, this leads to more defaults on
secured loans, for which the collateral is liquidated as housing. This further drowns down
home prices in a feedback loop which leads to a large and considerable fall in output.
The CMR model predicts that a drop in home prices actually decreases finance premiums.
This reaction is qualitatively robust to moderate and large investment adjustment cost elas-
ticities. Once again, this response implies a counter-factual correlations between home prices,
GDP and finance premiums. In summary, housing demand shocks don’t provide a plausible
explanation of business cycles through the lens of the CMR model since they fail to capture
the observed relationship between finance premiums and home prices. Conversely, in the
model presented in this paper, housing demand shocks have features consistent with the
Great Recession whereby a drop in home prices leads to a large prolonged recession.
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Figure 5.5: IRFs to a Contractionary Housing Demand Shock
5.4.2 What drives credit and output?
The 2008 financial crisis and resulting recession are intimately linked. The typical narrative
rests on interrelated credit and housing booms which fueled one another. As borrowers
received more favorable loan terms, housing prices continued to rise. While, at the same time,
increasing home prices allowed intermediaries to issue debt secured by the very assets they
were purchasing/providing - mortgage backed securities. This relationship led to increasing
GDP and lower than average home-default rates which put more pressure on home prices
to rise. Beginning to disentangle these rich feedback effects call for first understanding
which shocks can produce the relationships observed between output, home prices, finance
premiums and credit over the last decade.
Figure (5.6) reports historical decompositions from the estimated model. Interestingly, risk
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Figure 5.6: Historical Decompositions: The solid line denotes the actual data which
is reproduced when all shocks are activated. The dashed line denotes the counter-
factual time series of each variable when driven by each shock denoted by the
subcaption.
shocks fail to generate any significant movement of real output and home prices. Moreover,
the generated time series are negatively correlated with the actual time series: -10% for
GDP and -16% for real home price. However, the counterfactual risk shocks time-series does
reproduce some of the high frequency movements in the external finance premiums. that
being said, it clearly misses the lower frequency movements in the finance premiums. For
example, the historically low finance premiums from 2005-2007 were clearly driven by factors
other than risk shocks.
One leading candidate for the exceptionally low and ultimate rise in finance premiums are
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housing demand shocks. These shocks reproduce the majority of the movements in real home
prices. More concretely, the resulting series are 99% correlated. Given the role played by
housing secured-debt in this foreclosure accelerator model, it is therefore not surprising that
by capturing the rise and fall in home prices housing demand shocks are able to capture the
opposite behavior of finance premiums. Therefore, the low frequency movements in finance
premiums are driven by home prices and ultimately the housing demand shocks which drive
the price of housing. This is further confirmed by the forecast-error variance decompositions
in Table (5.4).
Table 5.4: Forecast Error Variance Decompostions
Horizon GDP EFP Home Prices Credit
(Quarters) εσ
ω
εz εη
h
εσ
ω
εz εη
h
εσ
ω
εz εη
h
εσ
ω
εz εη
h
1 0 50 17 45 11 16 0 19 56 1 30 14
2 0 55 12 40 11 25 0 21 57 2 31 13
3 0 58 10 35 11 34 0 21 61 2 32 13
4 0 60 11 30 11 41 0 20 65 2 33 14
8 0 63 12 19 10 60 0 20 73 1 38 24
20 0 66 13 9 7 78 1 30 64 1 41 28
The procyclical relationship between residential investment and home prices provides a clear
understanding as to why housing demand shocks generate a GDP time series which is 86%
percent correlated with actual GDP. However, these shocks fail to capture the quantitative
behavior of real output. Instead, Figure (5.6) shows that technology shocks play a critical
role in understanding the sharp drop in output in 2009.
The impulse response functions in Figure (5.4) show that unlike the CMR (2013) model,
the foreclosure accelerator model can generate a drop in output via a productivity shock
without decreasing finance premiums. This difference, along with the counterfactual rise in
home prices which accompanies risk shocks, is the primary reason why technology shocks
play an important role in driving output in this model and risk shocks play that role in the
CMR (2013) model. The time series produced by technology shocks also boasts the highest
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correlation with credit at 60%. The housing demand series is not far behind at 48% while
the risk shocks time series of credit is only 23% correlated with the actual time series of
credit.
5.4.3 Was the Great Recession the efficient response to technology
shocks?
The above findings suggest that technology shocks played a significant role in shaping the
path of output and credit in the wake of the great recession. In the spirit of Kydland &
Prescott (1982), this calls into question the extent to which countercyclical policy was nec-
essary in response to the recent recession. To assess the extent to which the fall in output
was ‘inefficient,’ and hence should be offset by policy makers, I compute the financial fric-
tions output gap. More specifically, I feed the filtered technology shocks through the model
presented in this paper and an identical model without financial frictions. The frictionless
model is identical, except the entrepreneur’s first order condition is replaced by a typical
Euler equation for capital. I then compute the difference between GDP in the full model
and the frictionless model - the financial frictions output gap.
Figure (5.7) illustrates the results of this exercise which are also repeated by feeding all
non-financial shocks through each model so that the number of shocks is always identical in
both models. Two immediate conclusions emerge from this exercise. First, the majority of
the fall in the output gap at the onset of the recession was due to technology shocks. Second,
the adverse technology shocks are primarily transferred through the financial sector, which
results in a large negative output gap, even when technology shocks are the only source of
the business cycle. Thus, the endogenous financial frictions, amplify and propagated the
downturn, therefore justifying considerable intervention into financial markets to limit the
inefficiencies associated with the recession.
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Figure 5.7: Historical Decompositions: The solid line denotes the actual data. The
dashed line denotes the counterfactual difference between GDP in a model with
and without financial frictions. The dashed line denotes the same difference when
each economy is only driven by technology shocks.
5.4.4 Was loose monetary policy to blame for the housing boom?
In a search for better understanding what caused the 2008 financial crisis, some have blamed
the Federal Reserve for keeping interest rates too low for too long in the years preceding the
crisis. For example, John Taylor provided testimony to congress in March of 2012 to this
extent. During his testimony, Taylor (2012a) cited loose policy as a primary cause of most
recent business cycle:
In 2003-2005 the Federal Reserve deviated from the policies it followed in most
of the 1980s and 1990s by holding interest rates too low for too long and thereby
setting off excesses in housing and other markets which helped bring on the most
recent boom and bust.
Examining historical decompositions provides a unique opportunity to perform a counterfac-
tual experiment to examine the empirical support for this critique of Federal Reserve policy.
Figure (5.8) illustrates the results of an experiment where I first produce the time series
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Figure 5.8: Historical Decompositions: The solid line denotes the actual data which
is reproduced when all shocks are activated. The dashed line denotes the counter-
factual time series of each variable when driven by housing demand disturbances.
The dotted line denotes the counterfactual time series of each variable with housing
demand and expansionary monetary policy shocks
of several variables assuming the economy is only driven by housing demand shocks. these
shocks are the primary driver of home prices which, according to Taylor’s (2012b) critique,
the Fed failed to appropriately contain. Interestingly, the path of interest rates during the
2003-2005 period Taylor (2012a) cites features policy rates on the estimated Taylor rule
above the observed Fed Funds rate.
To precisely understand the extent to which these deviations from the Taylor rule led to a
larger housing bubble, I then consider another counterfactual experiment in which the Taylor
rule is perturbed by expansionary monetary policy shocks from 2003-2005 which reproduce
the observed path of the Fed Funds rate. The resulting path of ‘easy money’ policy rates
yields marginally higher levels of output and credit than otherwise would have occurred
under the Taylor rule. However, the overall impact on home prices, finance premiums and
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secured lending is negligible. In summary, tighter money policies from 2003-2005 could not
have prevented the forthcoming financial crisis and recession. Instead, the ensuing credit
crunch was driven by a collapse in home prices which greatly reduced the share of secured
lending causing finance premiums on unsecured debt to soar.
5.4.5 How contractionary is the zero lower bound?
In addition to deviations from Taylor’s (1993) rule in the years leading up to the Great
Recession, there were large deviations from Taylor’s rule in the following years. However,
instead of policy being too loose, these deviations were contractionary in nature and driven
by the lower bound of zero on nominal interest rates, not discretion. To assess the extent to
which the zero lower bound constrained monetary policy makers in the wake of the Great
Recession, I again turn to historical decompositions. In this exercise I consider aggregate
demand disturbances in general, which includes shocks to preferences over housing and pref-
erences over consumption goods. This model verifies the findings in the nonlinear analysis
in Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2012) that preference shocks are likely to push the economy
to the zero lower bound.
Figure (5.9) displays model simulations when the only driving shocks are the aggregate
demand disturbances. The first observation is how remarkably similar the counterfactual
path of policy rates looks to the effective federal funds rate, at least until 2008. At the point
where the implied level of the gross nominal interest rate is one, the zero lower bound binds
which prevents policy makers from further accommodation. What is especially revealing
about the time series which satisfy the zero lower bound is the additional contraction.
GDP reacts to the the implicit monetary tightening inherent in the zero lower bound by
contracting sharply. The inclusion of the zero lower bound also allows for preference shocks
to account for the spike in the external finance premium. This ultimately leads to a larger
contraction in credit, which brings the counterfactual time series closer in line with the ob-
served behavior of credit. In all, the zero lower bound appears to have played a significant
role in explaining the sharp contraction in output, increase in finance premiums and drop
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Figure 5.9: Historical Decompositions: The solid line denotes the actual data which
is reproduced when all shocks are activated. The dashed line denotes the counter-
factual time series of each variable when driven by housing/consumption demand
disturbances. The dotted line is the same time series when the ZLB binds.
in credit. Risk shocks are noticeably absent from this explanation as they don’t drive the
economy to the zero lower bound. Figure (5.6) reveals that risk shocks were actually expan-
sionary from 2009 onwards. As counter-intuitive as this seems, it is likely the result of the
unconventional policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve and the TARP equity injections
which decreased systemic risk by stabilizing large financial firms.
5.5 Conclusion
Despite the fact that most narratives of the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession
feature housing markets and secured debt markets, current equilibrium models don’t typically
feature both (and often feature neither) markets. The implication is a large gap between
the narrative description of the worst postwar recession and the sources of the downturn
attributed by structural equilibrium models. This paper bridges that gap. By including
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integrated housing and financial markets in an otherwise standard medium scale DSGE
model, I provide an interpretation of the last decade that is more consistent with the casual
observation that housing and debt markets are highly integrated.
Unlike the recent findings of Christiano et al. (2013), I find that risk shocks account for es-
sentially none of the variation in real GDP. These shocks essentially capture high frequency
movements in finance premiums but otherwise have little predictive power regarding out-
put, home prices, finance premiums and credit. Instead, housing demand and total factor
productivity disturbances explain the bulk of the variation of housing, financial and goods
markets. This is due in large part to the novel debt contract which augments the finan-
cial accelerator with a foreclosure accelerator mechanism. This framework is better suited
to capture the observed relationships between home prices, finance premiums and output.
Although technology shocks in frictionless models imply there is no role for countercyclical
policy, I show the endogenous behavior of the modeled financial frictions played a significant
role in transmitting the technology shocks to the broader economy. The implication being
that countercyclical policy, especially intervention into financial markets, is well justified.
Along these same policy lines, I find the claim that the Federal Reserve kept interest rate
too low for too long and fueled the housing bubble has little empirical footing. Instead,
the housing expansion was largely driven by the interaction of exogenous housing demand
disturbances and the foreclosure accelerator mechanism. Counterfactual simulations show
that tighter monetary policy would have had a marginal effect on most variables. Conversely,
the deviations from the interest rate rule following the Great Recession played a significant
role in the large contraction of output and the spike in finance premiums in 2008-2009.
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5.A Appendix: The Stationary, Non-Linear Model
This section presents the system of N non-linear equations in N variables which defines the
model economy. All nominal variables inherit a unit root from the conduct of monetary
policy which induces a non-stationary price level through inflation targeting.
5.A.1 Household
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5.A.2 The Financial Sector
Et
{
Mt|t+1
rdt
πt+1
pnt
}
= Et
{
Mt|t+1
(
pHt+1z
r −χr
)}
(5.A.9)
dt = bt+p
n
t n̄ (5.A.10)
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5.A.4 Relevant Distributions for the Entrepreneurs
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5.A.5 The Wholesale Goods Producers
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5.A.6 Retail Goods Producers
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5.A.7 New Housing Production
hnewt = z
h
t (l
h
t )
(1−αh) (5.A.31)
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5.A.8 Investment Goods Production
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1
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5.A.9 Capital Goods Production
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5.A.10 Monetary Policy
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5.A.11 Market Clearing
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5.A.12 Exogenous Shocks
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